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
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JAINA PSYCHOLOGY

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

OUTLINES OF JAINA PHILOSOPHY

OUTLINES OF KARMA IN JAINISM

JAINA PSYCHOLOGY

A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE JAINA DOCTRINE OF KARMA

By

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With a Foreword

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1955

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DEDICATED TO
MY REVERED TEACHERS
DOCTOR CHANDRA DHAR SHARMA
AND
PANDIT DALSUKH MALVANIA
WITH ESTEEM AND AFFECTION

FOREWORD

I am glad to write this Foreword to the Book on "Jaina Psychology" written by Dr. Mohan Lal Mehta. With the advent of freedom there has been an increasing awareness of the treasures of Indian thought. And it is a blessing that these precious gems are multi-faceted and multi-coloured. The Jaina school of thought known to early Buddhists as the Nigantha, and for long celebrated as the foremost deviant from Vedic orthodoxy, is a collection of profound speculations—philosophical and psychological which are relevant in the context of modern life.

It is with justification that Pārśva (d. 772 B.C.), the historical founder of Jainism, was known to his contemporaries as the "people's favourite" (purisādāpiya). There is something in Jainism that directly appeals to our finer feelings and commands respect. Jainism did not, like Buddhism, develop into a world religion; but unlike Buddhism, it has been a living force in India. It has, during its history, exhibited a strange but gentle tenacity as well as adaptability. Although initially it denied Vedic authority and pursued a course of development in line with the Sāṃkhya and Buddhism, its basic postulates underwent many modifications, owing to their constant contact with the Vedic doctrines.

Comparative freedom from theistic assumptions has enabled the Jaina thinkers boldly to speculate on human nature—of particular interest to those thinkers are the problems concerning the process of experience, nature of emotions and the methods of their control. With man as the frame of reference, they have raised an imposing edifice. The canonical *Siddhānta* with its 48 books in Ardhamāgadhī, and the post-canonical works in Jaina-mahārāṣṭrī and Samskrit are a rich store house of Jaina thought. The sayings of great thinkers like Bhadrabāhu, Umāsvāti Kundakunda, Haribhadra, and Hemacandra are of great value. The Jaina contribution to mediaeval Indian logic is well-known. This phase of intellectual activity which began probably in the beginning of the third century B.C. has been active until recently. In the 17th century, for instance, Yaśovijaya wrote *Adhyātmapariṣā*. The philosophical aspects of Jainism have attracted some attention. But Jainism, like Buddhism, is pragmatic in intent, and psychological in approach. This aspect, however, has not attracted the attention it merits.

Umāsvāti (Circa 135-219 A.D.) is the author of a "Manual for the understanding of the True Nature of Things" (*Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*) which even now is studied by the Jaina monks. In this work we have valuable material concerning Psychology, Logic and Ethics. Nemicaṇḍa's *Gommaṣāsāra* (c. 980 A.D.) contains interesting psychological speculations in Chapter IX (Section on Soul, *Jivahānda*). Śāntisūri's *Jivavicāra* (1038) is similarly interesting for a student of Psychology. The passage from the school of Makkhali Gośāla to that of Mahavira Vardhamāna (Nigantha Nātaputta of the Buddhists) marks the transition from the biological standpoint to the psychological. The trend reaches its culmination in the

Abhidhamma philosophy of the Buddhists. Thus the Jaina psychology should mark an important stage in the evolution of Indian thought.

Students of modern Psychology know that the Science of Psychology as understood in the West has reached an impasse. There is need to examine the ways of thinking as well as the thoughts themselves of the ancient Indian thinkers, in order to find out their utility and application to our own times. Scholars trained in modern subjects must look back to the contributions of our ancestors. The significance of their suggestions to the present state of our knowledge must properly be assessed. The old thoughts must be integrated into the new frames of reference. That such an endeavour is necessary needs hardly any argument, for all knowledge must progress as a composite unity.

Thus a book like this will serve an urgent and relevant need. It brings together all available and pertinent pieces of information concerning psychological problems, in so far as they belong to the Jaina school. The author, Shri Mohan Lal Mehta, Śāstrācārya, has already made his name as a keen and discerning student of Jainism. His earlier volume, *Outlines of Jaina Philosophy*, was an important contribution to studies on Indian philosophy in recent times. It was well received as a scholarly tract. And he has now brought out another equally valuable treatise of Jaina Psychology. There is no doubt that it will throw much light on this important but hitherto rather obscure subject. I hope Shri Mehta's efforts will be the harbinger of greater scholarly labour in this direction. The field is fertile, but unexplored. This book may perhaps be both an invitation and a fulfilment.

25th December 1956
ALL-INDIA INSTITUTE OF
MENTAL HEALTH,
BANGALORE 2

M. V. GOVINDASWAMY
Director

PUBLISHERS' NOTE

Shri Parshvanath Vidyashram, Banaras, is a research institute. It is interested in Jainology, an important part of Indology, in all its branches for comparative study of them. It was founded in 1937 by Shri Sohanlal Jain Dharma Pracharak Samiti, Amritsar. From the beginning the Vidyashram had the fortune of being guided by Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi, then holding the chair of Jainism at the Banaras Hindu University and his able successor in office, Pandit Dalsukhbhai Malvania, of the Oriental College there. Under their care and affection it has grown and expanded its activities.

A number of scholars have worked at the Vidyashram and been awarded Doctorate of Philosophy by the Hindu University. Of these Dr. Mohan Lal Mehta, the author of this book, is one. He was a Rattan Chand Memorial Research Fellow. This fellowship has been provided by the brothers and sons of the late Shri Rattan Chand. Dr. Mehta has been connected with the scheme of studies of the Vidyashram from the beginning of his educational career at Banaras which covers a period of ten years. His work has always been attended with capability and diligence.

The present book represents his thesis on the psychological interpretation of the Jain doctrine of Karma. The Karma theory of Jain philosophy is not only interesting but is also of profound psychological significance. To Jainism psychological attitude of mind and motive of one's action have been of the basic value and an approach for correct governance of the relation between man and man, man and beast and other lower beings of the smallest life. Wanton life it discourages. A properly balanced and ordered life leading to the happiness of everyone concerned is its aim. In living such a life '*Sanyama*' plays an important role and this book attempts to unfold the why and wherefore of the same.

To borrow from the report of the examiners of the thesis, "the present work which is the first of its kind in Jainology, is a valuable contribution to Jain psychology in particular and to Indian psychology in general." It compares and contrasts the Jain view with the speculations of other Schools of Indian thought and also with the investigations of modern Western psychology. The author has not merely expounded Jain views but also at some places reinterpreted and reconstructed them. His treatment is thought provoking.

The Samiti has aimed at publishing the results of the research work done by its scholars at the Vidyashram. A publication fund of Rs. 10,000/- was sometimes ago provided by Messrs. Rattan Chand Harjas Rai and Muni Lal Moti Lal of Amritsar, from the Dharmartha fund. The publication of other theses will come in due course.

The Samiti has a scheme of preparation of basic Jain Literature which may guide and help in the study of Jain contribution to Indian and world

culture. The vast material has hitherto quite been neglected by Jain as well as other scholars here in India and abroad.

A scheme (Yojana) of Jain Sahitya Nirmana has been formulated. A survey of the entire Jain Literature for the last 2,500 years contributed by Jains in Prakrit, Sanskrit, Apbhramsa, Hindi, Gujarati, Rajasthani, Kannada and Tamil will be recorded in the History of Jain Literature. The work is under preparation for the last three years and will cover four volumes of 3,000 royal octavo pages. It will be published in Hindi. It is hoped that the first part covering about 1,500 pages dealing with the Agamic Literature will go to the press by the beginning of 1957.

In its wake will come a History of the Development of Jain Philosophical Thought, a Dictionary of the Proper Names of Jain Literature and a Dictionary of Jain Philosophical Terms. The matter of the development of Jain cultural thoughts is being and will be attended to by several research scholars like the present.

In the end the Publishers thank the Press and the Secretary of the Jain Mission Society of Bangalore where this book has been printed for helping in the due publication of this work. It is hoped that the public and scholarly interest may be stimulated towards greater study of Jainology.

Amritsar
2nd November, 1956

PUBLISHERS

PREFACE

My aim in preparing the present treatise has been to make an humble contribution to one of the most significant systems of Indian thought, *vis.*, Jainism. Like other thinkers of India the Jaina philosophers have also contributed to the field of Indian psychology. One remarkable thing in this connection is that the Jaina thinkers have developed their psychological investigations on the foundations of the Doctrine of Karma. Since the whole of our life-structure is based upon the working of karma, it is natural to seek the analysis and explanation of all our intellectual and motor activities through the assistance of karma. The Doctrine of Karma holds that every activity whether it be physical or mental produces, besides its perceptible consequence, also an imperceptible effect which is known as karma. In other words, every action generates certain potential energies which on passing a certain length of period change themselves into actual effects. This fact is not confined to the present life of a being. The effect may also appear in life after death. Moreover, it is the force of karmic particles that destines the state after death. The circle of birth and death is, however, a beginningless fact, and hence, it requires no explanation.

The Jaina account of the Doctrine of Karma is too vast to be adequately analysed in a single treatise. Bearing this fact in mind I have restricted myself to the psychological analysis of some of the salient features of the Jaina Doctrine of Karma. It is altogether a new attempt in this direction, and consequently, it is not an impossibility to present some of the remarks in an undesirable manner. It is also possible that I might have represented some of the Jaina tenets incorrectly. Despite these and such other defects I can humbly claim that the whole account has been prepared with an honest and faithful motive. It has been my aim to construct some of the fundamentals of psychology on the foundations of the Jaina Doctrine of Karma and to present the account in such a manner as to make the presentation interesting and intelligible to the reader who seeks to know what the Jaina thinkers tell about the nature of human mind, knowledge and its origination, feeling and emotion, activity and its control, and the like. An attempt has also been made to critically compare the Jaina analysis of different psychological problems with the investigations of modern Western psychology and the speculations of other schools of Indian philosophy where possible. It is not within my jurisdiction to declare how far I have been successful in performing this task. I need not state that the account is mostly based upon the original Prakrit and Sanskrit texts.

The treatise is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter is devoted to the study of the essentials of the Jaina Doctrine of Karma. With a preliminary background of the significance of the Doctrine of Karma in the philosophical systems of India, the Jaina conception of karma is briefly recorded. The second chapter deals with the problem of the nature of consciousness, its relation with the self, and its manifestation in the form of knowledge. Two varieties of cognition, *vis.*, apprehension (*darsana*) and comprehension (*jñāna*) which are generally called indeterminate

knowledge (*nirvikalpaka jñāna*) and determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka jñāna*) are thoroughly discussed in this chapter. With regard to temporal relation between the apprehension and comprehension of an omniscient person, I have supported the view of Siddhasena who holds that the knowledge of the omniscient is a complex of apprehension and comprehension in which both of them lose their separate identity as well as temporal distinction and form a unique pattern which possesses the characters of both. In the third chapter I have given an estimate of sensory and mental comprehension which the Jaina thinkers have elaborately discussed in the shape of *mati-jñāna* and *śruta-jñāna*. In the first part the nature and functions of different sense-organs and mind have been taken into account. In the second part I have tried to give an exhaustive account of the categories of non-verbal comprehension (*mati-jñāna*). It consists in the Jaina treatment of sensation, perception, retention, recollection, recognition, reasoning, etc. The third part of this chapter has been devoted to verbal comprehension (*śruta-jñāna*). In the fourth chapter I have dealt with an interesting problem in the field of psychology. This is the problem of what the parapsychologists call Extra-Sensory Perception. I have compared the Jaina account of *avadhi* and *manahparyaya-jñāna* with that of Clairvoyance and Telepathy of parapsychology and given their full description from the Jaina point of view. The problem of Omniscience is also discussed briefly. The fifth chapter is devoted to the analysis of sense-feeling and emotion from the Jaina standpoint. The Jaina account of sense-feeling and emotion is a very significant contribution to Indian psychology. In the beginning of the chapter I have advanced some arguments to refute the Jaina belief that holds that the omniscient also possesses sensory feelings, even though he is not in possession of sensory perception. In my opinion, the omniscient who is free from all emotion cannot have any feeling of pleasure and pain. Unlike Schopenhauer, the Jaina regards both pleasure and pain to be positively real. The Jaina further holds that there is neither a neutral feeling nor a mixed feeling. As regards emotions, they are of two varieties according to him: strong emotions and mild emotions. The nature of both these varieties is fully recorded in this chapter. The Jaina view of sex-drive is briefly compared with some important conclusions of modern psychologists. With respect to the Jaina view of the co-existence of various emotions, I have expressed my disagreement with it. The sixth chapter is on activity and its control. In the first part the Jaina conception of mental, vocal, and physical activities is reproduced with some critical remarks here and there. The second part deals with the Jaina account of self-control. All the essential conditions and means recognised by the Jaina thinkers for the successful control, regulation, and cessation of mental, vocal, and physical activities are thoroughly discussed. The Jaina account is compared with that of the Buddhist and of the Yoga. Regarding the rôle of physical austerity some mystics' opinions have also been quoted. I have given a brief account of transmigration, progression and retrogression, beings and their different states and classes, and the like in the seventh chapter. The last chapter is in the shape of conclusion and recapitulation of the entire treatise.

It is evident from the contents of the treatise what an enormous contribution the Jaina thinkers have made in the field of Indian psychology. I am sure this work will give a glimpse of the vast material available in the Jaina works on karma and other subjects. I have been very careful in selecting the technical terms. I did not hesitate even in coining some of them, since the present work is, if I may not be accused of vanity, the first of its kind in the field of Jainology.

The credit for the success I could achieve in preparing this volume goes to my revered teachers Dr. Chandra Dhar Sharma, M.A., D.Phil., D.Litt., LL.B., Sāhityācārya, Sāhityaratna, of the Department of Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University, in whose loving and scholarly guidance I worked for a considerable period and Pt. Dalsukh Malvania, Lecturer in Jaina Philosophy in the Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya, Banaras Hindu University, from whom I received constant light and unfailing inspiration during the period of the composition of the treatise. I am very much grateful to Dr. Satkari Mookerjee, Dr. Nathmal Tatia, Prof. J. N. Sinha, Dr. Glasenapp, and others whose works I have profusely utilized in preparing the present work. My thanks are also due to the author of the Foreword, Dr. M. V. Govindaswamy, Director, All-India Institute of Mental Health, Bangalore. I cannot find suitable language to express my deep gratefulness and sincere indebtedness to the authorities of the Parshvanath Vidyashrama and especially to Lala Harjas Rai Jain, Secretary of the institution, who gave me all encouragement including scholarships and fellowships for the prosecution of my studies of Jaina philosophy at Banaras for a continuous period of ten years.

MOHAN LAL MEHTA

S.M.K. COLLEGE

Jodhpur

15th November 1956

TRANSLITERATION

Vowels

अ,	आ,	इ,	ई,	उ,	ऊ,	ऋ,
a,	ā	i,	ī,	u,	ū,	r,
ए,	ऐ,	ओ,	औ,	अं,	अः	
e,	ai,	o,	au,	am,	ah	

Consonants

क,	ख,	ग,	घ,	ङ,
k,	kh,	g,	gh,	ṅ,
च,	छ,	ज,	झ,	ञ,
c,	ch,	j,	jh,	ñ,
ट,	ठ,	ड,	ढ,	ण,
t,	ṭh,	ḍ,	ḍh,	ṇ,
त,	थ,	द,	ध,	न,
t,	th,	d,	dh,	n,
प,	फ,	ब,	भ,	म,
p,	ph,	b,	bh,	m,

य,	र,	ल,	व,	श,	ष,	स,	ह,
y,	r,	l,	v,	ś,	ṣ,	s,	h

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CHAPTER I

KARMA: THE BASIS OF JAINA PSYCHOLOGY

THE doctrine of karma is one of the most significant tenets of Indian speculation. It has profoundly influenced the thought and life of Indian thinkers of all classes and grades with the solitary exception of the Cārvākas. It has penetrated Indian religion, philosophy, psychology, literature, art, and the like. The Indian solution of the great riddle of the origin of suffering, happiness, and the diversity of worldly conditions is to be found in the word 'karma'. The people of India strongly believe that the souls have been transmigrating from beginningless time. They hold that the well-being or suffering of a being is nothing more than the result of its former karma. This solution is not altogether unsatisfactory. It stands, no doubt, as a happy one, eminently moral, and to a great extent a true one.

Karma is the root of birth and death, and birth and death are called misery. Whatever actions a being has performed, good or bad, with its karma it will depart to its next existence. As a man sows, so he reaps. No man inherits the good or evil act of another man. The doctrine we are dealing with might be called the essential element, not only of all moral and philosophical theories, but also of popular belief. If a person is born unhealthy or deformed, the doctrine holds, it must be because of the sins he committed in his former life. It is an established fact that all the philosophical and ethical systems of India propagated the doctrine of karma, yet, it is in Jainism, however, that it reaches its climax, assumes a unique character, and becomes a system in itself. All the significant philosophical concepts of Jainism can be explained through it.

I

MEANING OF KARMA

The following are the hypothetical assumptions upon which the doctrine of karma is based :

1. Every act must necessarily be followed by its consequence. This rule can be applied not only to a physical phenomenon but also to a psychological fact. All our dispositions, drives, instincts, impulses, motives, tendencies are governed by it.
2. If the consequences of our acts have not been fully worked out in our life-time, they necessarily demand a future life for their fruition. On this hypothesis, the doctrine of the immortality of soul is justifiable.
3. The born diversity among different individuals seeks an explanation. The inequalities among men in worldly position and advantages and the apparent disagreement between their behaviour and their happiness or suffering call for an explanation. It is adduced as a proof of the truth of the doctrine of karma.
4. The karma-theory involves the idea of metempsychosis. The present state of existence is the consequence of the actions performed in the preceding life. The actions we perform in this life will serve as the cause of the future life. Thus, the series goes on expanding in an endless process if not checked.

The history of the individual does not begin with his birth. The tiny snowdrop droops its fairy head just so much and no more. It is a snowdrop, not an oak, and just that kind of snowdrop, because it is the outcome of the karma of an endless series of past existences; and because it did not begin to be when the flower opened, or when the mother-plant first peeped above the ground, or first met the embraces of the sun, or when the bulb began to shoot beneath the soil, or at any time which you or I can fix. A great American writer says: 'It was a poetic attempt to lift this mountain of Fate, to reconcile this despotism of race with liberty, when the Hindus said, Fate is nothing but the deeds committed in a prior state of existence.'¹

The theory involves the carrying over of instincts, passions, personality-characters, tendencies to another birth. It indicates that the mental faculties and physical characters of a particular

¹ See Indian Buddhism, pp. 114-5.

individual can be accounted for by the acts and experiences of his past life. The idea underlying this theory is that certain phenomena like a sudden appearance of an extraordinary genius, an unexpected occurrence of an emotional experience, and the like that seem inexplicable by any definite cause can be accounted for by the theory of the continuity of the soul and its experiences in more than one life.

DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM OF WILL

In short, the doctrine of karma is nothing more than a series of acts and effects in which each act is necessarily followed by its effect. This effect is known as fruition or retribution. This series of action and fruition goes on expanding, since every new effect produces another effect for which it serves as the cause. The event which is the effect of its preceding act becomes the cause of its succeeding event in turn. Thus, viewed from one standpoint, an event is an effect. Viewed from another angle, an event is a cause—an act. All our acts come under the supreme rule of this hypothesis.

Granting the validity of this assumption, the series of act and effect will go on marching in an automatic course. It will require no active effort. It will demand no voluntary endeavour. Thus, it will lead to Determinism and Necessitarianism. This is an objection which has been commonly advanced against the doctrine of karma. Determinism paralyses human effort. It is against the application of moral progress and collides with Libertarianism which propounds Freedom of Will. The exponents of the doctrine of karma try to remove this difficulty. They maintain that to confuse the doctrine of karma with Necessitarianism and Determinism is to demonstrate misconception of the doctrine. The view that 'what a man soweth, he shall reap' cannot be considered as Determinism. The adherents of the doctrine of karma not only defend their position but also attack the other side. They level the same charge against Libertarianism. If each and every act is absolutely at our liberty, there would be no consistence, coherence, harmony in the universe. You would require no water to clean your clothes, no fire to cook your food. If you choose, water will cook your food and fire will clean your clothes. You would require no air to fly, no mountain to climb, no horse to ride.

Every act will await your order. No sooner did you order than your wish is fulfilled.

This Determinism-Free Will controversy is due to the misrepresentation of the theories. Libertarianism is misrepresented by the adherents of Necessitarianism; Necessitarianism is misunderstood by the exponents of Libertarianism. This is not wholly due to wilfulness but arises partly on account of the ambiguity of language. 'Both parties commit themselves to a confusion which arises from language, and which is due to the fact that language is not meant to convey all the delicate shades of inner stages.'¹ It is, therefore, necessary to have an analysis of the term 'cause' that plays a very important role in the discussion of the problem.

The term 'causality' is used to embrace many meanings. A scientist means by it uniformity of sequence. If this is a complete account of causation, Libertarianism is utterly worthless. The objection against this meaning is that it seems to be full of contradictions. There are uniform sequences which are not causally connected, as the conjunction of night and day. Some explanation, though not quite satisfactory, may be given regarding the conjunction of day and night. One horrible objection still remains unanswered and that objection is that uniform sequences land us in an infinite regress. Our discursive thought which tends to satisfy itself by going one step back is urged to go back for ever. Leaving the field of matter when we come to man, however, we find a 'cause' which is explicable by itself. We can analyse some of our actions and know why we act in these cases; it is because we have purposes which we wish to realise, ideals by which we guide our actions. We are unable to explain how we act, since activity is an ultimate element of our life, just as we cannot explain how we think, since thinking is our very existence; we cannot demonstrate how we think, because thinking is not something separate or different from us. So is the case with activity. The theory of causality is not sufficient enough to reveal the ultimate nature of events. It is, like the beginninglessness of the chain of karma, an attempt to understand a change or sequence without beginning. It is an attempt that succeeds only because

¹ Time and Free Will, p. 160.

it has the instinct to stop somewhere and to take just as much of the change as it pleases. A change, however, can never explain itself unless it presupposes some underlying fundamental reality which is beyond any proof. This reality which is the foundation of all our activity cannot be regarded totally static. It is dynamic in the sense that it possesses the power of freedom to some extent; and this power increases as the obstacles obscuring it weaken. Assuming this hypothesis, the doctrine of karma implies that a man can influence his future destiny by his own actions. The freedom of the individual to regulate his conduct by his own rational volitions and the power to conquer his passions to a certain extent have been emphasised by the exponents of the karma-theory. The conclusion we want to arrive at is that the doctrine of karma teaches neither absolute Freedom of Will nor absolute Determinism. Necessitarianism and Libertarianism both the doctrines on the extremist level are discouraged by the right implication of the doctrine of karma. Necessitarianism quarrels with Libertarianism and Libertarianism is not prepared to agree with Necessitarianism, but the doctrine of karma quarrels with none, since it agrees with both to an intelligible extent. Man is neither completely free nor absolutely dependent; he is partly free and partly not-free. This is the only hypothesis upon which the law of morality can be established, upon which the concept of karma can be founded. The individual who is completely free or totally not-free does not have any concern with the law of morality, is not related to the doctrine of karma at all. Nay, he has nothing to do with psychological investigations, philosophical speculations, religious practices. It is, therefore, crystal-like clear that far from undermining the foundations of Freedom of Will, the doctrine of karma strengthens them. It always recognises the importance and significance of human effort. It also refers to, no doubt, the influence of environment and internal tendencies over which, sometimes, man has no control at all.

SOME OTHER THEORIES

The karma-theory has to face a number of other doctrines that advocate the views diametrically opposed to it. Some thinkers regard Time (*kāla*) as the determining factor of the universe. Others believe in Nature (*svabhāva*) as the determining factor of creation. There are others who advocate the theory of

Determinism (*niyati*). There are still others who hold the view that every event occurs as an Accident (*yadycchā*). There is no uniformity of sequence in the universe. The believers in the solitary reality of Matter conceive the whole universe as a combination of irreducible particles of a corporeal substance.¹

TIME

Those who believe in Time as the determinant factor of the events that occur in the universe maintain that every incident occurs in Time, and hence, is determined by Time. Time is the only factor to explain each and every occurrence. The Atharva-veda refers to Time as the foundational factor of creation. The text runs as follows :—

‘Time, the steed, runs with seven reins (rays), thousand-eyed, ageless, rich in seed. The seers, thinking holy thoughts, mount him, all the beings (worlds) are his wheels.

‘With seven wheels does this Time ride, seven naves has he, immortality is his axle. He carries hither all these beings (worlds). Time, the first god, now hastens onward.

‘A full jar has been placed upon Time; him, verily, we see existing in many forms. He carries away all these beings (worlds); they call him Time in the highest heaven.

‘He surely did bring hither all the beings (worlds), he surely did encompass all the beings (worlds). Being their father, he became their son; there is, verily, no other force, higher than he.....

‘.....Time, the highest God, forsooth, hastens onward’.²

The supremacy of Time is recorded in the Mahābhārata also. It mentions that the root cause of worldly diversity is Time. All happiness and sufferings of the worldly creatures are wholly due to Time. Man suffers not because he commits sinful acts but because Time does so. The individual gains happiness not as a consequence of his own effort but as an endowment of Time. Time is all-pervasive and all-powerful.³

¹ Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣad, I, 2.

² Hymns of the Atharva-veda (Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XLII), XIX, 53-4.

³ *Kālena sarvaṃ labhate manuṣyaḥ.....*
Śānti-parva, XXV; XXVIII; XXXII.

NATURE

The philosophers believing in Nature as the determining factor of creation hold that events are determined by their own inherent Nature. There is no other force, inside or outside, over and above Nature, that can claim to determine the course of events. Nothing can come into existence if it were against its Nature to be born. So the presence of Nature must be considered a necessary antecedent to the birth of the universe, and as such, Nature is the essential cause of the whole universe.

In the *Buddha-carita*, an enquiry was set afoot by someone as to what it was that gave pointedness to thorns, and diverse colours to woods and birds. It is all due to Nature and Nature alone. It is not in need of anybody's effort in the least. It is over and above human effort.¹ The Gita remarks the omnipotence of Nature in the following lines: The Sovereign Self does not create for the people agency, nor does He create acts. Nor does He connect acts with their effects. It is Nature that works out these.² This theory is brought out in the *Mahābhārata* passage endorsing sentiments like: Through Nature they are impelled to activity, and in the very same manner they desist therefrom: all these beings as well as non-beings. Human endeavour exists not.³

PRE-DETERMINATION

The advocates of Determinism think that whatever happens, happens necessarily. Things that happen by necessity happen by Pre-determination. Whether this Pre-determination is personal or impersonal, is a problem that does not require any discussion here. According to the doctrine of Necessitarianism, as we have already discussed, everything is ruled by an absolutely logical necessity. There is no such thing as Free Will. It will not be out of place to refer to Spinoza, a great philosopher of the West, who criticised the doctrine of Freedom of Will vehemently. He established the truth that only ignorance makes us think that we can alter the future; what will be will be, and the future is as

¹ *Buddha-carita*, 52.

² *Na kṛtyam na karmāṇi lohasya spṛjati prabhukḥ.*
Na karmaphalasamīyogaṁ svabhāvastu pravartate.
Bhagavad-gītā, V, 14.

³ Quoted in the *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 438 ff.
 (Belvalkar and Ranade).

unalterably fixed as the past. This is why hope and fear are condemned: both depend upon viewing the future as uncertain.¹ There is no such thing as free will; everything in nature is determined, everything follows necessarily from the universal substance. Man thinks he is free because he is ignorant of causes; the falling stone would regard itself as free if it were conscious. Because he thinks himself free, he forms the ideas of praise and blame, sin and guilt.²

The history of Indian philosophy records this view in the forms of *Akriyāvāda* and *Niyativāda*. Pūraṇa Kaśyapa and Makkhali Gośāla who were contemporary to Mahāvīra and Gautama, preached these doctrines. In the *Sāmañña-phala-sutta* the doctrine of non-action (*Akriyāvāda*) is ascribed to Pūraṇa Kaśyapa. This doctrine is reflected in the following lines: 'To him who acts or causes another to act; to him who mutilates or causes another to mutilate; to him who punishes or causes another to punish; to him who causes grief or torment; to him who trembles or causes another to tremble; to him who kills a living creature, who takes what is not given, who breaks into houses, who commits dacoity, or robbery, or highway-robbery, or adultery, or who speaks lies; to him thus acting there is no guilt. If with a discus with an edge sharp as a razor he should make all the living creatures on the earth one heap, one mass of flesh, there would be no guilt thence resulting, no increase of guilt would ensue. Were he to go along the south bank of the Ganges striking and staying, mutilating and having men mutilated, oppressing and having men oppressed, there would be no guilt thence resulting, no increase of guilt would ensue. Were he to go along the north bank of the Ganges giving alms and ordering gifts to be given, offering sacrifices or causing them to be offered, there would be no merit thence resulting, no increase of merit. In generosity, in self-mastery, in control of the senses, in speaking truth, there is neither merit nor increase of merit.'³

This account indicates that the Doctrine of Causation—the view of Dependent Origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) is absurd. It also points out that the doctrine of karma is silly. It carries

¹ History of Western Philosophy (Russell), p. 597.

² History of Philosophy (Thilly), p. 303.

³ Dialogues (Rhys Davids), II, pp. 69 ff.

out to the dogmas of the passivity of soul and the a-moralism of the *summum bonum*.

Makkhali Gośāla also preached the same doctrine. He advocated the view that there is no cause either ultimate or remote for the depravity of beings; they become depraved without reason and without cause. There is no cause either proximate or remote for the rectitude of beings; they become pure without reason and without cause. The attainment of any given condition, of any character, does not depend either on one's own acts, or on acts of another, or on human effort. There is no such thing as power or energy or human strength or human vigour. All animals, all creatures, all beings, all souls, are without force and power and energy of their own. They are bent this way and that by their fate, by the necessary conditions of the class to which they belong, by their individual nature; and it is according to their position in the one or the other of the six classes that they experience ease or pain. And it is only at the appointed period—after one has passed through the eighty-four hundred thousand periods of wandering in transmigration that there shall be an end of pain.¹

CHANCE

The believers in the accidental nature of the occurrences of events regard the theory of causation as absurd. It is an impossibility to investigate the ultimate cause of an occurrence, since that so-called ultimate cause ought to presuppose another cause. We may push back our explanation further and further, but there is a limit to all such explanations and we shall be forced to admit finally that we do not know the first cause of an event. It is then that we have to take refuge in the explanation that it is due to Accident or Chance, and not on account of any law or cause. The meaning is that an event requires no cause for its occurrence. It happens as an Accident.²

In the early Greek philosophy the idea of Accidentalism was a very persistent one. It appears in Plato and even in Aristotle; and it was not until the Stoics emphasised the scientific view of the universe that the unscientific nature of Accidentalism became fully recognized. Aristotle held that single events may be referred to uni-

¹ Dīgha-nikāya, I, 2.

² Nyāya-bhāṣya, III, 2, 31.

versal laws of cause and effect, but he did not commit himself to this conception wholly without reservation. He ascribes events to a causal order "for the most part," and insists upon the contingent in nature, that which is without cause and without law. Plato finds a place for Chance in the economy of the universe. "God governs all things, and chance and opportunity co-operate with Him in the government of human affairs." Accidentalism in the field of ethics appears in the theory of Absolute Indeterminism. Epicurus, for instance, regards the uncaused will of man as analogous to the accidental deviation of atoms from the direct line of their fall.¹ The uncaused event and the uncaused will both present the same general characteristics and the same difficulties also.

MATTER

Next comes Matter. The materialists believe in the sole reality of Matter. They refuse to recognize as the first principle something other and higher than the mere working out of the forces inherent in Matter, which may be a non-material power like a conscious soul. They acknowledge Matter as the solitary source of the created manifold. In the *Dīgha-nikāya* the doctrine of Materialism is ascribed to the philosopher Ajitakeśakambalin. He maintained that there is no such thing as alms or sacrifice or offering. There is neither fruit nor result of good or evil deeds. There is no such thing as this world or the next. There is neither father nor mother nor beings spring into life without them (*ayoniya*). There are in the world no *Śramaṇas* or *Brāhmaṇas* who have reached the highest point, who walk perfectly, and who, having understood and realized, by themselves alone, both this world and the next, make their wisdom known to others. A human being is built up of the four Elements. When he dies, the earthy in him returns and relapses to the earth, the fluid to the water, the heat to the fire, the windy to the air, and his senses pass into the ether. The four bearers, he on the bier as a fifth, take his dead body away. Till they reach the burning ground men utter forth eulogies: but there his bones are bleached, and his offerings end in ashes. It is a doctrine of fools, this talk of gifts. It is an empty lie, mere idle talk, when men say there is profit therein. Fools and wise alike, on the dissolution of the body, are cut off, are

¹ Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. I, p. 64.

annihilated; and after death they are not.¹

Evidently, this doctrine advocated by Ajitakeśakambalin is a violent denunciation of the doctrine of karma. It is a fatal attack upon the principles of morality. Ajita declares unhesitatingly that nothing is real that is not corporeal. As a man drawing a sword from the scabbard can say, "this is the sword and that is the scabbard," not so are we able to separate the soul from the body, pointing out, "this is the soul and that is the body". The materialist asserts that there is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world; nor do the actions of the four castes, orders, etc., produce any real effect. The *agnihotra*, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves and smearing one's self with ashes, were made by nature as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge and manliness. If a beast slain in the *jyotiṣṭoma* rite will itself go to heaven, why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father? If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the *Śrāddha* here, then why not give the food down below to those who are standing on the house top? While life remains let a man live happily, let him feed on clarified butter even though he runs in debt, when once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return here? All the religious observances are a means of livelihood for *Brāhmaṇas*. The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves and demons.² He admits the reality of four Elements, earth, water, fire, and air only. Everything that exists is due to a particular combination of these four Elements. The various combinations of the Elements undergo production and destruction. The Elements as such are eternal. Consciousness is a product of pure matter. It is produced when the Elements are combined in a certain proportion. Just as the combination of betel, areca nut, and lime produces the red colour, though the ingredients separately do not possess the red colour, in the same way a particular combination of the Elements produces consciousness, though the Elements separately do not possess it.³ Consciousness is always in association with a particular body and it vanishes when the body disintegrates. Thus, there is no other world to be afraid of. Enjoyment is the only end of human existence.

¹ Dīgha-nikāya, I. 2.

² Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha, ch. I.

³ Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha, 27.

The Jaina literature also records similar doctrines. It is mentioned in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* that some profess the exclusive belief in the five gross elements: earth, water, fire, air, and ether. They are the original causes of all things (including souls). On the dissolution of these elements living beings cease to exist. Everybody, fool or sage, has an individual soul. These souls exist so long as we possess body. After death they are no more. There are no souls that are born again. There is neither virtue nor vice, there is no world beyond. On the dissolution of the body the individual ceases to exist.¹

Some others hold that it is proved that there are individual souls and they experience pleasure and pain. They further maintain that pleasure and pain are not caused by the souls themselves, nor they are caused by others. It is all assigned to them by destiny. It is pre-determined and not caused by anybody. This is, in brief, what the fatalists say.²

Still others maintain that there are five elements and that the soul is a sixth entity, but they contend that the soul and the five elements are eternal. They never perish, nor the non-existent comes into being. All things are eternal by their very nature.³

Some hold that no action of the soul is transmitted to the future actions. There rises no sun, nor does it set. There waxes no moon, nor does it wane. There are no rivers running, nor any winds blowing. The whole world is ascertained to be unreal.⁴

LAW OF KARMA

The believers in the doctrine of karma regard these theories as incomplete if taken disunitedly and reject them as untenable. They, no doubt, accord a proper place to these theories as corroborated by our average experience,⁵ while installing karma in the supreme position. The reason is that by denying the supremacy of karma it is next to impossible to explain the diversity of the universe. Neither Time, nor Nature, nor Pre-determination, nor Chance, nor Matter can explain the diversity of the phenomenon, since none of them

¹ *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga*, I, 1, 1.

² *Ibid.*, I, 1, 2.

³ *Ibid.*, I, 1, 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 12.

⁵ *Śāstra-vārttā-samuccaya*, II, 79.

possesses an inherent nature of variegation. Karma is the ultimate determinant of the various courses of events, for it is not in fixture but of variegated nature. Even Time, Nature, Matter, etc., are not outside the province of karma. These different factors are only the expressions of the working of the universal law of karma. To what the change in Nature is assigned? To what the variation in Matter is attributed? To what the alteration in Time is ascribed? The only solution of these problems rests in the working of the supreme law of karma. No better solution of the diversity of the course of occurrences in the phenomenal world can be found out than the doctrine of karma.

II

JAINA ACCOUNT OF KARMA

The doctrine of karma gives some explanation of our specific characteristics, some satisfactory answer to the factor of our personality that we have at present. It tells us how these factors were generated as the resultant of the forces produced in the past. The Jaina holds that every individual soul possesses infinite apprehension, infinite comprehension, infinite bliss, and infinite power. All these characteristics belong by nature to every soul while it is in all perfection. The empirical souls are not perfect, therefore, they are not free to enjoy perfect apprehension, complete comprehension, unrestricted bliss, and unlimited power. Why is it so? What restricts their faculty of apprehension, comprehension, etc.? The Jaina philosopher answers that the innate faculty of the soul is infected by something foreign. The foreign element that covers the perfection and purity of the soul is nothing but karma. The Jaina meaning of karma is not "work or deed". According to the Jaina conception, karma is an aggregate of particles of very fine matter which is not perceptible to the senses. If the self be regarded to be pure and perfect by nature, why should it be subject to infection? If infection is possible, it must be infected for all time. The Jaina philosopher answers that this objection has no force. It is a matter of daily experience that though perfectly luminous and pure by nature, the light of the sun, etc., is very often obscured by a veil of dust, by fog, by a patch of cloud. The problem of the self is exactly like these.

It is also obscured by comprehension-obscuring karma and the like. As regards the removal of the obscuration of the self, it is possible by the practice of the prescribed course of meditation etc., just as the obscuration of the sun etc., is removed by a blast of wind.

It can be accepted that an obscuration having its origination in time is liable to be removed by some means. But the Jaina says that the obscuration of the self is not a historical fact. It is from time immemorial. Such being the case, how is it possible to remove the obscuration? The Jaina thinker does not agree with this view. For him, the fact of origination is entirely irrelevant. It is a common experience that the dross found in an ore of gold is as old as the gold itself, still it is found to be removed by the action of an alkaline substance, or by calcination in a sealed vessel. Exactly like this, the removal of comprehension-obscuring karma and the like, though without beginning, is possible by the practice of the prescribed course of meditation etc.

There is another objection regarding the obscuration of the self. How can an immaterial being like the self be obscured by material particles? The reply is as follows: The power of consciousness, although immaterial and amorphous, is found to be obscured by the consumption of spirituous liquor, intoxicating drugs, and the like.¹ Likewise, the immaterial self can be obscured by material karma. Moreover, the worldly souls are not absolutely immaterial, since they are always associated with material karmas. Hence, the objection is baseless.

What is the argument in admitting the material nature of karma? Karma is possessed of material form, inasmuch as its effect, viz., the body etc., is material in nature. It is our common experience that the causes of various effects having a material form are also possessed of the same form. The atoms which are the cause of a pot that is material in character are also material. One may raise an objection: Pleasure, pain, etc., are also effects of karma, and since they have no physical form, it may be argued that karma is not material. To this objection, the Jaina replies: The rise of pleasure, pain, etc., is not wholly independent of corporeal causes, since the experience of pleasure etc., is found to be associated with food etc.

¹ *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I, 1, 50-2.

There is no experience of pleasure etc., in association with a non-material entity, just as in connection with the ether.¹ Thus, it is only a material entity that can produce any pleasure or pain and not a non-material substance. Because karma produces pleasure, pain, etc., therefore, it is material in nature. It should also be noted that it is the soul which is the essential cause of all our experience; karma is only the instrumental cause. Unless karma is associated with the soul, it cannot produce any effect. Really speaking, the karmic matter not associated with the soul is no karma at all. This is, in brief, about the material nature of karma.

The entire cosmos is full of karmic matter. The soul which is infected by karmic matter from time immemorial goes on acquiring new matter while enjoying empirical status. Through the actions of body, mind, and speech karmic matter gets into the self. It is tied to the self according to the strength of passions, viz., anger, pride, deceit, and greed. Thus, first of all there is an influx (*āsrava*) of karmic particles due to vibrations (*yoga*).² At the same time there are certain other activities of consciousness, viz., passions (*kaṣāya*) through which bondage (*bandha*) takes place.³ In the state of bondage the self and karma are more intimate than milk and water. The particles of karma once entered into the self produce various types of effects.

The Jaina tradition distinguishes between physical karma and psychical karma. The former is material in nature, whereas the latter comprises those psychical effects and states which are produced in the soul due to the influx of physical karma. The former is the karmic matter that enters into the self. The latter is in the shape of various conscious activities. The physical and psychical karmas are mutually related to each other as cause and effect.⁴ As we have already mentioned, the self has been associated with karma from time immemorial,⁵ hence, no question of 'first association' does arise. Besides, the self is gathering new matter every moment. The

¹ *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya*, 1626-7.

² *Kāyavāñmanahkarma yogaḥ. Sa āsravaḥ. Tattvārtha-sūtra*, VI, 1-2.

³ *Saḥaśāyatojjīvaḥ karmāṇo yogyān pūḍgalanādattē. Sa bandhaḥ.*

Ibid., VIII, 2-3.

⁴ *Anyonyakāryakāraṇabhāvajñāpūnāthavāt. Aṣṭasaṣṭī*, p. 51.

⁵ *Tacca karma pravāhato nādi. Karma-grantha*, I, p. 3.

emancipation of the soul from matter is possible by two means. The influx of new karmic particles must be stopped and the accumulated karmas must be eliminated.

The material particles that take the form of karma can be viewed from four angles: according to their nature, length of duration, intensity of fruition, and quantity. The nature and quantity of karmic atoms depend upon the activities of body, mind, and speech. The length of duration and the intensity of fruition depend upon passions.¹

NATURE OF KARMA

According to the Jaina doctrine of karma, karmic atoms are classified into eight fundamental types: comprehension-obscuring (*jñānāvaraṇa*) karma, apprehension-obscuring (*darśanāvaraṇa*) karma, feeling-producing (*vedanīya*) karma, deluding (*mohanīya*) karma, age-determining (*āyus*) karma, physique-making (*nāman*) karma, status-determining (*gotra*) karma, and power-obscuring (*antarāya*) karma.² Karma, as we have already stated, obscures as well as distorts the natural characteristics of the self. Our worldly status is wholly dependent upon the eight main types of karma. The type that obstructs the faculty of comprehension is known as comprehension-obscuring karma. The type that obscures the faculty of apprehension is called apprehension-obscuring karma. The type which produces pleasure and pain is called feeling-producing karma. The karma that obstructs right belief and right conduct is known as deluding karma. The karma that determines life-longevity is called age-determining karma. The type of karma which constructs our body is called physique-making karma. The karma through which our position in society is destined is known as status-determining karma. The type that impedes the infinite energy of the self is called power-obscuring karma.

Of these eight types, the four, viz., comprehension-obscuring karma, apprehension-obscuring karma, deluding karma, and power-obscuring karma are obstructive (*ghātīn*), whereas the remaining four are non-obstructive (*aghātīn*). Of the obstructive types, some are completely obscuring, while others are partially obscuring. There

¹ Jogā payaḍīpaesaṃ, thīaṇubhāgaṃ kaśāyāo. Karma-grantha, V, 96.

² Karma-grantha, I, 3.

is another classification as well. They are classified under the heads of virtuous (*puṇya*) and sinful (*pāpa*) types. The virtuous types are auspicious and the sinful types are inauspicious in nature. The karma that yields pleasure in life is virtuous and the karma that leads to pain is sinful.

Each of the eight main types is again divided into a number of sub-types. The latter can be further classified into yet smaller subdivisions, so that the entire number is exceedingly large. We propose to confine our account to the following one hundred and fifty-eight types only.

The karma that obscures the comprehending faculty of the soul totally or partially is called comprehension-obscuring karma. It is classified into five sub-types corresponding to the five forms of comprehension recognized by Jaina epistemology. The karma obscuring the comprehension (which is imperfect) emerging through the media of the senses and the mind (*mati-jñāna*) is of the first type. That karma which causes the obstruction of a comprehension acquired by reading or hearing the scriptures, or by the words of an authority (*śruta-jñāna*) (which, too, is not perfect) is of the second type. The third type hinders the transcendental perception of material objects (*avadhi-jñāna*). The fourth one obscures the transcendental perception of the thoughts of others (*manaḥ-paryaya-jñāna*). The fifth one hinders the faculty of omniscience, i.e., perfect perception (*kevala-jñāna*) inherent in the self by natural disposition.¹

Now, we come to the apprehension-obscuring (*darśanāvaraṇa*) karma. In Jaina philosophy, the term '*darśana*' is used to signify two meanings. Firstly, it means belief or faith. Secondly, it means the simple awareness of an object, the mere apprehension of a thing. Thus, it is the first stage of cognition generally known as indeterminate perception. In *darśanāvaraṇa* karma, the term '*darśana*' is used to denote the second meaning. We have used the term 'apprehension' in place of indeterminate perception. The karma that obscures the faculty of apprehension inherent in the soul, partially or wholly, is called apprehension-obscuring karma. It is of nine sub-types corresponding to the four forms of apprehension and five

¹ Karma-grantha, I, 4-9.

kinds of sleep.¹ The first four obscure visual apprehension (*cakṣur-darśana*), non-visual apprehension (*acakṣurdarśana*), transcendental apprehension of material objects (*avadhi-darśana*), and perfect apprehension (*kevala-darśana*) respectively. The fifth type causes a light and pleasant sleep. The sixth one produces a deep sleep. The seventh species generates a sound slumber that overtakes a person while sitting or standing. The eighth type causes an intensive sleep which overcomes a person while walking. The last one causes somnambulism.

The karma producing feeling is of two varieties. The first variety produces a feeling of pleasure, as for instance, we have the feeling of pleasure by licking something sweet like honey etc. The second one causes a feeling of pain, as for example, one has a feeling of pain if hurt by a sword or knife.²

The deluding karma is divided into two chief groups: belief-deluding (*darśana-mohanīya*) karma and conduct-deluding (*cāritra-mohanīya*) karma. What deludes right belief is of the first group. What deludes right conduct is of the second group. The first group is classified into three types. The first type known as *mithyātva-mohanīya* produces complete wrong belief, i.e., heterodoxy. The person possessing this type does not believe in the truths proclaimed by true authorities but believes in false doctrines. *Samyaktva-mohanīya* is the second type. It generates correct belief. It is not to be understood in the form of the right faith in its completeness but only in a preliminary degree. The right faith in its completeness is obtained only when this type of karma, too, is completely annihilated. The sun which is covered by white clouds shines perfectly only when the clouds have completely been removed. The second type is like the white clouds covering the sun. The third type which is a mixture (*miśra*) of the two produces a mixed belief having some degree of truth and some of falsity. In a different language, it causes a kind of wavering between true faith and false belief. The second group is divided into two sub-groups: passions (*kaṣāyas*) and quasi-passions (*no-kaṣāyas*). The passions are sub-divided into four groups: anger (*krodha*), pride (*māna*), deceit (*māyā*), and greed

¹ Karma-grantha, I, 10-12.

² *Mahulittakhagadhārālihaṇaṇi va dūhāu veyayīyaṇi*. Ibid., 12.

(*lobha*). Each of these is, again, divided into four sub-groups, viz., (1) what obscures right conduct completely and leads to endless worldly life (*anantānubandhin*), (2) what hinders even partial self-discipline and does not last for more than a year (*apratyākhyānā-varaṇa*), (3) what obstructs only the beginning of complete self-discipline and never lasts for more than four months (*pratyākhyānā-varaṇa*), and (4) what arrests the attainment of complete right conduct and does not last for more than a fortnight (*sañjvalana*). Thus, the number of passions is four multiplied by four or sixteen. The *quasi*-passions are classified into nine varieties. They give rise to laughter (*hāsyā*), liking (*rati*), disliking (*arati*), sorrow (*śoka*), fear (*bhaya*), disgust (*jugupsā*), sexual desire for women (*puruṣa-veda*), sexual desire for men (*strī-veda*), and sexual desire for both (*napuṃśaka-veda*). They are called *quasi*-passions, inasmuch as they co-exist with the passions and are inspired by them. The conduct-deluding karma, thus, has sixteen plus nine or twenty-five sub-types. Adding three sub-types of belief-deluding karma to this, we have in all twenty-eight sub-types of the deluding karma.¹

The age-determining karma confers on a being a certain quantum of life. It has four sub-types corresponding to the four states of existence. The first of them determines celestial age (*deva-āyus*). The second one determines human existence (*manuṣya-āyus*). The third one determines the life of plants and animals (*tiryag-āyus*). The last one determines the age of hellish beings (*nāraka-āyus*).²

Now, we turn to the description of the sub-types of the physique-making karma. It causes the individual diversities of worldly beings and is chiefly responsible for the theory of reincarnation. The number of its sub-types is one hundred and three. They are mostly quoted in a fixed succession in four groups: collective types (*pinḍa-prakṛtis*), individual types (*pratyeka-prakṛtis*), ten types of self-movable body etc. (*trasa-daśaka*), and ten types of immovable body etc. (*sthāvara-daśaka*).³ The first group consists of seventy-five sub-types. They are as follows: four states of existence—celestial, human, animal and plant, and hellish; five classes of beings—beings with one sense, two senses, three senses, four senses, and five senses; five

¹ Karma-grantha, I, 14-22.

² Ibid., 23.

³ Doctrine of Karman in Jain Philosophy, p. 11.

bodies—physical (*audārika*), transformable (*vaikriya*), projectable (*āhāraka*), electric (*taijasa*), and karmic; (*kārmaṇa*); three parts—physical, transformable, and projectable (since electric and karmic bodies have no parts); fifteen bindings—(1) the binding of physical body with previous physical body, (2) with electric body, (3) with karmic body, (4) with electric and karmic bodies, (5) the binding of transformable body with previous transformable body, (6) with electric body, (7) with karmic body, (8) with both, (9) the binding of projectable body with previous projectable body, (10) with electric body, (11) with karmic body, (12) with both, (13) the binding of electric body with previous electric body, (14) with karmic body, and (15) the binding of karmic body with previous karmic body¹; five scrapings—the scraping of the matter of physical body, of transformable body, of projectable body, of electric body, and of karmic body; six firmnesses of the joints of physical body—an excellent joining in which two bones are hooked into one another (*vajra-ṛṣabha-nārāca-saṁhanana*), a joining which is not so firm (*ṛṣabha-nārāca-saṁhanana*), a joining which is still weaker (*nārāca-saṁhanana*), a joining which is on one side like the preceding one, while on the other the bones are simply pressed together and nailed (*ardha-nārāca-saṁhanana*), a weak joining in which the bones are merely pressed together and nailed (*kīlika-saṁhanana*), and a weak joining in which the ends of the bones merely touch one another (*sevārta-saṁhanana*); six figures—the entire body to be symmetrical, the upper part of a body to be symmetrical and not the lower, the body below the navel to be symmetrical and above it unsymmetrical, the body to be hunch-backed, the body to be dwarf-like, and the entire body to be unsymmetrical; five colours (of the body etc.)—black, blue, red, yellow, and white; two odours—pleasant and unpleasant; five tastes—bitter, sour, acidic, sweet, and astringent; eight touches—soft, hard, light, heavy, cold, hot, smooth, and rough; four types of transmigrating force (*ānupūrvī*) corresponding to the four states of existence—celestial, human, animal-cum-plant, and hellish; two gaits—moving in a pleasant manner and moving in an ugly manner. The second group has eight

¹ Certain types of bodies are not bound with one another. As for instance, physical body has no binding with transformable body and *vice versa*. Hence, the bindings are only fifteen in number.

sub-types: superiority over others, capability of breathing, hot body, cold body, a body which is neither heavy nor light, the body of a Founder of the Holy Order (*tīrthaṅkara*), a normal formation of the body, and an abnormal formation of the body. The third group consists of ten sub-species: (1) a body possessing more than one sense, (2) gross (*bādara*) body, (3) developed body, (4) individual body, (5) firm body, (6) beautiful and lovely parts of the body, (7) gaining of sympathy without any obligation, (8) sweet voice, (9) suggestive speech, and (10) honour and glory-winning personality. The fourth group also contains ten sub-types: (1) a body possessing one sense only, (2) subtle body, (3) undeveloped body, (4) a body in common, (5) a body without firmness, (6) ugly parts of the body, (7) no gaining of sympathy, (8) ill-sounding voice, (9) unsuggestive speech, and (10) dishonour and shame-giving individuality. Thus, we have seventy-five plus eight plus ten plus ten or one hundred and three sub-types that are determined by the physique-making karma.

The status-determining karma produces the rank possessed by a person through his birth etc. It is of two sub-species: that which determines high family-surroundings and that which bestows low family-surroundings.¹

The function of the power-obscuring karma is to hinder the natural or distorted energy (*vīrya*) of the self. It is classified into five sub-types: what hinders the inclination for making gifts and charities, what obscures receiving, what arrests the enjoyment of something that can only be enjoyed once, such as eating, what prevents the enjoyment of something which can be repeatedly used, such as clothing, and what arrests will-power, i.e., the free expression of will.² This is, in short, the nature of the eight fundamental types and one hundred and fifty-eight sub-types of karma. We propose to discuss, now, the length of duration of the eight fundamental types.

LENGTH OF DURATION

Before we present the length of duration of each type, let us understand the scheme of the division of time according to the

¹ Karma-grantha, I, 52.

² Ibid.

traditional conception of the Jains. The lowest unit of time is a 'samaya'. Innumerable *samayas* form an 'āvalikā'. 16,777,216 'āvalikās' make a 'muhūrta' which is of forty-eight minutes of modern time. Thirty *muhūrtas* make a day. Out of the days are formed weeks, months, years, etc. The number of years can be expressed in words up to a number containing seventy-seven cyphers. Beyond that, it is innumerable. An innumerable quantity of years make a 'palyopama'. Ten 'koṭākoṭi' (crore multiplied by crore) *palyopamas* form a 'sāgaropama'. Ten *koṭākoṭi sāgaropamas* comprise an 'utsarpiṇi' (ascending period of time). By the same number is measured an 'avasarpini' (descending period of time).¹ The following are the measures by which the maximum and minimum length of duration of various karmas is measured: The maximum length of duration of the comprehension-obscuring, apprehension-obscuring, feeling-producing, and power-obscuring karmas is thirty *koṭākoṭi-sāgaropamas*, of the deluding-karma is seventy *koṭākoṭi-sāgaropamas*, of the physique-making and status-determining karmas is twenty *koṭākoṭi sāgaropamas*, and of the age-determining karma is thirty-three *sāgaropamas*. The minimum length of duration of the comprehension-obscuring, apprehension-obscuring, deluding, age-determining, and power-obscuring karmas is less than forty-eight minutes, i.e., *antar-muhūrta*, of the physique-making and status-determining karmas is eight *muhūrtas*, and of the feeling-producing karma is twelve *muhūrtas*.²

INTENSITY OF FRUITION

As a sweet dish has in different kinds of preparation a more or less sweet taste, so also the nature of karma varies according to its circumstances in a more or less intense manner. The intensity of the effect of karma as well as the length of its duration depends upon the weakness or strength of our passions. The stronger the passions the lengthier and intenser are the duration and fruition of sinful karmas. As regards the case of virtuous karmas, the length of duration varies according to the strength of passions and the intensity of fruition varies inversely according to the strength.

¹ Doctrine of Karman in Jain Philosophy, pp. 20-1 ;

Outlines of Karma in Jainism, p. 15.

² Tattvārtha-Sūtra, VIII, 15-21.

Regarding that of sinful karmas, the intensity of fruition varies in accordance with the length of duration. The more sinful a person is, the duration of his sinful karma is longer and the fruition thereof is stronger. With an increased purity the length of the duration as well as the intensity of the fruition of sinful karmas decreases, while only the intensity of virtuous karmas grows.¹

QUANTITY OF KARMIC MATTER

The universal space is densely filled up with karmic particles. A particular soul attracts only those particles which are within its reach and not those lying outside, just as fire seizes only that inflammable material that is lying within its reach. There is constant influx of karmic matter into the soul which is always under the pressure of activity. To put it negatively, the influx of karmic particles is not stopped for a single moment until and unless the self is entirely free from all activity. The quantity of the karmic matter acquired by the self depends upon its activity. The more the activity of the self the greater is the influx of karmic matter. The matter thus attracted by the self is divided into various types of karma. We have already recorded the fact that according to the traditional conception of the Jainas, the binding of karmic matter is of eight main types. The shares that fall to these types differ from one another. The age-determining type receives the smallest part. A greater portion goes to the physique-making type, and the same to the status-determining type. More than that falls to the comprehension-obscuring type. The shares of the same quantity fall to apprehension-obscuring and power-obscuring karmas. Still a greater portion goes to the deluding type. The greatest of all falls to the feeling-producing karma.² The share falling to a main type is further divided among the sub-types in varying degrees.

CAUSES OF BONDAGE AND LIBERATION

Although all the types are bound by our physical, mental, and vocal activities and passions in general, yet, every type has some

¹ Karma-grantha, V, p. 51

² *Vigghāvarane mohe, savvovari veyapiye jēnappe.*

Tassa phudattam havai, phivisesepa sesānam. Ibid., 80.

special causes constituted by certain specific activities.¹ Hostility against knowledge, disregard of a true doctrine and its commandments, rebelliousness and lack of discipline towards the devotees of knowledge, and the like are the causes of the binding of both apprehension and comprehension-obscuring karmas, inasmuch as apprehension and comprehension are two different stages of the same faculty of cognition. Respects for parents and the like, pity, gentleness, keeping of vows, giving of alms or some other help, interest in noble and spiritual activities may be cited as some of the causes of the pleasure-producing karma. The contrary causes produce the karma that gives pain. The teaching of a false faith, the hindrance of the true religion, the blasphemy of saints and gods, the misuse of sacred objects, and the like cause the bondage of the belief-deluding karma. The actions produced by the outbreak of passions cause the bondage of passions. The mind confused through joking, liking, disliking, etc., causes the karma that produces *quasi*-passions. Slight passionate desire, inclination for right conduct, etc., help in binding the male-sex. Jealousy, deceitfulness, high sensuality, adultery, etc., cause the bondage of the female-sex. Intense attachment for pleasure and strong passions directed towards sexual intercourse with male and female cause that of the third sex (*napuṃśaka-veda*). Hellish age is bound by the actions of a person who tortures and kills other beings and strives after passions extremely. A deceitful and fraudulent person binds animal age. An humble and sincere one binds human age. A person possessing right belief, having slight passions binds celestial age. Honesty, gentleness, absence of desires, purity, and the like produce the good physique-making karmas, whereas the reverse causes produce bad ones. The recognition of the excellence of others, reverence towards teachers, the desire to learn and to teach are some of the causes of the bondage of the karma that is responsible for high family-surroundings, while the contrary causes produce the karma that furnishes low family-surroundings. The withholding of food, drink, lodging, clothing, and the like cause the bondage of the power-obscuring karma.

The binding of karma can be checked through the means of controlled activities of the body, mind, and speech (*guṇti*), carefulness is walking, speaking, lifting up, and laying down a thing

¹ Karma-grantha, I, 54-61.

(*samiti*), duties of a monk (*dharma*), reflections (*anuprekṣā*), dispassionate endurance of troubles (*pariśaha-jaya*), and proper conduct (*cāritra*).¹ The accumulated karmas can be eliminated through the proper means of fasting (*anaśana*), reduction of food (*avamaudarya*), restriction to certain food (*vr̥tti-parisaṅkhyāna*), renunciation of delicacies (*rasa-parityāga*), resting in a lonely place (*vivikta-śayyāsana*), mortification of body (*kāya-kleśa*), expiation (*prāyaścitta*), modesty (*vinaya*), service (*vaiyāvṛtīya*), study (*svādhyāya*), renunciation of ego-centricity (*vyutsarga*), and meditation (*dhyāna*).² Of these, the first six are external, whereas the last six are internal. The external means are chiefly related to physical purification, while the internal ones are mainly concerned with the purification of mind.

VARIOUS STATES OF KARMA

The Jaina doctrine of karma records various states and processes of karma that occur on account of certain activities and power-processes. They are roughly classified into eleven types: (1) binding (*bandhana*), (2) endurance (*sattā*), (3) realization or rise (*udaya*), (4) premature realization (*udīraṇā*), (5) increased realization (*udvartanā*), (6) decreased realization (*apavartanā*), (7) transformation (*saṅkramaṇa*) (8) subsidence (*upaśamana*), (9) incapability of all the processes other than increased realization and decreased realization (*nidhatti*), (10) incapability of all the processes (*nikācana*), and (11) endurance without effect (*abādha*).

'Binding', as we have already mentioned, is nothing but the assimilation of the material particles attracted by the worldly soul through certain activities.³ The process that leads to binding karmas is beginningless, but not necessarily endless. Because the inflow is wholly due to various activities, it stops with the stoppage of them. When there is no inflow, it is but natural and logical that there is no more binding.

The existence in *potentia* of the assimilated karmas from the instant of the assimilation to the moment of the enjoyment is known

¹ Tattvārtha-sūtra, IX, 2.

² Ibid., IX, 19-20.

³ Karma-grantha, V, p. 1.

as 'endurance'.¹ This is the period in which a particular karma exists without producing its effect.

'Realization' is the rise of the effect² of a particular karma that exists in *potentia*. It is the state of actual enjoyment in which we reap the fruits of our past actions.

The Jaina doctrine of karma does not maintain the rigidity of the process of karmic fruition. It holds that a karma which is to last for a certain length of duration can also be enjoyed earlier. Through certain means it can be released before the actual period of realization comes. The process by which a karma is enjoyed in its premature state is called 'premature realization'.³

Taking into consideration the existence in *potentia*, i.e., endurance (*sattā*), all the sub-species can exist in a soul. So far as the realization (*udaya*) of the species is concerned, the entire number amounts only to one hundred and twenty-two. If the binding (*bandha*) of new species is taken into consideration, the total number is assumed to be one hundred and twenty. As regards pre-mature realization (*udīraṇā*), the entire number amounts to one hundred and twenty-two, just as in realization. The following table will show the number of the sub-species existing in these states.⁴

¹ *Sattā kammāṇa phīṭṭi, bandhāṭṭaladdhaattalābhāṇaṭṭi*. Ibid., II, 25.

² *Udāo vivāgaveyana*.....Ibid., 13.

³ Ibid.

⁴ *Karma-vipāka*, p. 111.

	<i>Binding</i>	<i>Realisation</i>	<i>Premature realisation</i>	<i>Endurance</i>
Comprehension- obscuring karma	5	5	5	5
Apprehension- obscuring karma	9	9	9	9
Feeling-producing karma	2	2	2	2
Deluding karma	26	28	28	28
Age-determining karma	4	4	4	4
Physique-making karma	67	67	67	103
Status-determining karma	2	2	2	2
Power-obscuring karma	5	5	5	5
Total ...	120	122	122	158

In the state of endurance all the species exist. In that of realization the number is only one hundred and twenty-two, because fifteen bindings and the five types of scrapings are not included in it as they are taken to exist implicitly in five kinds of bodies. Colour, odour, taste, and touch are only reckoned as four species instead of twenty. In the state of premature realization the same number of species is counted. In the state of binding, the number is one hundred and twenty only, since *samyaktva* and *miśra mohaniya* karmas are not separately bound, inasmuch as they are merely the purified conditions of *mithyātva*. Therefore, they are subtracted from the species occurring in the states of realization and premature realization, so that the total number in the state of bondage is one hundred and twenty only.

The length of duration as well as the intensity of fruition of a karma is definite. Despite this fixation every karma can increase or decrease its realization. The process through which the realization is increased is called 'increased realization' and through which the realization is decreased is known as 'decreased realization'.¹ 'Pre-

¹ Karma-prakṛti (Bandhana-karaṇa), p. 19 (2).

mature realization' takes place before the actual period of rise commences, whereas 'increased realization' and 'decreased realization' take place after the period of realization begins. These processes and the like make an indication that Freedom of Will occupies an important place in the doctrine of karma of the Jains.

The process by which the nature, duration, intensity, and quantity of one kind of karma can be transformed into those of another is called 'transformation'. It takes place only between the sub-types of a main type, and not between different main types. It is, however, not possible between the four types of age and between the belief-deluding and conduct-deluding karmas nor between the three sub-types of the belief-deluding karma.¹

'Subsidence' is a process that holds up the states of realization, premature realization, and the like.² It is a temporary phase that does not last long. The contrary is the state of elimination, annihilation or destruction (*kṣaya*). In this state the particles of a karma are dissociated from the self. There is a third state as well. It is a complex of three states: elimination, subsidence, and realization (*kṣayopāśama*). In it some karmic particles are annihilated, some of them are held up, while others are in rise.

Under certain circumstances it is not possible to introduce any change whatsoever except 'increased realization' and 'decreased realization'. It is due to the 'incapability of all the processes other than increased realization and decreased realization'. Sometimes, however, even these two are impossible because of the 'incapability of all the processes'.³ In this state, there is no possibility of any change whatsoever in the nature, length of duration, intensity of fruition, and quantity of particles of a karma. They are unalterably fixed from the very moment of bondage. In this state, there is no place for Freedom of Will. It is absolutely pre-deterministic.

Every type of karma requires some time to produce its effect. It does not give its fruit at the same moment it is bound. In other words, a karma remains ineffective for a certain length of period. This state of karma is nothing but its 'endurance without effect'.

¹ Karma-prakṛti (Saṅkrama-karaṇa), pp. 1-3.

² Ibid., (Bandhana-karaṇa), p. 19 (1).

³ Ibid., 19 (2)

The period it requires is called 'period of non-fruit' (*abudhā kāla*).¹ When this period has passed, then and then alone a karma can yield its fruit in any form whatsoever. This is, in brief, the description of the various states and processes of karma.

Of these states, the state of 'realization' (*udaya*) corresponds to that of '*prārabdha*', i.e., the state of the karmas that have begun to yield fruit; the state of 'endurance' (*sattā*) corresponds to that of '*sañcita*', i.e., the state of the accumulated karmas that are to endure for a certain length of period; the state of 'binding' (*bandhana*) corresponds to that of *āgāmin*, i.e., the state of karmas that are being bound.²

Our aim in writing this account has been to demonstrate the actual position of the doctrine of karma in Jainism, and not to prove its validity or rationality. It is not our claim that the Jaina doctrine of karma is completely comprehensible and entirely logical. We are, however, tempted to admit that it is of immense importance, unique in nature, complete in itself, most exhaustive, and to some extent satisfactory, too. The task of the texts related to the present doctrine, it is obvious, is to expose entirely a dogma but not to prove it. They enumerate different types and sub-types of karma, various states of the self, different degrees of their perfection and development, etc., but we do not find in them a completely satisfactory explanation as to 'why' any of this is thus and not otherwise. As regards the questions of 'what' and 'how' the writers are, no doubt, quite consistent. The psychological investigations are chiefly concerned with 'what' and 'how' rather than with 'why' which, really speaking, is a metaphysical doubt. We propose to give a psychological estimate of the fundamentals of the Jaina doctrine of karma in the subsequent chapters. We promise to explain

¹ '*Abādha*' *anudayakālaḥ*. Karma-grantha, V, p. 37.

² That portion of a man's past that is operative in influencing a man's mind and the course of his experiences during an incarnation is called *prārabdha*. Those that yet lie deep within the inner recesses of his *liṅgaśeṣa* and have not yet begun to manifest themselves during an incarnation are called *sañcita*, while every present act, every present thought, every present desire becomes stored in his subtle body as *āgāmin* which goes to enrich his atmosphere of karma and will react on him in the future.

Outlines of Indian Philosophy (P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar), p. 62.

how the Jaina writers interpret various psychological functions and to what extent they seek the help of karma in performing this task.

CHAPTER II

CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION

According to the Jaina, consciousness is the essential attribute of the self. He admits that consciousness is present even in the state of deep sleep. If it is not admitted, the pleasant experience of a comfortable and sound sleep recalled in the subsequent waking state would be impossible.¹ The Jaina thinkers hold that consciousness is not merely a chain of successive momentary flashes but a constant factor undergoing various changes. It is a permanent faculty of the self undergoing various modifications.

Broadly, consciousness is said to be of two chief types; determinate and indeterminate. Determinate consciousness is the state of comprehension. It is divided into eight categories. These categories are known as non-verbal (sensory and mental) comprehension (*mati-jñāna*), verbal (mental) comprehension (*śruta-jñāna*), clairvoyance (*avadhi-jñāna*), telepathy (*manahpariyaya-jñāna*), omniscience (*kevala-jñāna*), wrong non-verbal comprehension (*mati-ajñāna*), wrong verbal comprehension (*śruta-ajñāna*), and wrong clairvoyance (*vibhaṅga-jñāna* or *avadhi-ajñāna*). Indeterminate consciousness is nothing but mere apprehension. It is divided into four categories. They are called visual apprehension (*cakṣurdarśana*), non-visual apprehension (*acakṣur-darśana*), apprehensive clairvoyance (*avadhi-darśana*), and apprehensive omniscience (*kevala-darśana*).²

COGNITION AS ONE OF THE ATTRIBUTES OF LIVING BEING

The defining characteristic of a living being is consciousness. The main line of demarcation between a living being and a dead entity is consciousness. Existence, origination, decay, permanence, etc., are the general characteristics of all entities.³ When the Jainas

¹ Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika, p. 49.

² Sa dvividhoṣṭacaturbhedāḥ. Tattvārtha-sūtra, II, 9.

³ Utpādayayadhrauyayuktam sat. Ibid., V, 29.

define a living being as an entity that possesses consciousness, they do not exclude other universal qualities (*sādhāraṇa dharmas*). The definition of a particular substance is through its differentia, *i.e.*, those special qualities that are not found in other substances.¹ When a substance is taken as a whole, or in other words, if we are to describe all the characteristics of a substance, we analyse the complete structure of the entity. This type of analysis is not a definition. It is proper to call it a description.

In the *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, living being is defined as the substratum of the faculty of cognition (*upayoga*).² Cognition is nothing more than the manifestation of consciousness in a particular form. It consists of apprehension and comprehension (*jñāna and darśana*) as its constituents. This definition is very liberal having bliss and power included in it. Strictly speaking, a living being is an entity having 'four types of infinity' (*ananta catuṣṭaya*) as its attributes. These four types are known as infinite apprehension, infinite comprehension, infinite bliss, and infinite power. An emancipated soul alone enjoys all these infinities. The worldly souls do not possess these faculties in all perfection, inasmuch as their faculties are obscured by the veil of the four obscuring (*ghātin*) karmas, *viz.*, comprehension-obscuring karma, apprehension-obscuring karma, deluding karma, and power-obscuring karma. The liberated souls as well as the omniscients are absolutely free from the association of these four kinds of karma,³ hence, they possess the four types of infinity in all perfection. Thus, the definition of a living being consists in the possession of the four types of infinity. The first two types are nothing but two different forms of cognition. Hence, cognition is regarded as an important attribute of a living being.

DIFFERENTIATION OF APPREHENSION AND COMPREHENSION

The main line of demarcation between apprehension (*darśana*) and comprehension (*jñāna*) consists in this that in the former the

¹ *Parasparavyatīreke satī yendvayatvaṃ lakṣyate tallakṣaṇam.*

Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika, p. 318.

² *Upayoga lakṣaṇam.* *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, II, 8.

³ *Mohakṣayājjñānadarśanāvarṇāntarāyaksayācca hevaṃ.*

Tattvārtha-sūtra, X, 1.

details are not perceived, while in the latter the details are also known. In the technical language of the Jaina theory of knowledge, apprehension is called '*nirākāra upayoga*' and comprehension is termed as '*sākāra upayoga*'. Herbert Warren writes: 'Before we know a thing in a detailed way, there is the stage where we simply see, hear, or otherwise become conscious of it in a general way, without going into its ins and outs. We simply know it as belonging to a class. This is the first stage of knowledge. It may be called detailless knowledge or indefinite cognition. If this stage is not experienced, there can be no knowledge of the thing.'¹ This statement is correct to some extent, because 'to know a thing as belonging to a class' is the first stage of comprehension which arises after apprehension, according to some Jaina writers. They say that the cognition of a thing as belonging to a class is sensation—'*avagraha-jñāna*' (a kind of comprehension).² According to them, apprehension is the primitive stage, i.e., the first stage of knowledge where we have only a general awareness of the object. This simple 'awareness' without any reference to a class is named apprehension. In this awareness, the cognition contains mere 'existence' (*sattā mātra*) as its content. This stage of cognition emerges just after the contact between the subject and the object. This state of cognition is a preceding stage of sensation proper. According to these writers, sensation is divided into two stages. The first stage where we have mere awareness of an object is called apprehension, i.e., the sensation of existence. The second stage where we have a knowledge of an object as belonging to a class is known as the sensation of class-character. There are, of course, some other thinkers who define apprehension as the cognition of generality, i.e., class-character. They regard '*avagraha*' as a stage of apprehension.³ According to this view, we may use the term 'cognition of generality' for apprehension. However, the difference between apprehension (*darśana*) and comprehension (*jñāna*) consists in this that in the former the details are not perceived, while in the latter the details are also known. In a different language,

¹ Jainism, p. 29.

² *Viśayaviśayisannipātānantarasamudbhūtasattāmātragocaradurśanājñātamādyamavāntarasāmānyākāraviśiṣṭavastugrahaṇamavagrahaḥ.*
Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, II, 7.

³ *Daśaṣaṇamoggahamettaṁ ghaḍottī nivvaṇṇaṇā havai nāṇaṁ.*
Sanmati-tarka-prakarāṇa, II, 27.

apprehension is indeterminate, indefinite, indistinct, whereas comprehension is determinate, definite, distinct.

SOUL AS THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

To arrive at a satisfactory solution of the riddle of the source of cognition in our psychological experience, we have no other alternative than to posit a conscious principle. True, this is a problem of metaphysics, nevertheless, the psychologist has to deal with it, since he attaches much importance to the inquiry of the nature of consciousness. It is evident that cognition is an important aspect of consciousness. Hence, our discussion of the problem of the existence of soul is not irrelevant.

The theory of soul declares that the principle of individuality must be substantial, since psychic phenomena are activities, and no activity is possible unless there is a concrete agent. This substantial agent cannot be brain but must be something immaterial, for its activity is immaterial. The brain is composed of matter, hence, it is incompatible with the power of immaterial thought-activity. Moreover, thought is spontaneous or free, whereas all material activity is determined from without; and the will can turn itself against all corporeal goods and appetites, which would not be possible were it a corporeal activity. These are some of the reasons why the principle of psychic activities must be both substantial and immaterial. This principle is the soul or the self.

William James confesses that to posit a soul influenced in some mysterious way by the brain-states and responding to them by conscious affections of its own, seems to me the line of least logical resistance, so far as we yet have attained.¹

Mary Whiton Calkins, a pupil of William James, argued that the self, far from being merely a metaphysical concept, was an ever-present fact of immediate experience and fully worthy to be made the central fact and a system of scientific psychology. She came to believe that 'the conscious self of each one of us is immediately experienced as possessed of at least four fundamental characters. I immediately experience myself as (1) relatively persistent—in other words, I am in some sense the same as my

¹ Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 181.

childhood self; as (2) complex—I am a perceiving, remembering, feeling, willing self; as (3) a unique, an irreplaceable self—I am closely like father, brother or friend, but I am, after all, only myself; there is only one of me. I experience myself (4) as related to (or conscious of) objects either personal or impersonal.¹ According to Calkins, the self is consciously related to the objects it experiences, in various ways. It takes a receptive attitude towards an object in observing it, but a dominating attitude in managing it; it has the attitude of liking certain objects but of disliking others. To speak of pleasantness and unpleasantness as impersonal scattered conscious states is as absurd as to speak of them as unrelated to objects, for the real datum is the self being pleased or displeased by an object. Among the objects of the self other selves are not less important. The self is essentially a social being. That is why only a self-psychology can provide the basis for a genuine social psychology. William Stern offered more or less the same truth in the form of personalistic psychology, just a few years after the self-psychology of Calkin's made its appearance. This account is an evident indication of the importance of the problem of self or soul in the field of psychology.

The Jaina philosophers have advanced various arguments to prove the existence of soul. In their opinion, consciousness is the essence of the soul. Every living being from the lowest to the highest possesses consciousness. The principle of consciousness is not a material substance but an immaterial entity—separate from and independent of the body as well as the brain.

In the Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, there is a long discussion between Lord Mahāvīra and Indrabhūti on the problem of the existence of soul as an independent principle of consciousness. Lord Mahāvīra in the opening presents the views of those opponents who do not believe in an independent existence of soul. "O Indrabhūti! You have a doubt about the existence of soul, since it is not directly perceived by the senses as is the case with a jar. And so you argue that whatever is imperceptible does not exist in the world, e.g., a flower in the sky".²

¹ Contemporary Schools of Psychology, p. 243.

² *Jīve tuha saṁdeho paccakkhaṃ jaṁ na ghippai ghaḍo vva. Accaṁtāpaccakkhaṃ ca natthi loe khapupphaṃ va.*
Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 1549.

Some one may here argue that though the atoms are not within the range of our empirical knowledge, yet, they do exist. So what about them? The answer is that no doubt they are imperceptible to us as atoms, but when they are so transformed as to perform the function of a jar etc., they no longer remain so. Such is not, however, the case with the self. It never attains a stage when it can directly be perceived.

"The self is not an object of inference, since inference, too, is preceded by perception and is the outcome of the recollection of the universal concomitance. There has not been previously seen any connection between the self (major term) and its mark (middle term), the recollection of which, along with the sight of its mark, can lead us to a conviction about the existence of the self".¹

"The self is not even within the range of scriptural authority, since scripture is not quite distinct from inference. Moreover, the soul is not directly perceptible to any one whose words have the honour to be called scripture."²

There is none to whom the self is an object of direct perception. Had there been any one of that type, his word would have been looked upon as scriptural authority, and on the basis of that, the existence of soul would have been admitted.

"Besides, the scriptural authorities are mutually contradictory. Consequently, on that account, too, the doubt is justifiable. You, therefore, believe that the existence of soul cannot be established by any of the means of valid cognition."³

The existence of soul cannot be established even by the means of analogy, for in the entire universe, there is no object whatsoever that resembles the soul. Even implication does not help us in proving the existence of soul. There does not exist any such object seen or heard whose postulation can prove the independent existence of soul.

Thus, when the existence of soul cannot be proved by any of the five means of valid knowledge, each of which establishes the existence of an object, it automatically follows that it comes within

¹ Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 1530-1.

² Ibid., 1532.

³ Ibid., 1553.

the range of negation, the sixth means of valid cognition that establishes non-existence. Hence, it is proved that the self does not exist. This is, in brief, the view of the opponent—the thesis.

Lord Mahāvīra refutes the arguments of the opponent in the following way:

“O Indrabhūti! the self is indeed directly cognisable to you also. Your knowledge about it which consists of doubts etc., is itself the self. What is proved by your own experience should not be proved by other means of knowledge. No proof is required to prove the existence of happiness, misery, etc.

“Or, the self is directly experienced owing to ‘*ahanipratyaya*’—the realization as ‘I’ in ‘I did, I do, and I shall do’—the realization which is associated with the functions pertaining to all the three tenses.

“If there is no soul, how do you realise ‘I’? How can there be a doubt whether the self is or not? Or, if there is a doubt in whose case is this experience of ‘I’ justifiable?”¹

This argument is offered from the psychological point of view. The various aspects of knowledge, i.e., recollection, recognition, doubt, judgment, etc., can never occur in our experience unless there is the existence of soul. All these psychological functions are centred in a conscious principle which cannot be taken to be material. Cognition, affection, and conation cannot be explained unless the existence of an immaterial entity be admitted.

Mahāvīra further argues that without a doubter who is beyond all kinds of doubt, but still remains in all doubts, no doubt is possible. Doubt presupposes the existence of a doubter. “If the object about which one has doubt is certainly non-existent, who has a doubt as to whether I do exist or I do not exist? Or, Gautama (Indrabhūti)! When you yourself are doubtful about yourself, what can be free from doubt?”² He further says: “The self which is the substratum of its attributes is self-evident owing to the attributes being self-evident, as is the case with a pitcher. For, on realizing the attributes, the substratum, too, is realised.”³ Let us explain the

¹ Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 1554-6.

² Ibid., 1557.

³ Ibid., 1558.

point. The substance cannot exist absolutely independent of its qualities and the qualities have no existence entirely independent of their substance. If the qualities are experienced, the experience of the substance is natural. The experience of the qualities of the self is evident. Because these qualities cannot have an absolutely independent existence, hence, the existence of the soul to which all these qualities belong, is obvious.

It may be that the opponent admits that there is a substance which is the substratum of the qualities like cognition, affection, etc., but he may refuse to believe that this substance is something else than the body. That is to say, he looks upon the body itself as the substance in question, because the qualities are experienced in the body only. The argument runs like this: Cognition etc., are the qualities of the body, because they are observed there and there only like other attributes of the body, such as its whiteness, thinness, etc.

The counter argument is: The qualities like knowledge etc., cannot belong to the material body, for the body has a form as is the case with a pitcher. The qualities of a substance having form must be with form. Knowledge etc., are bereft of form, therefore, the substance that possesses these qualities, too, must be formless, and hence, it cannot be the body which is with form. Thus, the substance which is formless is nothing but the self.

Secondly, as some other writers argue, sometimes it is seen that the qualities such as sensation, perception, memory, etc., are absent even when the body is present as in sound sleep, death, etc.¹ It indicates that cognition etc., cannot be attributed to the body but to a distinct substance, i.e., the soul.

Thirdly, the body cannot be the cause of knowledge, because it is composed of material elements that are bereft of consciousness. The effect must exist in the cause implicitly. Unless it is so, a particular effect cannot be ascribed to a particular cause. If the material elements do not possess consciousness as one of their qualities, how is it that the body becomes conscious? If consciousness is absent in each of the material elements, it would necessarily be

¹ *Jñānaṁ na śarīraguṇaṁ sati śarīre nīvartamānavāt.*
Prameya-kamala-mārttaṇḍa, p. 114.

absent in the combination also. As oil is absent in each of the particles of sand, it cannot be produced from the combination as well.¹ Hence, it is illogical to state that consciousness is merely a by-product of the peculiar amalgamation of the four primary elements, though none of them separately possesses it. Take the case of wine. The intoxicating nature of wine is not absent in those objects by whose combination it is produced. Intoxication is not a mere by-product. It is systematically produced only from those objects in which it implicitly exists. The patent nature of intoxication is merely the manifestation of its latent nature. It is not a product which is quite strange. Hence, consciousness cannot be attributed to the body. All the immaterial qualities reside in a separate spiritual substance. An effect which is totally non-existent cannot come into existence like a horn on the head of a hare. An entity which is existent cannot be absolutely non-existent like the material elements.² If consciousness is absolutely non-existent, it can never come into existence. It comes into existence, because it is not absolutely non-existent; it exists in the self, since the self is the principle of consciousness.

CONSCIOUSNESS AS THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTIC OF SOUL

Consciousness which one would expect to be regarded as the very essence of the soul is treated by the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas as an adventitious (*aupādhika*) quality,³ which enters temporarily into the soul as a result of the working of the machinery of cognition. Consciousness or knowledge is, thus, something different from the soul. This view is refuted by the Jaina in the following way:⁴

If knowledge is supposed to be absolutely distinct from the soul, the knowledge of Mr. Caitra is in the same position with respect to his soul as the knowledge of Mr. Maitra, that is to say, both the knowledges would be equally strangers to the self of Mr. Caitra, and there is no reason why his knowledge should serve him better

¹ *Pratyekamasatī teṣu, na ca syādreṣṭatāilavat.*
Sāstra-vārttā-samuccaya, 44.

² *Nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ.*
Ibid., 76.

³ *Caitanyamaupādhikamātmanonyat.*
Anyayogavyavaccheda-dvātriṃśikā, 8.

⁴ See also, *Outlines of Jaina Philosophy*, pp. 53-6.

than the knowledge of any other person in determining the nature of things. In fact, there is no such thing as his own knowledge, all knowledges being equally foreign to him. An explanation may be offered by the vaiśeṣika: Knowledge is absolutely distinct from the soul but it is connected with it by inherent relationship (*samavāya-sambandha*) and hence, the knowledge of Mr. Caitra is not in the same position with respect to him as the knowledge of Mr. Maitra, for the former is connected with him by inherence, while the latter is not so. But this explanation can be easily turned aside. According to the Vaiśeṣika, the category of inherence is one, eternal, and all-pervasive,¹ therefore, it is impossible that the knowledge should reside in Caitra and not in Maitra; and since the souls are also all-pervasive according to the view of this school, the knowledge that takes place in one soul must take place in all the souls as well. Consequently, any knowledge that Caitra has acquired would belong to Maitra also.

Granted it is possible for a particular knowledge to be connected with a particular soul by inherent relationship. But a question still remains to be answered. By what relation is the inherence connected with the knowledge and the soul? If the answer is that it is connected by another inherence, that would mean an unending series of inherent relationships and it will lead to an infinite regress. If the answer is in the form of 'itself', why should not the knowledge and the soul be connected of themselves without requiring an inherent relationship to accomplish the connection?

The opponent again argues that the soul is no doubt conscious, but that is not without a cause but is owing to consciousness coming to reside by inherent relationship in the soul as is shown by actual experience. The counter argument advanced by the Jaina is as under: If you are prepared to accept the evidence of experience, you must admit that the soul is essentially of the nature of consciousness (*upayogātma*). Nobody is aware of being first unconscious, and afterwards becoming conscious in consequence of the connection with consciousness. On the contrary, he is always aware of himself as the knower which implies the unity of the soul and consciousness.

It may be further held that the consciousness 'I have the knowledge' would prove a distinction between the knowledge and the

¹ *Samavāyasyaikatvānnityatvādvayāpakatvācca.*

soul, for the former is that which is possessed and the latter is that which possesses. This contention is also untenable. Who possesses knowledge in the theory of the opponent? Not the self, because it is supposed to be essentially devoid of consciousness like a pitcher. By this theory, it cannot be asserted that the self is unconscious and, yet, it is capable of becoming conscious. Hence, that substance which is conscious of having knowledge (*jñānavānaham*) cannot in itself be unconscious by nature. Therefore, the soul is not in itself unconscious which afterwards comes to possess consciousness by inherent relationship. It is, on the contrary, essentially conscious.

The most significant characteristic of a living being is, as we know, its capability of cognition. If the soul is quite free from the impeding influence of karma, it is capable of cognizing everything in all conditions. If it is infected by karmic matter, this faculty in its perfection disappears. Karma veils the omniscience of the self, as a compact veil of clouds hides the light of the sun. But as, although the light may be veiled, some light, however, breaks through the clouds, so there also, notwithstanding the influence of karmic matter, a fraction of the faculty of cognition is preserved to the self, for if it would also lose this, it is no longer the self.¹

MODERN PSYCHOLOGY ON INDETERMINATE COGNITION

As we have already discussed, the cognition of an object can be of two kinds: either it is restricted to the grasping of the object in its existential generality which is called indeterminate cognition, undifferentiated knowledge or apprehension (*anākāra upayoga*) or it grasps a thing with its individual attributes which is called determinate cognition, differentiated knowledge, or comprehension (*sākāra upayoga*). In the language of modern psychology, we are, perhaps, justified in calling the first kind of cognition as pure sensation and the second one as perception (including memory etc.). The function of sensation is mere acquaintance with a fact. Perception's function, on the other hand, is knowledge about a fact; and this knowledge admits of numberless degrees of complication. Viewed from the physiological standpoint, they are differentiated in the fact that in perception the nerve-currents arouse voluminous

¹ Karma-grantha I, p. 7.

associative or reproductive processes in the cortex; but when sensation occurs alone, the accompanying reproductive processes are at the minimum.¹ William James records the same fact more lucidly by admitting that there are two kinds of knowledge broadly and practically distinguishable. We may call them respectively knowledge of acquaintance and knowledge-about. I am acquainted with many people and things, which I know very little about, except their presence in the places where I have met them. I know the colour blue when I see it, and the flavour of a pear when I taste it; I know an inch when I move my finger through it; a second of time when I feel it pass; an effort of attention when I make it; a difference between two things when I notice it; but about the inner nature of these or what makes them what they are, I can say nothing at all. I cannot impart acquaintance with them to any one who has not already made it himself. I cannot describe them, make a blind man guess what blue is like, define to a child a syllogism, or tell a philosopher in just what respect distance is, just what it is, and differs from other forms of relation. At most, I can say to my friend, 'Go to certain places and act in certain ways, and these objects will probably come.' All the elementary natures of the world, its highest genera, the simple qualities of matter and mind, together with the kinds of relation that subsist between them, must either not be known at all, or known in this dumb way of acquaintance without knowledge-about. In minds able to speak at all there is, it is true, some knowledge about everything. Things can at least be classed, and the times of their appearance told. But in general, the less we analyse a thing, and the fewer of its relations we perceive, the less we know about it and the more our familiarity with it is of the acquaintance-type. The two kinds of knowledge are, therefore, as the human mind practically exerts them, relative terms. That is, the same thought of a thing may be called knowledge-about it in comparison with a simpler thought, or acquaintance with it in comparison with a thought of it that is more articulate and explicit still.²

¹ Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, pp. 2-3.

² Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 221-2.

INDETERMINATE COGNITION AND INDIAN SCHOOLS OF PSYCHOLOGY

The Indian schools of psychology hold slightly different views about the nature of indeterminate cognition from the standpoint of modern psychologists. The opinions of the schools of Indian psychology also differ from each other with respect to the nature and objects of indeterminate knowledge. How far the systems of Indian thought agree to the concepts of modern psychology and to what extent they differ from them; how long they disagree with each other; what is the opinion of the Jaina; all this we shall observe in the course of our discussion of the problem.

The Buddhist holds that indeterminate knowledge does not at all apprehend the qualifications of its object, viz., generality, substantiality, quality, name, and the like, since all these qualifications are the forms of thought which is always determinate. Indeterminate knowledge is always free from all forms and determinations. Its object is the unique momentary thing-in-itself (*svlakṣaṇa*) devoid of all qualifications.¹

The Sāṅkhya maintains that indeterminate cognition is the immediate apprehension of an object free from all associations of name, class, and the like. It is purely presentative in character possessing no element of representation.² It is the first act of immediate knowledge that apprehends an object, pure and simple, devoid of the relationship between the qualified object and its qualifications. It is the function of the external senses which give us a non-relational apprehension of an object unqualified by its properties. The external senses cognise an object as merely 'this' and not as 'like this' or 'unlike this'. Discrimination and assimilation, analysis and synthesis—all these are attributed to the function of mind.³

Prāśastapāda, an exponent of the Vaiśeṣika school, remarks that just after the contact of an object with a sense-organ there is immediate apprehension of the mere form of the object. Indeterminate cognition is nothing but this apprehension. It perceives an object

¹ *Tatra kalpanāpōdhamabhrāntaṁ pratyakṣam. Tasya viśāyāḥ svalakṣyaṁ.*

Nyāya-bīndu, I, 4: I, 12.

² Sāṅkhya-sūtra-vṛtti, I, 89.

³ Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudī, 27.

with its generic and specific characters, but does not distinguish them from each other. It is the first stage of perception, and not the result of any other prior cognition.¹ Śrīdhara's view is that indeterminate cognition is the immediate apprehension of the mere form of an object which is purely a presentative process free from all determinations and representative elements. It cognises both the general and particular characters of its object as indistinguishable mass, and does not apprehend the general character as general and the particular as particular. It cannot be denied that indeterminate cognition apprehends both the general and individual qualities of an object. It cannot recognize them as such, since it is purely a presentative process, and as such cannot revive the past impressions.²

Vātsyāyana, an ardent advocate of the Nyāya school, recognizes indeterminate cognition as the apprehension of an object without its name. It is free from verbal images which constitute the nature of determinate cognition. He argues that determinate cognition has the same object as indeterminate cognition has. The differentiating factor of the two is that determinate cognition is the knowledge comprehending the name of its object revived in memory by association, whereas indeterminate cognition does not cognise the name and the like, since it is not entangled in verbal images.³ Gaṅgeśa, the founder of the Neo-Nyāya (Navya Nyāya) system, defines indeterminate cognition as the non-relational apprehension of an object free from all associations of name, class, and the like.⁴

Kumārila, the founder of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā, maintains that just after peripheral stimulation there arises an undefined and indeterminate cognition. It is pure and simple, just like the simple apprehension of a baby or a dumb person. It arises purely out of the object itself and apprehends only a particular object which is the substratum of general and individual qualities. It cannot apprehend its object as specific, since it cannot distinguish it from other objects; nor can it cognise its object as generic, for it

¹ *Sāmānyaviśeṣajñānotpādivibhaktamālocanamātraṃ pratyakṣaṃ
pramāṇamasminnānyat pramāṇāntaramasti aphalarūpatvāt.
Prāśastapāda-bhāṣya*, p. 187.

² *Svarūpasyālocanamātraṃ grahaṇamātraṃ vikalparahitam
Nyāya-kandālī*, pp. 189-90.

³ *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, I, 1, 4.

⁴ *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, Vol. I. (Bibliotheca Indica), p. 809.

cannot assimilate it to other objects. It apprehends an object as pure and simple, and not as qualified by its general or particular character.¹

Prabhākara, the founder of the Prābhākara system of Mīmāṃsā, holds the view that in indeterminate cognition, we apprehend not the mere individual object that is the substratum of its general and particular qualities, but also cognise the generic and specific attributes of the object without apprehending their distinction. He remarks that the Buddhist is not justified in maintaining that indeterminate cognition apprehends merely the unique momentary thing-in-itself, since we are clearly conscious of the generality. Indeterminate cognition apprehends both the generality and particularity but not their distinction from each other.²

As regards the opinion of the Sāṅkarite, indeterminate cognition is not capable of cognising any qualifications whatsoever. According to him, it cannot apprehend even an object and its general character unrelated to each other, as the Mīmāṃsaka, the Vaiśeṣika, etc., hold, since the cognition of these various aspects presupposes the comprehension of their difference which falls outside the province of indeterminate cognition. So he concludes that indeterminate cognition apprehends merely the unqualified 'being' (*sattā*) which is identical with universal consciousness. It is absolutely undefined, devoid of all determinations. It knows neither a particular object nor its characters. It is strictly confined to the mere existence.³

Rāmānuja holds that indeterminate cognition is neither the apprehension of mere existence, as the Sāṅkarite believes, nor the cognition of a qualified object and its qualifications unrelated to each other, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsaka, recognize. On the contrary, it apprehends an object attributed by some qualities.⁴ It can never apprehend an object devoid of all qualifications. An

¹ *Na viśeṣo na sāmānyam tadānīmanubhūyate*
Tayorādhārabhūtā tu vyaktiravāśīyate.
Śloka-vārttika, IV, 113.

² *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*, pp. 54-5.

³ *Śāstra-dīpikā*, pp. 126-7.

⁴ *Nirvikalpakaṁ nāma kenacidviśeṣeṇa viyuktasya grahaṇam*
na sarvaviśeṣarahitasya.
Śrī-bhāṣya, I, 1, 1.

entirely unqualified object never enters into our cognition, since discrimination is the most fundamental character of consciousness.

JAINA CONCEPTION OF INDETERMINATE COGNITION

With this background in mind we, now, proceed to the Jaina conception of indeterminate cognition as elaborated by different Jaina thinkers. According to the Jaina, indeterminate cognition apprehends merely the existence of an object, and not its other attributes. This view resembles the conception of the Śāṅkarite to a certain extent. In the language of modern psychology, it is pure sensation of the existence of objects. The Jaina does not deny that in this state of cognition we apprehend the qualifications of an object. He recognizes the apprehension of the qualifications in the form of existence, and not in the shape of qualification, since the cognition of a quality as qualifying an object presupposes distinction and determination. Moreover, the Jaina writers are not unanimous with respect to the nature of indeterminate cognition. The aforesaid opinion is more prevalent in the works of the Jaina logicians and is generally ascribed to the Jaina system.

INTROSPECTION AND OBSERVATION

Vīrasena observes in his commentary Dhavalā on Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama of Puṣpadanta that which cognises an external object of the nature of both generic and specific qualities is comprehension, i.e., determinate cognition (*jñāna*), and the introspection of the self of the same nature is apprehension, i.e., indeterminate cognition (*darśana*). He criticises those philosophers who hold that comprehension cognises only the particular, whereas apprehension knows only the general. Particularity without generality is a figment and generality bereft of particularity is an impossibility. The cognition that knows a particular aspect of an object without a general one is invalid. Similarly, the cognition of the universal bereft of the particular is not valid. In his opinion, therefore, both apprehension and comprehension cognise the object as it is. Since the object is a complex of universality and particularity, each of the two cognises both the particular and the general. The difference between the two lies in the fact that the former apprehends the internal entity, i.e., the self, whereas the latter cognises external objects. In a different language, apprehension is introvert, while comprehension is extravert. As regards the nature of the object itself, the internal entity as

well as the external object is a complex of both generality and particularity.¹ Thus, according to Virasena, the object of both apprehension and comprehension is a complex of generic and specific qualities. They can be differentiated on the ground that the function of apprehension is to introspect, while that of comprehension is to observe external objects.

Brahmadeva also records a similar view. According to his interpretation of the nature of apprehension, there are two different opinions. They are distinguished from the standpoint of scripture and from that of logic. The ordinary view of apprehension as the cognition of the universal, for instance, existence, is from the standpoint of logic.² The view from the standpoint of scripture is as under: The cognition of one's own self, consisting in the striving for the origination of comprehension in its wake, is apprehension, and the subsequent cognition of external objects is comprehension.³ The same faculty of cognition is called apprehension when it intuits the self and comprehension when it knows external objects. In other words, the self-conscious and other-conscious states of the same consciousness are apprehension and comprehension respectively. It is further observed by him that the position of apprehension as the knowledge of the general and comprehension as the cognition of the particular is accepted for the sake of non-Jaina logicians who are not capable of grasping the real significance of the Jaina tenets. For those possessing a good intellect the other explanation is given which is in accordance with the scriptures.⁴ Nemicandra, the author of the *Dravya-saṅgraha*, however, did not point out any distinction of this kind. He simply defined apprehension as the knowledge of

¹ *Sāmānyaviśeṣāt makabhūyāsthagrahaṇaṁ jñānam, tadātmaśvarūpagrahaṇaṁ darśanam, iti siddham.*
Dhavalā on *Ṣaṭ-khaṇḍāgama*, I, 1, 4.

² *Tarhūbhiprāyeṇa sūttāvalokanadarśanam.*
Commentary on *Dravya-saṅgraha*, 44.

³ *Atārūhvaṁ siddhāntūbhiprāyeṇa kathyate. Tathāhi uttarajñāno-
tpattinimittam. . . yat svasyātmanah paricchedanamavaloka-
nam tad darśanam bhāṣyate. Tadanantaram yadbahirviṣaye
vikalparūpeṇa padārthagrahaṇam tajjñānamiti.*
Ibid.

⁴ *Tarhe mukhyavṛttyā parasamayavyākhyānam. . . siddhānte punaḥ
svasamayavyākhyānam mukhyavṛttyā.*
Ibid.

it is in conjunction with the auditory organ but sees a coloured figure even without conjunction'.¹ Now, apprehension is the cognition of an object which does not take into account specific determinations. It takes place immediately after the sense-object-contact.² He further elaborates this point. Apprehension, according to him, is the stuff which is transformed into comprehension. It is an established fact that nothing is produced which was absolutely non-existent and nothing existent is totally destroyed. Thus, apprehension itself undergoes transformation into the subsequent state, i.e., comprehension.³

This account of Hemacandra is a realistic one. He agrees with the Sāṅkhya who holds that indeterminate cognition is the immediate apprehension of an object free from all associations of name, class, and the like. It is purely presentative in character. It cognises an object as merely 'this' and not as 'like this' or 'unlike this'. He agrees with the Vaiśeṣika as well in maintaining the fact that just after the intercourse of an object with a sense-organ there is the immediate apprehension of the mere form of the object. Like Śrīdhara, he also maintains that apprehension cognises both the general and particular features of its object as indistinguishable mass, and does not apprehend the general character as general and the particular as particular, since this kind of distinction is comprehended in the latter stage of knowledge, viz., comprehension. Apprehension is the stuff which is transformed into comprehension. Vātsyāyana is also in perfect agreement with him in holding the view that determinate cognition has the same object as indeterminate has. The difference between the two lies in the fact that determinate cognition is the knowledge comprehending the name of its object revived in memory by association, whereas indeterminate cognition does not cognise the name and the like, since it is not involved in verbal images. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's criticism of the Buddhist view that

¹ *Puṭṭhaṃ suṇeti saddaṃ*.....

Āvaśyaka-niryukti, 5.

² *Akṣārthayoge sati 'darśanam' anullikhitaviśeṣasya vastunaḥ pratipattiḥ*.....

Commentary on Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, I, 1, 26.

³ *Darśanasyāvagrahaṃ prati pariṇāmitoktā, nahi, asata eva sarvathā kasyacidutpādaḥ, sato vā sarvathā vināśaḥ*.

Ibid.

if indeterminate cognition apprehends only the unique individuality of its object, how do its general features suddenly enter into the succeeding cognition, viz., determinate knowledge, is quite similar to the observation of Hemacandra who holds that it is a truism that nothing is produced which was absolutely non-existent and nothing existent suffers absolute destruction. The consciousness of generality must be already embedded in apprehension, which is only brought to relief by the latter stage of cognition. The consciousness of generality which is implicit in apprehension becomes explicit in the succeeding state of knowledge. The object of comprehension is essentially the same as that of apprehension. The Śāṅkarite is wrong in holding the view that indeterminate cognition apprehends merely the unqualified 'being', since we are distinctly conscious of the specific features in the latter state. William James records the same fact when he states that there are two kinds of knowledge broadly and practically distinguishable; we may call them respectively knowledge of acquaintance and knowledge-about. All the elementary natures of the world, its highest genera, the simple qualities of matter and mind, together with the kinds of relation that subsist between them, must either not be known at all, or known in this dumb way of acquaintance without knowledge-about. He differs from the view of the Jaina and other Indian psychologists in maintaining that the same thought of a thing may be called knowledge-about it in comparison with a simpler thought, or acquaintance with it in comparison with a thought that is more articulate and explicit still, since no Indian psychologist recognizes such degrees of indeterminate cognition. The comparison of various degrees is possible only in the states of determinate cognition. Indeterminate cognition or apprehension is absolutely inarticulate, free from verbal images. The question of more or less is irrelevant to it.

TEMPORAL RELATION BETWEEN APPREHENSION AND COMPREHENSION

It has already been mentioned that there are four kinds of apprehension: visual apprehension, non-visual apprehension, apprehensive clairvoyance, and apprehensive omniscience. As regards temporal relation between apprehension and comprehension, there is no unanimity among the Jaina thinkers. The Canonical conception of the above problem is that two conscious activities cannot occur

simultaneously. Even two perfect conscious activities, viz., perfect apprehension and perfect comprehension are not an exception to this rule. This fact is recorded in the *Āvaśyaka-niryukti* as 'the omniscient cannot have two conscious activities simultaneously'.¹ Therefore, as regards the Canonical conception, it is free from doubt that apprehension and comprehension, whether they are sensory or extra-sensory, cannot occur simultaneously. Regarding the occurrence of them in an imperfect person, the Jaina thinkers are unanimous, inasmuch as all of them admit the impossibility of the simultaneous occurrence of apprehension and comprehension in an imperfect being. But with respect to the case of a perfect person (omniscient) there is a controversy among them. Their opinions can be classified into three varieties. Some of them hold that the apprehension and comprehension (both extra-sensory) in an omniscient person occur simultaneously, some stick to the Canonical conception and regard them as successive and not operating at the same time, while others assert that they are mutually identical. Let us deal with all the three.

SIMULTANEITY OF APPREHENSION AND COMPREHENSION

It has been observed by Umāsvāti that the conscious activities (*upayoga*) manifesting themselves as sensory cognition, scriptural cognition, clairvoyance, and telepathy, (*mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi*, and *manahparyaya*) occur successively and not simultaneously. The conscious activities of the omniscient, possessing perfect cognition which comprehends all objects and is independent and pure, occur simultaneously at every moment.² Umāsvāti, thus, upholds the view of the simultaneous occurrence of apprehension and comprehension in the case of the omniscient. Kundakunda also holds the same view. It is observed by him that the comprehension and apprehension of an omniscient person operate at the same time even as the light and heat of the sun occur simultaneously.³ Pūjyapāda is also of the same opinion. According to him, comprehension and apprehension occur in succession in the imperfect who is under the influence of obstructive karma, while in the perfect who is completely free from

¹ *Āvaśyaka-niryukti*, 973.

² *Tattvārtha-bhāṣya*, I, 31.

³ *Niyama-sāra*, 159.

the veil of obscuring karma, they occur simultaneously.¹ Akalaṅka also supports the same view. He says: 'If the comprehension and apprehension of an omniscient person were to occur in succession, his perfection would be conditional and accidental. To the omniscient who has destroyed all the obstructive karmic veils, the universal and the particular reveal themselves simultaneously'.² The same position is possessed by Vidyānandī who holds that the awareness of the generic form is apprehension, and the cognition of the specific characters is comprehension. The apprehension-obscuring karma and the comprehension-obscuring karma obstruct these faculties. Because of the presence of these two, people like us are not in a position to possess apprehension and comprehension in all perfection. There is no reason why the universal and the particular should be revealed only in alternate succession and not simultaneously due to a particular kind of purification of the self?³

SUCCESSIVE OCCURRENCE OF APPREHENSION AND COMPREHENSION

Now, we proceed to the problem of the successive occurrence of apprehension and comprehension in the omniscient. Jinabhadra is a great advocate of this view. He has very elaborately dealt with the problem in his *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* and *Viśeṣaṇa-vatī*. He has recorded all the three positions and advanced arguments for and against all of them. His own opinion is in favour of the successive occurrence, since he sincerely recognizes the authenticity of the Scriptural Texts. He argues that if perfect apprehension and comprehension are identical and not separate, what is the sense in recognizing two separate veils of karma, viz., apprehension-obscuring karma and comprehension-obscuring karma? Moreover, the Scriptural conception of five types of comprehension and four types of apprehension is condemned by those who are not prepared to accept the successive occurrence of apprehension and comprehension.⁴ The view of the simultaneous occurrence of apprehension and comprehension is also unjustifiable, since two conscious activities cannot occur at the same instant.⁵ Now, the opponent may argue that the simultaneous occur-

¹ Sarvārtha-siddhi, II, 9.

² Aṣṭa-śatī on Āpta-mīmāṃsā, 101.

³ Aṣṭa-sahasrī on Āpta-mīmāṃsā, 101.

⁴ Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 3093.

⁵ Ibid., 3096.

rence of the two in the imperfect is not possible, since he is under the influence of the veil of obstructive karma and thus, not completely free from it; but in the case of the perfect who is completely free from obstructive karma, it is not an impossibility. This argument, according to Jinabhadra, is also futile. The faculty of the self is qualitatively the same whether it is partially free or completely free.¹ The cognition of the self is of the same sort whether it is imperfect or perfect. The only difference between the two is that perfect cognition comprehends all the objects with all their modes, whereas imperfect knowledge does not claim to comprehend so. Thus, Jinabhadra supports the alternate occurrence of apprehension and comprehension in the omniscient.

APPREHENSION AND COMPREHENSION AS IDENTICAL

Now, we come to Siddhasena who does not recognize the apprehension and comprehension of an omniscient being as two separate faculties. According to him both these faculties are identical as regards the case of the omniscient. He observes: 'We can distinguish between apprehension and comprehension up to telepathy (*manah-paryaya*). In omniscience, however, comprehension and apprehension are identical'.² He elaborates the remark in a systematic and logical manner. When perfect comprehension dawns just after the complete destruction of the veil of the relevant karma, perfect apprehension also must dawn immediately after the complete destruction of the relevant karma. And as it is unanimously admitted that both the destructions are simultaneous, it logically follows that the dawnings of perfect apprehension and perfect comprehension also occur at the same time.³ As it is accepted that there is no sensory cognition, i.e., the senses do not serve any fruitful purpose as regards the cognition of the omniscient who has completely destroyed the karmic veil that obscures cognition, so also it should be admitted that there is no separate faculty of apprehension in one who has completely destroyed the relevant karmic veil.⁴ The contention that comprehension is determinate and distinct, whereas apprehension is indeterminate and indistinct is true only in the case of an imperfect person.

¹ Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 3104-5.

² Sanmati-tarka-prakaraṇa, II, 3.

³ Ibid., II, 5.

⁴ Ibid., II, 6.

As regards a person who has destroyed all the relevant karmic obstructions, such distinction has no meaning. In his case, there is no distinction between determinate knowledge and indeterminate knowledge.¹ The difference of distinct and indistinct, determinate and indeterminate, is true only in the case of the knowledge of imperfect beings, and not regarding the knowledge of perfect ones. He further argues: If it is admitted that the omniscient apprehends the uncomprehended and comprehends the unapprehended, the conception of all perfection would be ridiculous.² According to the view of the successive occurrence of the apprehension and comprehension in the omniscient, a perfect person comprehends a fact that was not known before and apprehends a feature which was not cognised previously, since his cognition occurs in succession. In a different language, for the omniscient some aspect of an object remains unknown for ever. If such is the case, what is the charm in admitting omniscience? Moreover, in the Scriptures, omniscience has been described as having beginning but no end.³ Those who have any regard for the commandments of the Scriptures must realize the significance of this fact. If it is held that at the time of perfect apprehension, comprehension is not possible, and at the moment of perfect comprehension, apprehension is an impossibility, it would mean to admit breaking of continuity of both of them, but this is absurd, since it goes against the Scriptures that do not prescribe any break.⁴ If the destruction of the apprehension-obscuring karma and comprehension-obscuring karma takes place simultaneously, and the problem arises which of the two, perfect apprehension and perfect comprehension, should spring forth first? Naturally, the priority cannot be given to any one of them. Nor is it proper to maintain the simultaneous occurrence of both of them, for two conscious activities never synchronize. If the removal of the obstruction of both of them takes place at one and the same moment, does the question at all arise as to which of the two arises first? There is no reason why apprehension should emerge first and comprehension afterwards? Now, if the believer in the successive

¹ Sanmati-tarka-prakarāṇa, II, 11.

² Ibid., II, 13.

³ Prajñāpanā-sūtra, XVIII, 10.

⁴ Sanmati-tarka-prakarāṇa, II, 7-8.

occurrence persists in maintaining that apprehension arises first and comprehension afterwards, then with the same force of argument, the opponent may hold that comprehension appears first and apprehension afterwards. Besides, why should we admit succession at all when the removal of the obstruction is simultaneous? To refute the position of the advocates of simultaneity, Siddhasena remarks that even the view of the simultaneous occurrence is not logical, since two conscious activities cannot occur simultaneously. He further observes: 'If the omniscient knows all in one instant, he must continue to know all for ever, or otherwise, he does not know all'.¹ If it is admitted that the omniscient cognises all the modes of all the objects at one and the same time, it must be admitted that it is so at all times, otherwise he is not omniscient. Therefore, Siddhasena concludes that the apprehension and comprehension of the omniscient arise simultaneously, last for ever, and remain identical. This interpretation of the controversial problem of the occurrence of apprehension and comprehension in the omniscient does not go against the Scriptures. A doctrine that holds that there is an interval of one moment between the occurrence of apprehension and comprehension should not be accepted as a real Jaina doctrine, and is to be understood as the position of the non-Jainas.² A perfect person apprehends and comprehends directly the whole of the universe in its generic and specific forms. His conscious activity as the cognition of generic features is apprehension and the same conscious activity as the cognition of specific features is comprehension.³ Hence, it is not illogical to believe in the identity of apprehension (*darśana*) and comprehension (*jñāna*) of the omniscient. This finishes our discussion of the position of Siddhasena as regards the occurrence of apprehension and comprehension in perfect personalities. We have already stated that all the Jaina thinkers are unanimous with respect to the problem of the temporal relation between apprehension and comprehension in the case of imperfect beings. All of them believe in the successive occurrence of the two. In other words, two

¹ *Jai savvaṃ sāyāvaṃ jāyāi ekhasamaṇa savvaṃ.*

Jujjai sayā vi evaṃ ahavā savvaṃ na yāñāi.

Ibid., II, 10.

² Ibid., II, 31.

³ Ibid., II, 30.

conscious activities cannot occur simultaneously in the case of an imperfect being.

Now, how to reconcile the conflicting views we have just discussed? It is beyond any doubt that two conscious activities cannot occur simultaneously. To distinguish between two conscious activities that occur at the same moment in the same person is impossible. Temporal distinction always presupposes temporal break. There is no temporal break between two simultaneous occurrences. Hence, two conscious activities that occur simultaneously cannot be distinguished. From this logical statement it follows that Siddhasena is right in advocating the conception of identity between apprehension and comprehension in the case of a perfect being. If the relation is viewed from the standpoint of the object that is cognised by the two, there is, no doubt, a vast distinction between the two. The object cognised by apprehension is generality, whereas the object of comprehension is individuality. One apprehends the generic features of the universe, whereas the other comprehends the specific ones. Those who believe in the separate existence of apprehension and comprehension in the omniscient can be reconciled in this manner. The same fact is expressed by Yašovijaya in a different language.¹ According to him, he who admits separate identity of apprehension and comprehension but does not recognize succession, is right from the empirical standpoint that entertains distinction, the believer in the successive occurrence of apprehension and comprehension is correct from the analytic standpoint that distinguishes the borderline between cause and effect, while the upholder of the identity of apprehension and comprehension is right from the synthetic standpoint that tends to abolish distinction and establish identity. Therefore, none of these three positions can be called improper.

¹ Jñāna-bindu-prakarāṇa, p. 48.

CHAPTER III

SENSORY AND MENTAL COMPREHENSION

Comprehension, as has already been mentioned, is the determinate and definite cognition of an object. The Jaina thinkers, just like other ancient psychologists of India, recognize two varieties of comprehension: sensory and extra-sensory. Sensory comprehension is conditioned by the senses and mind, whereas extra-sensory comprehension is directly derived from the principle of consciousness, i.e., the soul. It perceives the object directly and immediately without any assistance of the senses and mind, hence, it is also called direct perception, immediate perception, or extra-sensory perception.

An objection is raised here that the statement about sensory comprehension that it is conditioned by the senses and mind is extremely inadequate. Thus, for example, visual perception has for its additional conditions the presence of the object and light. In answer to this, it is said: 'The object and light are not the conditions of cognition, because of the lack of concomitance in difference (*vyatireka*) between the two'.¹ The meaning is that the external object and light are not the direct conditions of visual perception, though it is not denied that they are remote (*vyavahita*) conditions just as time, space, and the like are. Of course, it is admitted that they are of direct service to the cause of the removal of knowledge-obscuring karma and also of direct service by benefiting the sense of vision. The question is: Then why should not they be held to be the direct conditions of the visual perception? The answer is: Because there is no concomitance in difference between them which is the most essential form of universal relationship. For instance, it is observed that the perception (illusion) of water takes place in mirage (*marīcikā*) in the desert in spite of the absence of sensation of water in it and the cats and owls have, notwithstanding the absence of light, perceptual cognition of objects in a place steeped in thick pall of darkness.

¹ *Nārthālokaḥ jñānasya nimittamavyatirekāt.*
Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, I, 2, 25.

Before we take sensory comprehension into account, let us deal with the nature and functions of the sense-organs and mind which are the necessary conditions of the emergence of sensory comprehension.

I

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF SENSE-ORGANS

The different systems of Indian psychology have different opinions as to the nature and functions of the sense-organs. These views are based on the different systems of philosophy and to some extent they are supported by the facts of experience, too.

The Buddhist recognizes six types of consciousness: visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and purely mental. Corresponding to these varieties there are six bases (*āśrayas*): the organs of vision, audition, smelling, tasting, touch, and consciousness itself; and there are six objects (*viśayas*): colours, sounds, smells, tastes, touches, and ideas.¹ Thus, there are six senses including the mind. The mind is the faculty of intellect that cognises non-sensory objects.² It is immaterial and invisible. Excluding the mind, there are five sense-organs that are called eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin. They are composed of a kind of translucent and subtle matter. Therefore, they are not perceptible. They are divided into two classes: *prāpyakārin* and *aprāpyakārin*. The former apprehend their objects when they come in direct contact with them, whereas the latter do so without coming in direct contact. The organs of smell, taste, and touch are of the former class. The organs of vision and audition are of the latter class.³

The Sāṅkhya recognizes eleven senses: five organs of knowledge, five organs of action, and mind as the internal organ.⁴ The Sāṅkhya-kārikā sometimes mentions eleven senses and sometimes thirteen.⁵ Adding intellect and ego to the above list it becomes thirteen. The Sāṅkhya, thus, recognizes two varieties of senses: external and internal. It, again, divides the external senses into two classes:

¹ Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 58.

² Ibid., pp. 96-7.

³ Ibid., p. 60.

⁴ Sāṅkhya-pravacana-sūtra, II, 19.

⁵ Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 26-7; 32-3.

sensory organs, i.e., the organs of knowledge and motor organs, i.e., the organs of action. The visual organ, the auditory organ, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, and the tactual organ are the organs of knowledge. The vocal organ, the prehensive organ, the locomotive organ, the evacuative organ, and the generative organ are the organs of action. By sensory organ the Sāṅkhya means the determinate sensory psycho-physical impulse that goes out to the external object and receives impressions from it. The motor organs are the determinate motor psycho-physical impulses which react to the objects perceived. In the language of modern psychology, the sensory organs are the receptors, whereas the motor organs are the effectors.¹ These organs are not the products of gross matter but of the ego which may be called psycho-physical. The function of the internal sense-organ, i.e., mind is reflection or discrimination. It carefully reflects upon the object intuitively apprehended by a sense-organ, and determines it as like this and unlike this, and thus, discriminates it by relating the object to its properties in the subject-predicate relation. Vijñānabhikṣu holds that the intellect (*buddhi*) and the ego (*ahaṅkāra*) are the subtle sense-organs, and the five sensory organs, the five motor organs and the mind are the gross sense-organs.² The Sāṅkhya maintains that the sense-organs move out to their objects in the form of modifications (*vyrttis*), take in their forms, andprehend them. They cannot grasp their objects without being related to them as a lamp cannot illumine objects without being related to them. If the sense-organs cognise their objects without being related to them, then they may cognise all objects, distant and hidden. But this is not a fact. Hence, the sense-organs must be conceived as moving out to their objects and assuming their forms without leaving connection with the body. This process is possible only by means of a peculiar modification of the senses.³

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school establishes the existence of five sense-organs on the ground of five types of functions. Gautama says that the existence of five sense-organs is inferred from five distinct

¹ Foundations of Psychology, pp. 21 ff.

² *Mahadāhāṅkāraḥ sūksmendriyamekādaśa ca sthūlendriyāṇi*.
Yoga-vārttika, II, 18.

³ Sāṅkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya, V, 106.

functions.¹ Vātsyāyana argues that the senses serve five purposes: touching, seeing, smelling, tasting, and hearing. These five purposes presuppose the existence of five distinct sense-organs. Touch is cognised by the tactual organ; but colour is not cognised by it. So the existence of the visual organ is inferred which serves the purpose of cognising colour. Touch and colour are cognised by the tactual organ and the visual organ respectively; but these organs do not cognise odour. So we are justified in inferring the existence of the olfactory organ that serves the purpose of cognising odour. Similarly, touch, colour, and odour are cognised by the tactual organ, the visual organ, and the olfactory organ respectively; but they do not cognise taste. So we infer the existence of the gustatory organ which cognises taste. Lastly, touch, colour, odour, and taste are cognised by the tactual organ, the visual organ, the olfactory organ, and the gustatory organ respectively; but these organs do not grasp sound. So the existence of the auditory organ is inferred that grasps sound. The function of one sense-organ cannot be performed by another sense-organ. Hence, the existence of the five sense-organs is inferred from the five types of sense-activities.² These five sense-organs correspond to the five sites. The tactual organ that cognises touch has its seat throughout the body. The visual organ which perceives colour has its seat in the pupil of eye. The olfactory organ that is indicated by the perception of odour has its site in the nose. The gustatory organ which is inferred from the prehension of taste has its site in the tongue. The auditory organ that is inferred from the cognition of sound has its seat in the cavity of ear.³ According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, all the sense-organsprehend their objects by coming in direct contact with them. The visual organ in the form of light-rays moves out to the object endued with colour. The tactual organ, the gustatory organ, the auditory organ, and the olfactory organ come in contact with their objects resting in their own sites. They, unlike the visual organ, do not move out to their objects. The sense-organs are composed of material elements of earth, water, fire, air, and ether. Therefore, each of them senses the particular quality of its element. There is a community of nature

¹ *Indriyārthapāñcatvāt.*

Nyāya-sūtra, III, 1, 58.

² Nyāya-bhāṣya, III, 1, 58.

³ Ibid., III, 1, 62.

between the sense-organs and their objects. A sense-organ perceives the distinguishing quality of that substance that enters into its constitution.¹ As regards the nature of mind, Vātsyāyana observes that mind is the internal sense-organ and points out its distinction from the external senses.² Viśvanātha holds that the mind is a sense-organ. He advances the argument that the perception of pleasure, etc., must emerge through an instrument just as the visual perception of colour arises through the instrument of eye; and this instrument is nothing but mind.³ Praśastapāda also argues that pleasure and pain are not cognised through the external senses but through an internal instrument, and that instrument is mind.⁴ Unless the mind is recognized as the internal instrument of perception, the cognition of pleasure and the like would be impossible.

The Mīmāṃsaka recognizes two kinds of sense-organs: external and internal. The olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the visual organ, the tactual organ, and the auditory organ are of the first kind. Of these, the first four are made up of earth, water, light, and air respectively. The auditory organ is of the nature of space (*dik*) confined within the ear-hole. The mind is the only internal sense-organ. It is atomic in nature, since there is no possibility of simultaneous cognitions. It operates in the perception of the self and its qualities. In the perception of external objects it acts jointly with the external sense-organs. It depends upon a particular mark (*liṅga*) in producing inferential cognition. In bringing about recollection it has to depend upon the subliminal impressions.⁵

The Śāṅkarite recognizes five sensory organs, five motor organs, and four internal organs. The five sensory organs and the five motor organs are the same as admitted by the Sāṅkhya. The Sāṅkhya recognizes three types of internal organs: mind, intellect, and ego, whereas the Śāṅkarite admits of four forms of internal organs: mind (*manas*), intellect (*buddhi*), ego (*ahaṅkāra*) and thought (*citta*). Though the internal organ is one and the same, it adopts various forms according to its different functions. When it performs the

¹ Nyāya-bhāṣya, III, 1, 62.

² Ibid., I, 1, 4.

³ Siddhānta-muktāvalī, 85.

⁴ Praśastapāda-bhāṣya, p. 152.

⁵ Śāstra-dīpikā, pp. 115-6.

function of undecisiveness it is called mind. When it serves the function of determination it is known as intellect. When it produces the notion of 'I' it is called ego. And when it accomplishes the act of recollection it is called thought. All these functions are various modifications of the same internal organ. The organ of vision, that of audition, that of smell, that of taste, and that of touch are made up of the light and bright elements (*sattva-guṇa*) of light, ether, earth, water, and air respectively in an uncombined state. The vocal organ, the prehensive organ, the locomotive organ, the excretive organ, and the generative organ are made up of the mobile and stimulating elements (*rajo-guṇa*) of ether, air, light, water, and earth respectively in an uncombined condition. The internal organs are made up of the light and bright parts of the five material elements combined.¹

The Rāmānujite admits of eleven sense-organs: five sensory organs, five motor organs, and the mind. He disproves the views of the Sāṅkhya and the Śāṅkarite stating that the so-called internal organs are nothing but various functions of one and the same internal organ, i.e., mind.² The Śāṅkarite himself admits this, so it is not an attack on the system of Śāṅkara. The Sāṅkhya, of course, recognizes the mind, the intellect, and the ego as distinct internal organs, therefore, this charge may be advanced against the Sāṅkhya system.

JAINA ACCOUNT OF SENSE-ORGANS

Now, we propose to deal with the nature and functions of the senses as recognized by the Jaina. According to him, there are five sense-organs: tactual, gustatory, olfactory, visual, and auditory having for their characteristic the capacity of perceiving touch, taste, odour, colour, and sound respectively. Each of these, again, is of two kinds: physical and psychical.³ The proof of the existence of senses is as follows: Cognitions of touch and the like must be conditioned by relevant instruments, since they are acts like the act of cutting. The senses are called '*indriyas*' because they have been

¹ Advaita-cintā-kaustubha, pp. 62-5.

² Tattva-muktā-kalāpa, p. 94.

³ *Sparśavarasagandharūpaśabdagrahaṇalākṣaṇāṇi sparśanavarasana ghrāṇacakṣuṣśrotrāṇīndriyāṇi dravyabhāvabhedāni.*
Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, I, I, 21.

produced by 'indra' which means karma, since the senses are produced by the manifestation of the physique-making (*nāman*) karma as their condition. The reason for their being named 'indriyas' may also be due to the fact that they are the distinctive marks of the self that is designated by the name 'indra'. The senses serve as the organs of perception of objects for a soul which is polluted with karma and is, thus, unable to cognise things by itself. Now, here is an objection: The cognition of an object by the self, generated as it is by a mark, viz., a sense, should be regarded as inferential. Such being the case, the inference cannot arise if there be a lack of the knowledge of the mark. If the mark were to be known by another inference, the result would be an infinite regress. The Jaina replies that the objection advanced by the opponent is baseless, since the psychical senses are self-intuitive and so there is no possibility of *regressus ad infinitum*.

The senses are classified into two categories: physical and psychical. The physical senses are caused by the rise of the corresponding physique-making karma. The psychical senses are caused by the destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopaśama*) of knowledge-obscuring karmas.

Now, what is exactly meant by the term destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopaśama*)? The Jaina philosophers recognize five different states of the soul.¹ The first of them is its essential state (*pārīṇāmika bhāva*). This is the state in which the soul possesses the characters belonging to it by its very nature which can never be changed through the manifestation of karma. The soul, for instance, can never become unconscious. The second state is the result of the manifestation of karma (*audayika bhāva*). All accidental qualities of the soul that are produced through the rise of karma belong to this state. The third state is produced by the suppression of karma (*aupaśamika bhāva*). All states of the soul arising through the subsidence of karma come under this category. The state resulting from the destruction of karma is the fourth one (*kṣāyika bhāva*). This is the consequence of the total annihilation of a particular type of karma. The fifth state is a mixed form of the second, third, and fourth states (*kṣāyopaśamika bhāva*). In it the process of the destruction-cum-subsidence of a particular kind of karma occurs. The 'completely obscuring'

¹ Tattvārtha-sūtra, II, 1.

(*sarva-ghātin*) karmic particles that are manifesting themselves are annihilated, those existing in *potentia* are suppressed, and the 'partially obscuring' (*deśa-ghātin*) ones are continued to manifest in this state.¹ Really speaking, it is a state of destruction-cum-subsidence-cum-realization (*kṣayopaśamodaya*). The term '*kṣayopaśama*' used by the Jaina authors indicates only destruction and subsidence, and not realization (manifestation) with them. The *terminus technicus* for this state is, therefore, not a very aptly chosen one. It creates unnecessary confusion in our minds. We, however, render it as 'destruction-cum-subsidence.'

The Jaina doctrine of karma ascribes different senses to different types of organism, according to the manifestation of the species of *nāma* karma. Of the five senses, the tactual sense is present in such immobile creatures as earth-bodied, water-bodied, fire-bodied, and air-bodied beings and plants. Consciousness reaches its lowest limit in these beings. The two senses, viz., the tactual sense and the gustatory sense are present in such mobile creatures as worms, pearl-mussel, helix, leeches and the like. The senses of touch, taste, and odour are present in ants, red-ants, bugs and the like. The senses of touch, taste, odour, and vision are present in black-bees, flies, mosquitoes, scorpions, spiders, butterflies, etc. All the five senses are present in fish, apodal-reptiles, limbed-reptiles, birds, men, etc.²

The Jaina, as we have stated, recognizes only five types of external organs whereas according to the Sāṅkhya and the Vedāntist there are five other organs, viz., the vocal organ, the prehensive organ, the locomotive organ, the evacuative organ and the generative organ. Such being the case, why should the number of external organs be fixed at five only? The Jaina removes the doubt in the following manner: Only those that are the conditions of specific cognitions are treated of under the head of '*indriya*'.³ If the rank of '*indriya*' were accorded to the vocal organ, etc., on the ground of their being instruments of particular varieties of physical action, the number of *indriyas* would have to be extended indefinitely, for no limit can be set to various kinds of action. It follows, therefore, from

¹ *Sarvaghātisparḍhahānāmudaykṣayāt*.....

Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika, II, 5, 3.

² *Commentary on Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I, 1, 21.

³ *Jñānaviśeṣaśeṭhināmavehendriyatvenādhihṛtatvāt*.

Ibid.

the specification of the individual senses that the number of external senses is only five. It is neither more nor less.

Similar arguments have also been advanced by the Nyāya system to refute the position of the Sāṅkhya and Vedāntist. In the Nyāya-mañjarī of Jayanta¹ it is urged that if tongue, hands, feet, etc., are regarded as *indriyas*, many other organs should also be admitted as such. The throat discharges the function of swallowing food, the breasts perform the function of embracing, the shoulders perform the function of carrying burdens. Thus, they also must be recognized as *indriyas*. If it is argued that these functions can be discharged by other organs also, then it may equally be argued that the function of swallowing food can sometimes be performed by the anus, grasping of things by the mouth and so on. Thus, the functions of the so-called motor organs are sometimes done by other organs also. But this is not the case with respect to the sensory organs. The function of one cognitive organ can never be discharged by another. A person whose eyeballs have been taken out of their sockets cannot perceive colour. But a person can grasp and walk a little even with his hands and feet amputated. Moreover, walking is not the function of feet alone; it can also be performed by hands. If the different parts of the body having different functions in the shape of actions are admitted to be motor organs, then throat, breast, shoulder, etc., also should be included in the list of motor organs. According to the Jaina conception, all the motor organs are included in the tactual sense-organ.²

As regards the relationship of these sense-organs, the Jaina holds that the senses can be regarded as mutually identical when looked at from the standpoint of substantial unity and can, again, be regarded as numerically different from one another if viewed from the standpoint of differential modes. If the identity of the senses were absolute then the consequence would be that the tactual organ would perceive taste and the rest just it does of touch. Consequently, the postulation of other organs would be a superfluity. Moreover, the perfection or the defection of one would make the corresponding perfection and defection of others. On the other hand, if the mutual difference of senses were absolute then the result would be that they

¹ Nyāya-mañjarī, pp. 482-3.

² Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika, p. 326.

could not co-operate in the generation of a synthetic judgment involving reference to the identity of the distinct sense-data, e.g., the judgment 'I see what I touch'. This type of synthetic judgment cannot be explained on the ground of mind, since the mind cannot generate such a judgment without the assistance of the corresponding senses. The same line of argument would dismiss the theories of absolute difference and absolute identity of the senses with the self. If the senses were absolutely identical with the self, the former would function as the subject or the latter would act as the organs, or both of them would function in dual capacity, for there is no difference between the two. On the other hand, if the senses were absolutely different from the self, they could not be held to belong to the self as its organs, just as the senses of other subject are not. The senses of A would not belong to the self of A, just as the senses of B do not belong to the self of A; since the senses of both A and B are equally foreign to the self of A. Or in the alternative, the reverse might be the case, i.e., the senses of A would be the senses of B and *vice versa*. The Jaina, therefore, concludes that the relation between the senses and the self should be accepted in terms of non-absolutistic position as neither absolutely different nor absolutely identical but both. They can be regarded as identical if viewed from the standpoint of substantial unity and as different when viewed from the standpoint of diversity. This kind of non-absolutistic position of the relationship of the senses with the self is approved by the verdict of experience.¹ This finishes our discussion of the problem of the nature and functions of the senses in general. It has already been mentioned that the senses are of two kinds: physical and psychical. Now, we propose to present their respective characteristics.

PHYSICAL SENSE-ORGANS

A physical sense-organ is nothing but the material atoms as possessed of a definite shape.² In other words, the atoms having a specific structural arrangement are called physical sense-organ. It is of two varieties: the organ itself and its protecting environment. The former is called *nirvṛtti* and the latter *upakaraṇa*. Thus, e.g.,

¹ Commentary on *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I, 1, 21.

² *Dravyendriyaṃ niyatāhārāḥ pudgalāḥ*.

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, I, 1, 22.

in the case of the auditory organ, the combination of the material atoms in the shape of an ellipse is the protecting environment and that in the globular shape is the organ itself.

Regarding the relationship of the physical sense-organs among one another and to the material atoms from which they are produced it should be understood in terms of identity and difference from the same standpoint of non-absolutism, since the element of identity is intelligible from the viewpoint of substantial unity and that of difference from the standpoint of differential modes.

PSYCHICAL SENSES

A psychical sense is also of two varieties: attainment and activity. Attainment is nothing but the acquisition of the potential sense-activity which consists in the destruction-cum-subsidence of that species of karma which obscures cognition. Activity is a particular conscious modification of the self, in the presence of which the self is directed to the physical sense-organ roused to activity.¹ Of these two psychical senses, the former generates the capacity of the self to prehend a relevant object, the postulation of which is necessary, since no cognition is generated in an entity which is constitutionally incompetent for prehending its object, e.g., space which is not capable of performing conscious activity. The latter is of the nature of an activity in respect of the cognition of an object. The postulation of a conscious activity as sense is necessary owing to the fact that the senses of touch, vision, etc., are not capable of prehending their objects unless they are appropriated by the conscious activity of the self. Not admitting this fact, the emergence of such cognition in deep sleep also would be a possibility. Hence, the Jaina view of postulating attainment and activity as the two varieties of the psychical senses is not unintelligible.

An objection may be raised regarding the nature of conscious activity that the conscious activity employed upon the sense-perception of a relevant object is rather the result and as such cannot be regarded as an organ which is necessarily of the nature of a condition. The Jaina replies that the objection does not apply to the present case, since certain attributes of the cause follow into the

¹ *Bhāvendriyaṃ labḥyupayogaḥ.*
Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, I, 1, 23.

effect. A lamp and the like which are the effects of fire do possess the capacity of illuminating things just as fire has the quality of illuminating objects. Moreover, it is not admitted that conscious activity is an organ in the same capacity in which it is the result. It serves as an organ in the capacity of the most-efficient instrument and becomes the result in the capacity of an act both of which characters are noticeable in it. Take the example of light. It discharges the function of the most-efficient instrument in its character as an illuminator and performs the function of effect in its character as the act of illumination, and plays the role of the agent on account of its independent status. All this is easy to explain from the standpoint of non-absolutism.

Now, let us consider the position of mind as conceived in the system of the Jainas.

POSITION OF MIND

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas recognize mind as the internal organ through which pleasure and pain are experienced. The Mīmāṃsaka also recognizes mind as the internal organ. It operates, according to him, independently in the cognition of the self and its attributes, and in the perception of external objects it acts in co-operation with the external senses. The Sāṅkhya also admits mind as an internal sense-organ. In his view, the mind is a sensori-motor organ that partakes of the nature of both the organs of knowledge and the organs of action.¹ The Vedāntists also recognize mind as an internal sense-organ.

As regards the views of the Jaina thinkers, Pūjyapāda writes in his commentary Sarvārtha-siddhi on the Tattvārtha-sūtra that mind is the internal sense-organ. It is called '*anindriya*' (not-sense) since it does not occupy a particular site in the body nor does it last for a long period, whereas the sense-organs have their seats in the different parts of the body and last for a long time. The mind is, therefore, not a sense-organ in the ordinary sense, but it enjoys a unique status, since it cognises internal activities. It is called not-sense (*anindriya*) in the sense of *quasi*-sense. Just as a girl is called '*anudarā*' (without uterus) not because she does not have a uterus

¹ *Ubhayātmaśaṅkha mānaḥ.*
Sāṅkhya-kārikā 27.

but because her womb is so small that it does not possess the capacity of conceiving, so also the mind is called 'anindriya', since it is not of the rank of ordinary sense-organ.¹ The same opinion we come across in the Tattvārtha-bhāṣya.² Vidyānanda argues that the mind is not a sense-organ because it is different from the sense-organs. The sense-organsprehend specific objects. One sense-organ cannotprehend the object of another. Such is not the case with the mind. It can cognise all objects of all the senses. So it cannot be regarded as a sense-organ. It may be argued, he further remarks, that the mind is an instrument of cognition and so it must be regarded as a sense-organ. But in that case smoke also would be a sense-organ, since it is an instrument of cognition, being a mark of inference. Hence, it is wrong to include the mind in the list of the sense-organs.³ This argument of Vidyānanda can only refute the position of a psychologist who regards mind as an ordinary sense-organ. In the case of smoke the situation is quite different, since it is not an instrument of the self, being an object of cognition. A sense-organ must be an instrument of the self, since the self is the agent that cognises. Smoke is an ordinary object that can be perceived by the external senses. The mind is not like that. It is an important instrument of the self and not an ordinary object of the senses. Hence, the status of mind is not like that of an ordinary external sense-organ, nor can it be regarded as an object of the senses like smoke. It is the internal instrument that helps the self in cognising internal states like pleasure, pain, etc. Hemacandra's account regarding the status of mind seems to be quite consistent. He gives the definition of mind as follows: Mind is the organ of cognition of all objects of all the senses.⁴ All objects of all the senses, and not specifically determined such as touch is of the tactual sense, are cognised by the mind. So it is called the organ of cognition of all objects. If the definition were worded simply as 'the mind is the cognisant of all objects', then this definition would also

¹ *Anindriyaṃ manaḥ antaḥkaraṇamīyanarthānturam.*
Iṣadindriyamanindriyamiti. Yathā, anudarā hanyā, iti.
Sarvārtha-siddhi I, 14.

² *Tattvārtha-bhāṣya, I, 14.*

³ *Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika, p. 326 (śāstra II, 15).*

⁴ *Sarvārhagrahaṇaṃ manaḥ.*
Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, I, 1, 24.

apply to the self, since the self while in all perfection cognises all the objects requiring no help of the senses, and so the phrase 'the organ of cognition' has been inserted in order to emphasise the instrumental character of the mind.¹ And thus, the definition does not extend to the self which is but the agent.

The mind is also of two types, just like the five external senses, according as it differs as physical mind and psychical mind. The physical mind is nothing but the material atoms transformed into the form of mind. The nature of the stuff of which the physical mind is made up is as under: The Jaina philosophers conceive an indefinite number of groups (*vargaṇās*) of material atoms. The first group contains only such atoms as remain alone and solitary and have not formed composite bodies with others. The second group contains the composites of two atoms; the third group contains those of three atoms and so on. By this process we arrive at a group that contains the composites of an indefinite number of atoms, which is fit for the making up of gross (*audārika*) body. There is another group of this type which is competent for the making up of transformable (*vaikriya*) body. There is still another group of atoms that is fit for forming the stuff of projectable (*āhāraka*) body. Similarly, other groups can be conceived which are capable of forming electric (*taijas*) and karmic (*kārmaṇa*) bodies, speech, respiration, and the like.² The stuff of which the physical mind is composed is one of these various types of groups which is technically known as '*manovargaṇā*' meaning thereby the group of atoms which is competent to form the mind.

The psychical mind is in the shape of attainment consisting in the destruction-cum-subsidence of the relevant obscuring karma and in the form of conscious activity of the self apt to cognise its object. Thus, from these observations we arrive at the conclusion that the status of mind in the Jaina system is just like that of the other senses, the only unlikeness being that the other senses are external and have specific objects for their cognition, whereas the mind is internal and has no special object for its cognition. It cognises all objects of all the senses, and thus, serves as an organ.

¹ *Karaṇatvapratipādanārtham 'grahaṇam' ityuktam.*

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, Commentary, I, 1, 24.

² *Āvaśyaka-niryukti, 39; Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 65.*

The internal activities, e.g., pleasure, pain, recognition, love, aversion, etc., are performed by the mind. All these activities are rooted in sense-perception. In other words, all the various states of mind are based on the sensory cognition and hence, we are justified in establishing the fact that mind is the organ of cognition of all objects of all the senses. Whatever is the object of sensory perception can also be the object of mental cognition.

PROBLEM OF CONTACT

With regard to the problem of the contact of the senses with their objects, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṅkhya, the Mīmāṃsaka, and the Vedāntist hold that all the sense-organsprehend their objects when they come in direct contact with them. The Buddhist holds that the visual organ and the auditory organ cognise their objects at a distance without coming in direct contact with them. All the other sensesprehend their objects when they come in direct contact with them. All of them agree that the mind cognises its object without coming in direct contact with it. According to the Jaina, with the solitary exception of the visual sense-organ, all the senses grasp their objects when they come in direct contact with them. The visual sense perceives its object at a distance without coming in direct contact with it. The Jaina, unlike the Sāṅkhya, does not hold that the senses move out to their objects in the form of modifications (*vṛttis*), take in their form, and cognise them, but in his opinion the objects themselves come in contact with the senses, whereas the senses remain in the same state as they are situated in their sites. One hears a word when it is in conjunction with the auditory organ but sees a coloured shape even without conjunction and so on.¹ The mind does not come in direct contact with its object. It cognises those objects that are already perceived by the other senses, hence, the question of direct contact does not arise. This is, in brief, the account of the nature and functions of the senses, including the mind, given by the Jaina thinkers in their philosophical works. As regards some purely metaphysical problems as that of the relation of identity-cum-difference of the data of the

¹ *Puṭṭhaṃ suṇodi saḍḍaṃ apuṭṭhaṃ puṇa passaṇḍe rūvaṃ.
Gandhaṃ rasaṃ ca phāsaṃ baddhaṃ puṭṭhaṃ viyāṇādi.
Āvaśyaka-niryukti, 5.*

senses and the like, we have deliberately omitted them, for they do not serve any significant purpose in the field of psychology.

We have already noted that comprehension is always determinate, definite, relational, vocal, articulate. It is as valid and real as apprehension, and is of two varieties: sensory and extra-sensory. The Buddhist is not prepared to accept determinate cognition as an organ of valid knowledge. He denies the cognitional character of determinate knowledge and admits indeterminate knowledge alone as truly cognitive in character. According to him, indeterminate cognition alone is valid and real. He argues that since determinate knowledge depends on the recollection of the name denoting its object, and not upon the direct contact of an object with a sense-organ, it cannot be regarded as truly cognitive in character. In other words, determinate cognition is not directly produced by peripheral stimulation but by the recollection of the name of object, and therefore, is not purely sensory presentation but a complex of sensory presentation and memory-image. Hence, it cannot be recognized as truly cognitive in character. Therefore, the attribute of validity cannot be ascribed to it.¹

This view of the Buddhist has been criticized by almost all the schools of Indian psychology. Prabhācandra, in his commentary *Prameya-kamala-mārttaṇḍa* on the *Parīkṣamukha-sūtra* of Māṇikyānandī, observes: 'If the Buddhist contends that determinate cognition is not valid, because it is preceded by the recollection of the name denoting its object, how does he maintain the validity of inference, since both of them depend on the recollection of the name which is necessarily preceded by verbal images'?'² Hence, determinate cognition is as valid as the other organs of knowledge are. When we perceive a man with our eyes wide open, we have a direct knowledge of the man as a man; we feel it as a direct presentation. The directness as well as the distinctness of this presentation is not an adventitious and accidental character of our cognition, but it is an intrinsic character of the determinate cognition that constitutes

¹ *Vikalpajñānaṃ hi saṃhetahāladṛṣṭatvena.....*

.....*śabdasaṃsargayogyāṃ gṛhṇīyāt.....*

Dharmottara's commentary on *Nyāya-bindu*, p. 21.

² *Śabdasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsatvādityapyasamīcīnam,
anumānepi samānatvāt.*

Prameya-kamala-mārttaṇḍa, pp. 37-8.

its essential nature. We cannot be sure of the validity of our knowledge unless it is determinate, distinct, and definite.

II

CATEGORIES OF NON-VERBAL COMPREHENSION

Sensory (including mental) comprehension is of two kinds: verbal (*śruta*) and non-verbal (*mati*). As regards the number of the categories of non-verbal comprehension (*mati-jñāna*), there is a slight difference of opinion among the different authors of the system. This difference lies in the fact that some of them have unconsciously undergone a confusion between apprehension and comprehension. Or let us express the same fact in a different way. They have dealt with the process of cognition in general without indicating its two separate divisions, viz., apprehension and comprehension. They regard even the first stage of cognition, i.e., the contact of an object with a sense-organ as a category of comprehension (*jñāna*). We have already recorded the fact that up to the stage of the awareness of the existence of an object that arises just after the sense-object-contact, is the province of apprehension (*darśana*). According to them this stage of cognition also constitutes the category of comprehension. In other words, according to their treatment apprehension itself is a form of comprehension that arises immediately after the sense-object-contact. Non-verbal comprehension is generally divided into four categories: sensation (*avagraha*), speculation (*ihā*), perception (*avāya*), and retention (*dhāranā*).

SENSATION

Umāsvāti defines sensation as the implicit awareness of their respective objects by the senses. According to him, receiving, holding, prehending, etc., are the synonyms of sensation.¹ In the Āvaśyaka-niryukti sensation is defined as the awareness of sense-data.² It has no explicit reference to the specific characters of its object.

¹ *Tatrāvyaaktaṃ yathāsvamīndriyairviśayāñāmālocanādvadhāraṇa-mavagrahaḥ. Avagraho grahaṇamālocanamavadhāraṇamītya-narthāntaram.*

Tattvārtha-bhāṣya, I, 15.

² *Atthāṇaṃ uggahaṇaṃ avaggahaṇaṃ.....*
Āvaśyaka-niryukti, 3.

Mere awareness of an object without any distinction is the proper province of sensation, according to these thinkers. This view is not capable of being defended, since from our previous discussion it is clear that comprehension (*jñāna*) is always determinate and distinct, whereas apprehension (*darśana*) is never of this character. Now, how can sensation which is indeterminate, be a category of comprehension which is always determinate? Siddhasena in his *Sanmati-tarka-prakaraṇa* remarks that the same cognition in its lengthy process is named two-fold. At its preliminary stage when the object is indistinctly apprehended, it is called apprehension and at its latter stage owing to the distinct awareness of the object, it is called comprehension. The primary stage of cognition, viz., sensation is nothing but apprehension,¹ since it is indistinct and the next stage such as that of cognising the object distinctly is called comprehension. But this is not convincing, since sensation is recognised as a category of comprehension, (*jñāna*) and as such if apprehension (*darśana*) were held to be nothing but sensation, it would follow that apprehension is a category of comprehension which is a contradiction.

Now, let us turn our attention towards the view of those logicians who define sensation in a different way. Pūjyapāda says: 'The first cognition arising immediately after the contact of a sense-organ and its object, is sensation. On the contact of the object and the sense-organ, there occurs apprehension. The cognition of the object there-after is sensation. As for example, the comprehension 'this is white colour' by the visual organ is sensation.'² This definition obviously distinguishes apprehension from sensation. Sensation follows apprehension and apprehension necessarily precedes sensation. In other words, the differentiating factor of the two is that apprehension necessarily precedes sensation but sensation never precedes apprehension. Sensation is not apprehension (*darśana*) but a category of comprehension (*jñāna*) that follows apprehen-

¹ *Daṁṣaṇamoggahamellāḥ*

Sanmati-tarka-prakaraṇa, II, 21.

² *Viśayaviśayisannipātasamanantaramādyagrahaṇamavagrahaḥ*.

Viśayaviśayisannipāte satī darśanaḥ bhavati, tadantaramarthasya grahaṇamavagrahaḥ. Yathā cakṣuṣā śuklāḥ rūpamiti grahaṇamavagrahaḥ.

Sarvārtha-siddhi, I, 15.

sion. The same view has been expressed by Akalaṅka in the *Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika* nearly in the same language¹ and in the *Laghīyastraya* slightly differently. 'Sensation is a determinate cognition of the distinctive nature of an object following the apprehension of pure existence emerging just after the contact of a sense-organ with its object.'² Immediately after the contact of a sense-organ with the object there arises the apprehension of mere existence. This very apprehension further develops into a determinate cognition. This developed state of cognition is the first stage of comprehension known as sensation. At this stage our cognition comprehends the distinctive nature of the object. Because this stage of cognition is determinate and distinct, therefore, it is a category of comprehension. Vidyānada defines sensation as 'the cognition of the specific characters of an object that follows the apprehension of the object in general born of the contact of the sense-organ with it.'³ Just after the contact of the sense-organ and the object there arises an apprehensive cognition that prehends the object in its general form. This is the first stage of cognition known as apprehension. Sensation follows this stage and cognises the specific features of the object. Vāḍideva observes: 'Sensation is the first stage of comprehension of an object determined by a secondary common feature born of the apprehension that follows the contact of the sense-organ and the object, and has mere existence as its object.'⁴ Every object is in possession of two types of general attributes: primary and secondary. The primary generality is that of existence (*sattā*) including everything. This is the highest type of universality. It is cognised by apprehension that arises just after the sense-object-contact. Every other generality is secondary because it covers a limited number of things and cannot cover all things. Sensation cognises a secondary generality and not the primary one. The primary generality, i.e., mere existence is exclusively cognised

¹ *Viśayaviśayisannipātasamanantaramādyagrahaṇamavagrahaḥ.*
Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika, I, 15, 1.

² *Akṣārthayoge sattūlokhorthāhārviśālpāṭhī avagraho*
Laghīyastraya, 5

³ *Akṣārthayogajūḍvastumātragrahaṇalakṣaṇāt.*
Jātaḥ yadvastubhedasya grahaṇaṁ tadavagrahaḥ.
Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika, I, 15, 2.

⁴ *. avāntarasāmānyākāraviśiṣṭavastugrahaṇamavagrahaḥ.*
Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, II, 7.

by apprehension. Thus, sensation is the first stage of cognition of an object determined by a secondary common character. Now, let us record the definition of sensation formulated by Hemacandra in the *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* 'Sensation is the cognition of an object that follows in the wake of apprehension upon the contact of the sense-organ with the object'.¹ As we have already discussed in detail that the contact between a sense-organ and its object is a relation competent for the rise of cognition. It is a sort of competency constituted by the situation of the object in a spatio-temporal context which is neither too far, nor too near, nor intercepted by an obstructive barrier. Now, apprehension is that cognition which does not comprehend the specific characters of an object. It arises immediately after sense-object-contact. Apprehension itself is transformed into sensation when it attains the stage of specific determination. That very object which could not be specifically determined at the apprehensive stage of cognition, attains the stage of specific determination at the subsequent stage of cognition, viz., sensation. In other words, apprehension itself undergoes transformation into the succeeding state, viz., sensation. It has been observed by Hemacandra that this state of cognition must not be taken to be a sheer mental construction, since it depends for its emergence on the active exercise of a sense-organ such as sight and also because it is not discarded by our discursive thought. A sheer mental construction is cancelled by discursive thought, but sensation is not done so. Therefore, it is not a sheer mental construction.²

Those who hold sensation to be an indeterminate cognition, i.e., a state of apprehension, divide it into two sub-classes: contact awareness and object-apprehension. Let us, in brief, discuss their nature.

CONTACT-AWARENESS AND OBJECT-APPREHENSION

Sensation is of two types: contact-awareness (*vyāñjanāvagraha*) and object-apprehension (*arthāvagraha*).³ Now, what is contact-

¹ *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I, 1, 26.

² *Na cāyaṃ mānaśo vikalpaḥ, caḥṣurādisannidhānāpekṣatvāt*....
Commentary on *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I, 1, 26.

³ *Arthasāya. Vyāñjanasyāvagrahaḥ.*

Tattvārtha-sūtra, I, 17-8.

tatthoggaho durūvo gahaṇaṃ jaṃ hoi vaṃjaṇa-tthāṇaṃ.
Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 193.

awareness? Jinabhadra defines contact-awareness as follows: 'What reveals an object even as a lamp reveals jar is contact-awareness. It is nothing but a relation between the sense-organ and the object in the form of its sense-datum such as sound'.¹ Suppose, a man is asleep and is being awakened by a call. Now, according to the Jaina, sound which is material reaches his ears and he is awakened. But this process is not completed in a moment. It requires some time to occur. The sound-atoms reach the ears of the person in succession. Innumerable instants have to pass before the ears become full of the sound-atoms so that the person may be conscious of the call. For instance, a clay-cup (*sarāva*) is to be made full of water. Before it is filled, some drops of water sink into it without demonstrating any overt sign of their separate existence. Gradually the cup is filled and the water in it becomes apparent. Similarly, the sound-atoms gradually reach the plane of consciousness of the person who is being awakened by the call.² Contact-awareness is nothing but the direct contact of an object with a sense-organ. Such being the case, it is, without any doubt, indeterminate. In other words, it is only an awakening of consciousness. Of the five sense-organs and the *quasi*-sense, i.e., mind, as we have already indicated, only four sense-organs, viz., the auditory sense-organ, the olfactory sense-organ, the tactual sense-organ, and the gustatory sense-organ are competent to establish a direct contact with their objects. Hence, it goes without saying that there are only four types of contact-awareness. The visual sense-organ is incompetent to establish a direct contact with its object, inasmuch as there is no possibility of physical contact between the eye and its object. To see a coloured shape a conjunction of the visual sense-organ with the shape is not required. The object is visualised by the sense of sight while remaining the former in its own province. This competency of the sense and its object is a specifically determinate characteristic. The mind is also incompetent for contact-

¹ *Vaṃhijjai jeyattho ghaḍovva divveṇa vaṃhjaṇaṃ taṃ ca.*
Uvagarāṇimhīyasaddāpārīṇayadavvasambandho.
Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 191.

² *Toṇa mallagaṃ piva vaṃhjaṇamāpūriyaṃ ti jaṃ bhāṇiyaṃ.*
Ibid., 250.

awareness, since it has no physical contact with its object.¹ There has been a long discussion as to the problem of the contact of the object with the visual sense and the mind in the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya*.² The essence of the discussion is as aforesaid. We do not want to discuss it here in detail.

'This is sound' is an example of object-apprehension. In this state of knowledge, the person does not cognise the exact nature of the sound.³ He is conscious of some sound but does not cognise the definite nature of it, such as from where the sound has come, whose sound is this, and the like. This is one opinion. The other opinion is that in this state, the person is aware only of the occurrence of the cognition and not of its specific content, since it lasts only for a moment.⁴ How is it possible that an instantaneous apprehension should be of a definite form? 'This is sound' is a definite cognition which is not instantaneous. Besides, it is determinate and distinct, for it is exclusive of everything else other than sound. As we have already mentioned, according to this school, sensation is indeterminate and indefinite, and hence, the cognition which is definite and determinate cannot be accommodated in the region of sensation. Hence, object-apprehension is always confined to the mere occurrence of a cognition which is indeterminate and indistinct. It does not reach the stage of the cognition of specific contents, since the stage of the cognition of a specific content is determinate and definite. In the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* an opinion is quoted that indicates the view of some Jaina thinkers who define object-apprehension on the basis of development of personality. The apprehension of a new-born child is confined to the grasping of general characters only, whereas that of a person having sufficient acquaintance with the object cognises the specific features even in one instant. This view has been criticised on the assumption that it

¹ *Na cakṣuranindriyābhyām.*

Tattvārtha-sūtra, I, 19.

² *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya*, 204-249.

³ *Se jahānāmae kei purise avvattaṃ saddaṃ suṇijjā teṇaṃ
saddo tti uggahe, no ceva naṃ jāṇai ke vesa saddāi*
Nandi-sūtra, 35.

⁴ *Saddaṇetti bhāṇai vattā tammattaṃ vī na saddabuddhī.*

Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 253.

Ārthavaggrahasya tvekosāmayikatvāt.

Commentary on the same.

will lead us to the postulation of an indefinite number of object-apprehensions, since there can be indefinite varieties of apprehension according to the varieties of the contents of the knowledge of the knower.¹

SPECULATION

It is the cognition that follows in the wake of sensation. After sensation which is the primary stage of sensory perception, there arises a cognition that enquires more facts about the specific characters of its object. In other words, speculation is the cognition knowing the object more distinctly. In sensation, as we have already discussed, there is only a general awareness of the object. In speculation, our enquiry advances towards a distinctive awareness, although we are not quite sure of the distinctive characters. We approximately grasp the distinctive features. For instance, in sensation we simply hear a sound and do not know the nature thereof. There we have a mere acquaintance of the sound. In speculation we are able to cognise the nature of the sound to a great extent. The Nandī-sūtra records the same instance like this: In sensation a person hears a sound but does not know whose sound is this, whereas in speculation he cognises the nature of the sound also and knows that it is his sound.² The Tattvārtha-bhāṣya differentiates sensation and speculation as follows: 'Sensation cognises only a part of the object, while speculation cognises the rest and strives for the determination of a specific feature.'³ Sensation, according to it, is an indistinct awareness of the object that is why it cognises only a part of its object in a general way, while speculation is a distinct cognition, and hence, it strives for the determination of the particular character of its object. Pūjyapāda defines speculation as 'the striving for a specific determination of the object that has already been cognised by sensation.'⁴ For Jinabhadra speculation means an enquiry for the distinctive feature.⁵ Akalaṅka defines

¹ Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 268-9.

² Nandī-sūtra, 35.

³ *Avagrāhite viśayārthaikadeśāccheṣānugamanam niścayaviśeṣajijñāsā ceṣṭā 'ihā'*.

Tattvārtha-bhāṣya, I, 15.

⁴ *Avagrahagrāhite tadviśeṣāhāṅkṣaṇamihā*.
Sarvārtha-siddhi, I, 15.

⁵*bheyamaggahaṇamāhchā*.
Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 180.

speculation almost in the same terminology.¹ Vidyānanda defines speculation as the enquiry for a particular feature of the object generally cognised by sensation. Speculation is different from doubt for the reason that it positively possesses the element of ascertainment.² Vāidīdeva also defines speculation similarly.³ Hemacandra gives the following definition of speculation: 'Speculation is a striving for the specific details of the object cognised by sensation.'⁴ On the reception of an objective datum by sensation, for instance a sound, there arises a doubt whether the sound comes from a conch or a horn, and the faculty of cognition begins to consider the specific points of agreement and disagreement in the form of the judgment 'it seems to be sweet which feature belongs to the sound of conch and not to be harsh which attribute belongs to the sound of horn'. This type of mental enquiry is called speculation. Now, what is the ground on which speculation is distinguished from doubt? The mental state that relates to many contradictory features, is not able to differentiate the true from the false, is incapable of excluding the wrong from the right, is called doubt. On the other hand, the mental state that strives for the ascertainment of the truth on the ground of reason, which is to be successful at the next stage without any doubt, which tends to accept the true and reject the false is called speculation.⁵ Hemacandra draws the same line of distinction between doubt and speculation in a different manner. It is certain that doubt arises in the interval between sensation and speculation even when the object is a matter of habitual perception. But its existence is not detected due to the rapidity of succession.⁶

PERCEPTION

Perception is the third variety of non-verbal comprehension. It follows in the wake of speculation. The enquiry that begins in

¹ *Avagrhīterthe tadviśeṣākāṅkṣaṇamīhā.*

Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika, I, 15, 2.

² *Tadgrhītārthasāmānye yadvīśeṣasya kāṅkṣaṇam.*

Niścayābhīmukhaṁ seḥā samśīterbhinnalakṣaṇā.

Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika, I, 15, 3.

³ *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka*, II, 8.

⁴ *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I, 1, 27.

⁵ *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya*, 183-4.

⁶ *Commentary on Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I, 1, 27.

the state of speculation attains completion at this stage. In speculation our mental state tends towards the enquiry for the right and the wrong, and in perception we attain the stage of the ascertainment of the right and the exclusion of the wrong.¹ In other words, perception is a determinate cognition of the specific feature of an object. It arises from the exclusion of the wrong and the ascertainment of the right. Now, how does perception involve the ascertainment of the existent specific feature and the exclusion of the non-existent character? Take the same instance of sound. On hearing the sound the person determines that this sound must be of a conch and not of a horn, since it is accompanied by sweetness which is the quality of conch, and not by harshness which is the quality of horn. This type of ascertainment of the existent specific feature of an object is called perception.² It is without any reference to indeterminateness as is the case with speculation. This is one view. The other view regards this stage of cognition as the mere exclusion of the non-existent qualities. It ascribes the function of comprehending the existent qualities to the latter stage of cognition, viz., retention (*dhāraṇā*).³ Retention according to this view, is an ascertainment of the right feature. The third stage is only an exclusion of the wrong one. Jinabhadra, a staunch supporter of the former view, criticises this conception as absurd. He holds that whether a cognition merely excludes the non-existent qualities or only determines the existent characters or performs both the functions, it is perception.⁴ Pūjyapāda defines perception as a 'cognition of the true nature because of the comprehension of the specific features'.⁵ On account of the cognition of the particular qualities of an object our knowledge becomes definite. This definite state of cognition is called perception. Akalaṅka supports the same view.⁶ Vidyānanda

¹ *Avagrhāte viṣaye samyagasamyagiti guṇadoṣavicāraṇādhyavṣāyāpanodopāyah.*

Tattvārtha-bhāṣya, I, 15.

² *Mahurāḍigunattanao saṃkhasseva tti jaṃ na saṃgassa.*

Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 290.

³ Ibid., 185.

⁴ *Sauvo vi ya souão*

Ibid., 187.

⁵ *Viśeṣanirjñānādvāitātmyāvagamānamavāyaḥ.*

Sarvārtha-siddhi, I, 15.

⁶ Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika, I, 15, 3.

defines perception as 'the ascertainment of a specific feature'.¹ Vālideva defines it as 'the determination of the particular feature of the object cognised in the state of speculation'.² Hemacandra also holds the same view.³ Perception, according to him, is the final determination of the specific character regarding the object of speculation as illustrated by the proposition, 'the sound must be of a conch and not of a horn'. Thus, with respect to the nature of perception, there are two opinions in the Jaina system. One opinion regards perception as only the exclusion of the non-existent characters, whereas the other opinion holds that perception involves both the determination of the existent qualities and the exclusion of the non-existent ones. The latter view seems to be more logical and consistent with the Jaina concept of knowledge. The later Jaina thinkers supported this view and not the former one.

Let us, now, state the nature of retention which is the fourth category of non-verbal comprehension.

RETENTION

Retention follows in the wake of perception. At this stage the determination that took place at the stage of perception is retained. The Nandi-sūtra defines retention as the act of retaining a perceptual judgment for a number of instants, numerable or innumerable.⁴ According to the Tattvārtha-bhāṣya, retention is the final determination of the object, retention of the cognition, and recognition of the object in the future.⁵ Thus, according to the opinion of Umāsvāti, retention develops through three stages. Firstly, the nature of the object is finally determined, secondly, the determination of the object is retained, and thirdly, the object is recognised on future occasions. These three states are, expressing the idea in the language of modern psychology, the different stages of the development of mental process in the form of memory. Jinabhadra

¹ *Tasyaiva nirṇayovāyaḥ.*

Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika, I, 15, 4.

² *Ihāviśeṣanirṇayovāyaḥ.*

Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, II, 9.

³ *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I, 1, 28.

⁴ Nandi-sūtra, 35.

⁵ *Dhāraṇā pratipattiriyathāsvaṃ matyavasthānamavadhāraṇaṃ ca.*

Tattvārtha-bhāṣya, I, 15.

defines retention as 'the absence of the lapse of perceptual cognition'.¹ At this stage the judgment which has been acquired in the third stage of comprehension, becomes so firm that it does not lapse. Like Umāsvāti he also admits three stages of retention. As he says: 'The absence of lapse of the perceptual judgment of the object, the formation of mental trace, and the recollection of it again in the future constitute the fourth category of non-verbal comprehension. All of them follow in the wake of perception.'² These three varieties are quite similar to the stages admitted by Umāsvāti. Pūjyapāda defines retention as 'the condition of the absence of forgetting in the future of what has been cognised in the state of perception'.³ Akalaṅka defines it as 'the absence of forgetting the same of what has been cognised by perception'.⁴ Vidyānanda defines it as 'the condition of recall'.⁵ It is, like the other categories, of the nature of cognition, since it is the condition of another cognition called recollection. Vādīdeva gives a different definition. According to him, retention is the consolidation of perception.⁶ It is the gradual consolidation and the absence of the lapse of perceptual cognition for some time because of the mindfulness of the cogniser.⁷ He criticises the view of those who regard retention as the condition of recall in the future. It has been observed by him that retention is nothing but the consolidation of perception for a certain length of time. It is not the condition of recall in the future, since it is a category of perceptual cognition and, hence, cannot last up to the time of recollection. Furthermore, if it were to last up to that time, it would be impossible to cognise anything else during that interval, inasmuch as even the exponents of the said view are not prepared to admit the presence of two conscious activities at the same

¹ *aviccui dhāraṇā tassa.*

Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 180.

² *Ibid.*, 291.

³ *Aveśasya hālāntare avismaraṇakāraṇam dhāraṇā.*

Sarvārtha-siddhi, I, 15.

⁴ *Nirjñātārthāvismṛtirdhāraṇā.*

Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika, I, 15, 4.

⁵ *smytihetuḥ sā dhāraṇā.*

Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika, I, 15, 4.

⁶ *Sa eva dṛḍhatamāvasthāpanno dhāraṇā.*

Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, II, 10.

⁷ *Syādvāda-ratnākara*, II, 10.

time. Thus, how can retention be defined as the condition of recall? We recollect our past experience on account of the special capacity of the soul to remember past events. The faculty of retention cannot be regarded as the cause of recollection. Retention, however, can be admitted as a remote cause of recall, and not as the immediate one, since it is not an impossibility to admit so many remote causes of an event.¹ Hemacandra does not totally agree with this view. He supports the other view also. According to him, 'retention is the condition of recollection'.² This condition is nothing but the causal stuff capable of change into the effect called recall that consists in the recollection of past events. To express the same idea in a different manner, retention is nothing but the latent mental trace left over as legacy by previous experience. It is, thus the continued existence of a particular perceptual judgment for a certain length of time. Hemacandra further remarks that this latent mental trace should be admitted as a species of cognition on the ground that it is a category of non-verbal comprehension. It should not be supposed that it is different from cognition as such, because if it were not cognitive in character, it could not produce recall which is a category of cognition. One kind of existence is impossible to be transformed into another kind of existence which is opposite in nature. If retention in the form of hidden mental trace were not cognitive in nature, it could not be an attribute of the self, inasmuch as the attribute of a conscious entity cannot be non-conscious in nature.³ Now, as regards the controversy between the two schools as to the nature of retention, Hemacandra tries to reconcile it. The older Jaina thinkers assert that the absence of lapse is also a case of retention. The following statement of the Viśeṣā-vaśyaka-bhāṣya 'the absence of lapse is retention' may be quoted in support. How then have you stated that the condition of recollection alone is retention? This is the problem that has been put before him, He gives the following answer: True, there is such a thing as absence of lapse which is called retention. But it is included within the fold of perception. This is the reason why it

¹ Syādvāda-ratnākara, II, 10.

² *Smṛtiheturdhāraṇā*.

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, I, 1, 29.

³ Commentary on Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, I, 1, 29.

has not been separately mentioned. Perception when continued for a certain length of period is entitled as retention in the shape of the absence of lapse. Or let us hold that absence of lapse is also a condition of recollection, and it has been included within the fold of retention as defined by us. Mere perception bereft of the absence of lapse cannot give rise to recollection. The perceptual cognitions which are not of the nature of attentive reflection are almost on the level of the unattended cases of perception as the touch of grass by a person in hurried motion and such cases of cognition are incapable of giving rise to recollection.¹

MEMORY AND ITS PROCESS

From our description of the nature of retention it is obvious that memory has been affirmed to be a species of cognition in the Jaina system. Modern psychology regards memory as a specific kind of revival or reproduction of past events. It includes the following factors: Retention, reproduction, recognition, and localisation. To remember an event, the event must have been experienced before and the experience must have been retained or preserved in the mind in the form of an unconscious trace. This is called retention. But the mere retention of a percept is not memory. It must be reproduced in the shape of an image. Thus, one may retain the multiplication-table in the mind, but he is not said to remember it until the table is actually revived in consciousness in the form of visual or verbal images. This stage is called reproduction. Again, any vague reproduction cannot be regarded as memory proper. The image reproduced must be recognised as the image of a former percept. The image must be known to be the image of the object which was experienced in the past. This state of cognition is called recognition. Further, in memory the percept reproduced is referred to a particular point of time in the life-history of the individual. In other words, the reproduced percept is understood as having occurred at such and such a time. Along with this there is also a reference to the place of occurrence. For instance, I may have simply a visual image of a cow, i.e., only a mental picture of it. This is not memory. But when the image is understood as of one that I saw at the dairy last year, i.e., when I recognise and localise the image, then alone I may be truly said to remember

¹ Commentary on *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I, 1, 29.

the cow. This stage of memory is called localisation.¹ Thus, retention implies the process or power of preserving the unconscious traces or dispositions of past percepts. Reproduction is the revival of past percepts in the form of images and ideas that pre-supposes the retention of those percepts in the shape of mental traces. Recognition means the cognition of an object knowing it to be old and familiar or as something perceived before. Localisation is the recognition of the object having a temporal and spatial reference to it. In the light of modern psychology, it will be easy to understand the Jaina concept of memory. We have already discussed the position of retention as a latent mental trace. Now, let us turn to the nature of recollection which is also known as reproduction, revival, recall, or representation.

RECOLLECTION

Recollection is the cognition that has the stimulus of a latent mental trace for its condition. It refers to its content by a form of the pronoun 'that.'² The latent mental trace is nothing but the disposition retained by our past experience. Its emergence to the surface of consciousness constitutes the stimulation of recollection. The emergence of recollection is necessarily conditioned by this sort of stimulation. Unless and until this type of stimulation is present, recollection cannot emerge. But how does the latent mental impression serve as the stimulus for the emergence of recollection? It requires another stimulus. The disposition of past percepts, though it may have continued for a certain length of time, does not operate as the cause of recollection unless it is awakened by another stimulus. The stimulus to excite it is admitted to be two-fold by the Jaina.³ First of all, the person reproducing his past experience must be competent to do so. Now, what is this competency? It is nothing but the destruction-cum-subsidence of the obscuring karmic veils. This condition is common to every type of cognition. Even the highest type of knowledge, viz., omniscience cannot emerge unless

¹ Psychology (Dutt), pp. 117-8.

² *Vāsanodbodhahetukā tadityākārā smṛtiḥ.*

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, 1, 2, 3.

³ *Āvaraṇākṣayaopāśamasadṛśadarśanādisāmagrīlabdhaprabodhā tu smṛtiḥ janayati.*

Commentary on *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, 1, 2, 3.

complete destruction of the knowledge-obscuring veils takes place. For the emergence of recollection also this condition is necessary. The second factor is nothing but the external conditions that bring the disposition to maturation. It includes the observation of similar objects and the like. Now, mere observation of similar objects and such other conditions are not enough to arouse recollection, since sometimes it happens that such conditions as the observation of similar objects and the like being present recollection does not arise. All the external conditions may be there to arouse recollection and, yet, recollection does not emerge because of internal incompetency. Unless the mental make-up is efficient enough to recollect what has been experienced in the past, no emergence of recollection is possible. Mere external causes cannot give rise to internal activities. In co-operation with internal states only external conditions can produce certain mental functions. For this very reason the Jaina thinkers admit both internal and external conditions as the cause of recollection. One without the other is incapable of giving rise to it. However, when the requisite conditions such as the destruction-cum-subsidence of the obstructive veils, observation of similar objects, and the like, are at work to bring the latent mental trace to maturation, the disposition produces recollection. The external conditions necessary for the act of recalling may be classified into three types. These three types represent the three laws of association and suggestion of ideas. They help in reviving a previously perceived phenomenon. They are the law of contiguity, the law of similarity, and the law of contrast. The contents of recollection are expressed by a form of the pronoun 'that', inasmuch as it refers to our past percepts. Thus, all the cognitions that point to their contents as that jar, that cloth, that ear-ring, and the like, are the cases of recollection. The line that distinguishes recollection from perception is that perception always refers to its content as existing in the present, whereas recollection always has reference to its content as existed in the past. There are other differences as well. We need not state them here. Now, let us turn to another factor of memory, viz., recognition.

RECOGNITION

Recognition is a synthetic judgment born of perception, i.e., direct sensory observation and recollection. It is represented by

such forms of deliverance as 'that necessarily is it,' 'it is like that,' 'this is dissimilar to that,' 'this is different from that,' and so on.¹ Recognition is a complex mode of cognition. It includes both perception and recollection. Perception is the direct observation of the objects existing before our sense-organs. Recollection, as we have already stated, is reproduction of the latent mental trace. These two are the conditions of recognition. Thus, recognition is a kind of synthetic judgment. When perception and recollection are combined in a particular form, recognition emerges. As recollection refers to its content by a form of the pronoun 'that,' recognition delivers its contents in forms like the following: 'That necessarily is it' is one of the forms. It is the judgment of identity. All such judgments as 'this is necessarily that jar,' 'this is necessarily that cloth,' 'this is necessarily that man' are the cases of this type. When the same object is cognised on different occasions, such judgments occur. 'This is like that' is the judgment of similarity. When we happen to come across an object which is similar to another one that has already been experienced, such judgment as 'this is like that' emerges. All such judgments as 'this book is like that one,' 'my watch is like that of yours,' are the cases of the judgment of similarity. There are certain judgments that are just reverse to the judgments of similarity. 'The buffalo is dissimilar to the cow,' 'the horse is dissimilar to the ass,' and the like can be mentioned as examples of this variety of judgment. This is called the judgment of dissimilarity. There is also the judgment of difference. All such judgments as 'ten is less than twenty,' 'five is more than three,' 'the elephant is heavier than the camel,' are cases of the judgment of difference. The difference between the judgment of dissimilarity and that of difference lies in the fact that the objects of the former have some similarity, whereas the objects of the latter are quite different from one another. It is proper to say that the cow is dissimilar to the buffalo but to state that ten is dissimilar to five is not proper. Sometimes the judgment of dissimilarity is merged into the judgment of difference, as for instance, it is not improper to cite that the cow is different from the buffalo. Dissimilarity and difference are however, two separate concepts.

Now, an objection may be raised against the very notion of recognition. We do not come across any phenomenon called recognition, which is given out as an independent category of cognition, as anything different from the two cognitive acts, viz., 'recollection' indicated by the form 'that' and 'perception' indicated by the word 'this.' When both these mental processes are in fusion, we derive the notion of recognition. Thus, strictly speaking, recognition is not separate factor of our cognition. This contention is not a sound one. Recognition is not merely a combination of recollection and perception but something more. The object of recognition is the entity that stands out as the identity in and through its precedent and subsequent states.¹ This identity cannot be the content of recollection, since recollection cognises only what has been perceived before. As has been stated: 'Recollection cognises only what has been known before and refers to its content as 'that,' whereas recognition establishes the identity of a past datum with a present one in the form 'that is this.' Therefore, the content of recognition is certainly different from the datum of recollection.² Nor can this identity be the content of perception which is confined to the present state of an object only. In other words, the province of perceptual cognition is limited to what is actually present and given to the senses. 'That which is in direct contact with the senses and actually present, is directly grasped by the senses of sight and the like.'³ Hence, the identity of a past object and a present datum cannot lie within the jurisdiction of sensory perception. Therefore, we are justified to conclude that the province of recognition is different from that of recollection and perception. No doubt, recognition is a synthetic judgment born of perception and recollection, but it cannot be regarded as the mere combination of the two, inasmuch as it is a new state of the mind as a unitary cognition. Hence, it is not a sound contention that there is no cognition different from perception and recollection, for recognition is a different state of

¹ *Pūrvāparābhāvāikadhurīṇaṁ hi dravyaṁ pratyabhijñānasya viṣayaḥ.*
Commentary on *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, 1, 2, 4.

² *Pūrvapramitāmātre hi jñāte sa iti smṛtiḥ. Sa evāyamitiṣṭiṣṭi tu*
pratyabhijñānātrekiṇī.
Tattva-saṅgraha, 453.

³ *Sambaddhaṁ vartamānaṁ ca gṛhyate cakṣurādīnā.*
Śloka-vārttika, IV, 84.

knowledge which is distinctly felt to arise subsequently to perception in co-operation with recollection. This account is enough to establish the validity of the notion of recognition advocated by the Jaina thinkers. As regards the fourth factor of memory, viz., localisation, it has not been separately treated in the Jaina works on knowledge. It is included within the fold of recognition. Therefore, we do not propose to discuss it separately.

REASONING

We have so far discussed how materials of sensory perception are picked up in the forms of sensation, speculation, and perception. We have also seen how these materials are preserved and recalled in the various forms of memory. Now, we propose to take up reasoning that helps us in arriving at certain conclusions in our experience. Reasoning elaborates and expands the materials collected and conserved by the above-mentioned processes. It is an immense extension of the bounds of our experience that lies in the form of sensory comprehension. It enables us to rise above the particular and grasp the universal. It helps us in getting a glimpse of the remote past, unseen present, and distant future. It is through reasoning that we discover the mutual relations of different facts and form different concepts. It is the power of reasoning upon which our inferential judgments are based. Inferential judgments cannot emerge in the absence of the proper assistance of reasoning. Now, let us take into account the nature of reasoning held by the Jaina thinkers. We are aware of the fact that their account is chiefly based upon logical enquiry, but it is also in our knowledge that it is not such which cannot be claimed to be psychological. Moreover, to a certain extent, logical enquiry itself is psychological.

Reasoning may be defined as the mental process of passing from some given judgments to a new one. For instance, we observe smoke and fire together in our experience. This observation is not confined to one or two cases only. We observe the same on so many occasions and reach the final conclusion that smoke is necessarily related to fire. On the basis of this, we infer the existence of fire from the sight of smoke. Our inferential judgment develops through the process of reasoning somewhat in the following way: 'I saw smoke and fire together so many times, and I never saw smoke

without fire, although I sometimes saw fire without smoke; because here is smoke, therefore, here must be fire.' In short, our reasoning derives the conclusion that whatever is a case of smoke is invariably the product exclusively of fire. Take another example. A burnt child dreads fire. His fear is based on reasoning. 'Fire once burnt me; what I see before me is fire; therefore, it will burn me again if I put my hand into it.' This is a simple instance to show how the process of reasoning begins and arrives at a definite conclusion. Thus, reasoning is a synthesis of different judgments in the form of premises and a conclusion in the shape of inferential judgments. The former, i.e., the form of premises is called inductive reasoning and the latter, i.e., the form of inferential conclusions is called deductive reasoning. Thus, reasoning takes two main forms: induction and deduction. Induction is that form of reasoning in which we draw a general conclusion from particular cases. In deduction, on the contrary, we draw particular conclusion from general premises. Induction and deduction, really speaking, are not absolutely distinct processes but only two steps in the selfsame process of reasoning. This unitary process consists in passing from the particular through the general to the particular again. The Jaina admits both these forms.

We have, now, discussed the first variety of sensory and mental comprehension, viz., non-verbal comprehension (*matī-jñāna*). Now, we come to the problem of verbal or scriptural comprehension (*śruta-jñāna*) which comes next in order. The mind and the auditory sense are the chief organs that give rise to verbal comprehension. Bearing this fact in mind we propose to discuss the nature of verbal comprehension.

III

VERBAL COMPREHENSION

As non-verbal comprehension is essentially conditioned by the destruction-cum-subsidence of *matī-jñānāvaraṇa* karma, so also verbal or scriptural comprehension is necessarily conditioned by that of *śruta-jñānāvaraṇa* karma. Verbal comprehension is the knowledge derived from the reading or hearing of words of trustworthy persons. The knowledge embodied in scriptures, i.e., in

the works of reliable authorities is also called verbal knowledge. Verbal comprehension is necessarily preceded by non-verbal comprehension (*mati-jñāna*). As has been observed by Umāsvāti: 'Scriptural comprehension is preceded by non-verbal comprehension. The difference of the two is that non-verbal comprehension comprehends only what is present, whereas scriptural comprehension knows what is present, past, and future'.¹ As regards the types of scriptural comprehension, there may be as many as the number of letters and their different combinations, since the very foundation of scriptural comprehension is verbal assertion, and such being the case, it is not possible to enumerate all the types.² Bhadrabāhu mentions fourteen salient features of scriptural comprehension. They are: alphabetic, discursive, right, having beginning, having end, containing repetition, that which is included in the original scriptures, non-alphabetic, non-discursive, wrong, having no beginning, having no end, containing no repetition, and that which is excluded from the original scriptures.³ He further enumerates eight qualities of intellect necessary to give rise to verbal comprehension. These qualities are: desire for hearing, repeated questioning, attentive hearing, grasping, enquiry, conviction, retention, and right action.⁴ To properly grasp the importance of verbal comprehension let us understand the nature of alphabet. The Nandi-sūtra recognises three varieties of alphabet; script, sound, and learning. The shape of a letter is called script or alphabet proper. The spoken letter is nothing but sound. Learning is the competency to follow the meaning of the letters and their combinations.⁵ The first two varieties are only material symbols written or spoken. The third

¹ *Śrutajñānaṃ matijñānapūrvakam bhavati-.... Sāmpratakālavīṣayaṃ matijñānam. Śrutajñānaṃ tu trikāla-vīṣayam-....*
Tattvārtha-bhāṣya, I, 20.

² *Patteyamakṣharāṇi akṣharasamjoga jattivā loe Evaiyā suyanāye payadto hoṃti nāyavvā.*
Āvaśyaka-niryukti, 17.

³ *Akṣhara saṃpī sāiyam-....*
Ibid., 19.

⁴ *Sussūsaī paḍipucchai suṇei gīṇhai ya īhae vāvi.*
Tatto apohae vā dhārei harei vā samman.
Ibid., 22.

⁵ *Sañjñākṣara, vyañjanākṣara, and labdhyakṣara.*
Nandi-sūtra, 38.

variety is verbal comprehension proper, inasmuch as it is a kind of cognition which is different from material symbols. It can be produced through any of the senses and the mind provided it involves verbal assertion. Thus, it is natural that only those who possess the faculty of speech are capable of verbal comprehension. When we hear a sound or see a coloured shape, there arises in the wake of sensory perception, i.e., non-verbal comprehension, a cognition having appropriate words composed of various letters following the conventional vocabulary. This type of cognition is called verbal comprehension.¹ Now, a question may be raised in this connection. If the objects of all the sense-organs can produce verbal comprehension, where lies the differentiating factor of non-verbal comprehension and verbal comprehension? The answer is as follows: Conscious exercise of the faculty of language is the essential condition of verbal comprehension, but such is not the case with non-verbal comprehension. A perception that does not involve conscious reference at the time of the application of vocabulary, falls in the category of non-verbal comprehension. Such perception is not scriptural in nature. Mere verbal application is not said to be of the nature of scriptural cognition. The perception must involve conscious attempt on the part of the knower at the application of vocabulary if it is to be entitled to be called verbal comprehension. Jinabhadra gives the same answer in the following manner: 'The knowledge that emerges on account of the activity of the sense-organs and mind, is possessed of proper words according to the conventional application, and is capable of expressing its object clearly, is verbal comprehension, whereas the rest is non-verbal comprehension.'² Speculation, simple perceptual judgment, and the like are also possessed of proper language, but nevertheless, they fall in the category of non-verbal comprehension, since there is no deliberate application of language in these cases. Mere verbal association is not considered sufficient to raise a cognition to the status of verbal comprehension. True, in our

¹ Haribhadra's Commentary on Nandī-sūtra, 39.

² *Indiyanamāṇimittāṃ jaṇ vṛṇṇāṇaṃ suvāṇusāreṇa.
Nīyayathuttisamatthāṃ taṃ bhāvaśuvāṃ māi sesaṃ.
Viśeṣāśyaka-bhāṣya, 100.*

usual perception we associate the object with its name as soon as we perceive it. But we do not proceed any further. There are cases of perceptual cognitions which do not stop at simple verbal association but continue further into discursive thought with the assistance of language. It is only this continuation that leads them to the category of verbal comprehension. Thus, those cognitions which are totally free from all verbal association or at best are associated with the mere names of their objects without any reference to the conventional usage, fall in the category of non-verbal comprehension, whereas their further continuations with the help of the conscious exercise of the gift of language in accordance with the conventional vocabulary come under the head of verbal comprehension.¹

On account of the significant rôle played by language in giving rise to verbal comprehension, the auditory sense-organ is considered to be the chief instrument of producing this variety of comprehension. As has been remarked by Jinabhadra: 'Verbal comprehension is the cognition born through the auditory sense-organ.'² As we have already indicated, verbal comprehension is necessarily preceded by non-verbal comprehension. Let us elaborate this point. The perception of sound as such by the auditory sense-organ is regarded as non-verbal comprehension. It is admitted by the Jaina thinkers that all cases of verbal comprehension born through any sense-organ are to be regarded auditory perceptions, since the verbal assertions of these cognitions are competent to be made only by the auditory organ. As regards the perception of articulated words, it is obviously accomplished through the auditory sense-organ. Regarding those words which are in the shape of thought, and not in the form of language, it can be maintained that, though they are not actually pronounced yet potentially they also serve as the objects of auditory perception.³ Therefore, it is justifiable to hold that verbal comprehension born of whatever sense-organ, is as a rule preceded by auditory perception.

¹ Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 56.

² Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 117.

³soopaladadhireva suyam

Ibid., 125-6.

DIFFERENTIATION OF NON-VERBAL AND VERBAL COMPREHENSION

To differentiate verbal comprehension from non-verbal one it is further stated that the perception of a person which has any conscious reference to his previous cognition is verbal and that of the same person, free from any conscious exercise of his previous learning, is non-verbal.¹ It is improper to differentiate the two on the ground that verbal comprehension is associated with words, whereas non-verbal comprehension is free from language. If all types of non-verbal comprehension were regarded as devoid of association with language, there would be no speculation, perceptual judgment, and the like, inasmuch as without verbal assertion there is no possibility of perceptual comprehension. Consequently, it will be an impossibility to differentiate the characteristics of a man from those of a post. The determination of particular features presupposes the assistance of language.² Jinabhadra, in his *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya*, quotes an opinion that discriminates non-verbal comprehension from verbal comprehension on the ground that the former, like a dumb person, can reveal its object to the knower alone, whereas the latter can reveal its content to others as well. Jinabhadra does not agree with this opinion. He argues that both non-verbal comprehension and verbal comprehension are varieties of knowledge, and thus, no question of revelation does arise. Moreover, no doubt, verbal comprehension in the shape of articulated words can convey its meaning to others, but the same is the case with non-verbal comprehension also. Our physical gestures such as nodding, hand-shaking, and the like that reveal their contents to others are related to non-verbal comprehension in the same way as language is related to verbal comprehension. Nevertheless, Jinabhadra realises the truth that language is an exceedingly important instrument of conveying knowledge to others, and hence, it is recognised as the cardinal factor of verbal comprehension. He further maintains that physical gestures also perform the function of words, since they, too, convey our intention. We make their

¹ *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya*, 121.

² *Jai mairanakkhavaracciya bhavajja nehādao nirabhilapfe.*
Thānu-purisaipajjāyavivego kiha nu hojīāhi.
Ibid., 163.

use in place of language for revealing our purpose. Hence, they also fall in the category of language.¹ Therefore, the view that distinguishes non-verbal comprehension from verbal comprehension on the ground that the former cannot reveal its contents to others, while the latter can reveal its contents to others as well, is, from this standpoint, justifiable. Pūjyapāda maintains that all varieties of cognition except verbal comprehension are for one's own self and not for others, for they are not capable of expressing themselves to others. Verbal comprehension in the form of knowledge reveals its contents to the knowing self alone, whereas in the shape of verbal expression it reveals its contents to others as well.² The same truth is accepted by Akalaṅka in a different mode. According to him our cognitions constitute the nature of non-verbal comprehension so long as they are free from verbal association. As soon as they are associated with verbal assertion, they come under the category of verbal comprehension.³ In other words, all forms of knowledge fall in the category of non-verbal comprehension so long as they are not expressed in language. They fall in the category of verbal comprehension as soon as they are expressed in words. Thus, non-verbal comprehension is limited to the cogniser himself, whereas verbal comprehension conveys its message to others as well. In brief, non-verbal comprehension is the primary stage in the process of the development of comprehension, while verbal comprehension constitutes the secondary stage in the evolution of comprehension. Non-verbal comprehension is not conditioned by conscious application of the conventional vocabulary, whereas verbal comprehension necessarily presupposes conscious exercise of the gift of language associated with the conventional vocabulary. It is immaterial whether the content is actually expressed to others or not. The point of importance is that the comprehension which is scriptural, must be competent to reveal its content to others when occasion arises. Jinabhadra's view seems to be more intelligible with respect to the nature of the distinction

¹ Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 171-5.

² *Tatra svārthaṁ pramāṇaṁ śrutavarjyam. Śrutaṁ punaḥ svārthaṁ bhavati parārthaṁ. Jñānātmakaṁ svārthaṁ vacanātmakaṁ parārthaṁ.*

Sarvārtha-siddhi, I, 6.

³ Laghūyastraya, 10-11.

between non-verbal comprehension and verbal comprehension. The knowledge that is due to the activity of the sense-organs and mind, is couched in proper words in accordance with the conventional usage, and is capable of expressing its object to others, is actually scriptural, while the rest is non-scriptural. Object-apprehension, speculation, perceptual judgment, and the like are also couched in proper words, but nevertheless, they fall in the category of non-verbal comprehension, inasmuch as there is lack of conscious application of language in these cases of cognition. Mere verbal expression is not sufficient to raise a cognition to the status of verbal comprehension. The knowledge that does not stop at simple verbal association, but continues to develop into discursive thought with the help of deliberate application of language in accordance with the conventional usage, is of the category of verbal comprehension.

CHAPTER IV

EXTRA-SENSORY PERCEPTION

Indian psychologists have distinguished between sensory perception and extra-sensory perception. Extra-sensory perceptions are above the laws of sensory perceptions. They do not require any help of the general laws and conditions of normal cognition. They transcend the categories of time, space, and the like. The nature of extra-sensory perception is beyond our ordinary understanding. Except the Cārvākas and the Mīmāṃsakas all the schools of Indian psychology believe in the occurrence of extra-sensory perceptions. The Cārvākas do not admit any other source of valid cognition than sensory perception. The Mīmāṃsakas believe in the impossibility of extra-sensory perception, since the Vedas are of superlative importance, according to them, and hence, the past, the future, the distant, the subtle, and the like can be known only through the injunctions of the Vedas. The philosophers believing in the occurrence of extra-sensory perception prove its validity on the basis of speculative arguments. According to the Buddhist, extra-sensory perception is produced by constant contemplation of the ultimate truths when it reaches the highest limit of perfection. The Sāṅkhya maintains that the so-called future objects are present as latent or potential, and the so-called past objects are present as sub-latent. The person possessing the peculiar power of super-normal perception can cognise the past and future objects which are not non-existent at present, but exist only as sub-latent and potential respectively. Patañjali holds that our ordinary mental functions can be arrested by a constant practice of meditation and concentration. Trance (*samādhi*) is the consummation of the long and arduous processes of the inhibition of bodily activities, regulation of breathing, withdrawal of the mind from distracting influences, fixation of the mind on a certain object, and constant meditation on the same. When the mind by deep concentration on an object is transformed into it and feels at one with it, that condition of the mind is called 'trance.' This state of the mind is super-normal, according to the Pātañjala school. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system

also divides perceptions into two categories: ordinary and extraordinary. Ordinary perception has been defined as the direct and immediate comprehension of gross objects, produced by a particular relation between the sense-organs and their objects with the help of light, time, space, and merit or demerit of the person. Extraordinary perception has been defined as the direct and immediate cognition of distant, past, future, and subtle objects. The Vedāntists accept the view of the Pātañjala school in its entirety.¹ It is evident from this brief account that the concept of extra-sensory perception is not new to the Indian mind.

Now, let us record the evidence of psychical research to measure the validity of extra-sensory perceptions.

PSYCHICAL RESEARCH ON EXTRA-SENSORY PERCEPTION

It is a general conclusion of modern scientific psychology that all our ideas, images, and concepts are mere representatives of the sensory perceptions that have been acquired in our experience. No element of cognition can ever be found in the mind that has not entered there through the windows of the senses. Thus, our cognitive structure is nothing but our sensory experience limited in time and space.

There has been ample research work in the field of Psychical Research that shows the possibility of cognition independent of the assistance of the senses and mind. Such phenomena as clairvoyance, telepathy, clairsaudience, and the like have been recorded to prove the validity of the occurrence of extra-sensory perceptions. 'Clairvoyance and telepathy are a primary datum of scientific observation. Those endowed with this power grasp the secret thoughts of other individuals without using their sense-organs. They also perceive events more or less remote in space and time. This quality is exceptional. It develops in only a small number of human beings. But many possess it in a rudimental state. They use it without effort and in a spontaneous fashion.'² Professor McDougal writes: 'The ancient belief in clairvoyance seems also in a fair way established. Further, pre-cognition or fore-sight of events that

¹ Indian Psychology: Perception, pp. 335-55.

² Man, the Unknown, p. 124.

lie in the future is also under experimental investigation that seems to promise positive results.¹ Bavink observes: 'It is agreed that there is such a thing as true knowledge of the contents of another person's mental life, which is not transmitted in the usual way by the known senses. Even such critical investigators as Lehman, Dessoir, and Baerwald admit today the existence of genuine telepathy.'² Saltmarsh says: 'As a matter of personal opinion and as a result of prolonged and careful study of the evidence, I am forced to the conclusion that non-inferential precognitions do occur, that is to say, that chance, illusion of memory, or any other normal cause cannot account for all the cases of fore-knowledge which have been investigated and published.'³ Dr. T. W. Mitchell is reported to have said in the course of a paper: 'Telepathy or some mode of acquiring knowledge which for the present we might call super-normal must be admitted, for if we refuse to accept telepathy we stood helpless in the face of well-attested phenomena which we could not account for and could not deny.'⁴ Professor. H. H. Price writes: 'The evidence for telepathy and clairvoyance is both abundant and good; and the evidence for pre-cognition—the most paradoxical, perhaps, of all super-normal phenomena is very considerable.'⁵ Professor Richet, a great French psychologist, admits that telepathic lucidity certainly exists. There is a great faculty of cognition in human beings that brings information which could not possibly be acquired by the normal senses. The faculty of cryptaesthesia is not limited by time and space.⁶ Dr. Rhine holds that extra-sensory perception is an actual demonstrable occurrence. It is not a sensory phenomenon. It seems to be a fairly dependable and persistent capacity when it is given proper conditions for its functioning.⁷ In an interesting analysis of the spontaneous cases of fore-

¹ Riddle of Life, p. 235.

² Anatomy of Modern Science, p. 523

³ Foreknowledge, p. 114.

⁴ London Times, dated September 6, 1927.

⁵ Questions about Telepathy and Clairvoyance, Philosophy, October, 1940.

⁶ Thirty Years of Psychical Research, pp. 203-4. (Cryptaesthesia is a general term covering the varieties of supernormal modes of sensibility, such as telepathy, clairvoyance, clairaudience, and the like.)

⁷ Extra-sensory Perception, pp. 220-3.

knowledge collected by the Society for Psychical Research which was made by Mr. H. F. Saltmarsh in 1934, it was found that 349 cases existed which had been considered good enough for publication. Mr. Saltmarsh drastically criticised these and rejected 166 on the score of slight vaguenesses or other features he did not consider quite satisfactory. An irreducible score of 183 remained. There is also a mass of cases in the files which do not reach publication-standard, and it must be remembered that the number of cases in which people observe the precautions necessary for evidence form only a small proportion of the total number which occur. There can be little doubt that if all the cases of telepathy and fore-knowledge were properly evidenced and duly reported, the weight of evidence would be overwhelming. In any case a study of these 183 cases is indispensable for anyone who wishes to make up his mind regarding pre-cognition.¹ All these evidences can be considered good enough to establish the fact that such thing as extra-sensory perception does exist. Clairvoyance and telepathy which are the cases of extra-sensory perception, are now-a-days regarded as an established fact by all the psychic investigators. All students of Psychical Research who have devoted a considerable period of their life to the study of super-normal phenomena have become convinced that super-normal cognition does occur. Many of these investigators believe that it occurs more often than we know. Telepathy, clairvoyance, clairsaudience, psychometry, etc., which are comprised now-a-days under extra-sensory perception are some of the most undisputed facts of modern age. 'The term 'telepathy' has acquired a respectable status among scientific terms particularly, when more mysterious facts like psychometry and spirit-communication are in question for explanation.'² Having recorded the facts and figures regarding extra-sensory perception investigated by Psychical Research (which is also called Parapsychology) we, now, come to the Jaina conception of extra-sensory perception which, according to the tradition of Indian thought, is conditioned by speculative arguments and to a great extent establishes the same facts that have been accepted by Parapsychology on the basis of experimental investigations. Just like Parapsychology, Jaina psy-

¹ Personality of Man, p. 26.

² Introduction to Parapsychology, p. 134.

chology also admits the validity of the occurrence of clairvoyance and telepathy; of course, there is a considerable difference between them as regards the details of the two. We shall now, take into account the nature of extra-sensory perception expounded by the Jaina thinkers.

JAINA ACCOUNT OF EXTRA-SENSORY PERCEPTION

Sensory and mental comprehension, as we have already discussed, is of the rank of normal cognition conditioned by the senses and mind. The following three varieties fall in the category of extra-sensory perception, i.e., super-normal cognition. They are limited direct perception (*avadhi*), direct perception of mental processes (*manahparyaya*), and perfect or absolute perception (*kevala*). In the language of Parapsychology, 'limited direct perception' and 'direct perception of mental processes' can be called clairvoyance (including clairsaudience and the like) and telepathy respectively. Perfect perception is nothing but omniscience.

The self, according to the Jaina, has the inherent capacity to know all things irrespective of time and space. Temporal and spatial distances are immaterial if the self were in all perfection. To put it in a different language, the self is inherently capable of cognising all things together with all their characters irrespective of temporal distinctions, i.e., past, present, and future, and spatial differences, i.e., here, there, near, far, and the like. It is only because of the karmic veils that this capacity of the self is obscured. Pure perception occurs on the total destruction of the corresponding karmic obstructions. But when there is variation in degrees of this destruction, there occur different varieties of perception. That is to say, pure perception occurs on the complete annihilation of the relevant karmic veils. But when there is variation in degrees of this annihilation, there is variation in degrees of perception as well. As regards the occurrence of our normal perceptions, they are produced through the senses and mind. Regarding the occurrence of super-normal perceptions, the Jaina holds that they are derived directly from the self. They are not dependent on the services of the senses and mind. Nevertheless, there is variation in degrees of their occurrence. Perfect perception occurs on the complete destruction of the obscuring veils. But when there are differences in the destruction of these

veils, there occur two varieties of super-normal perception, viz., clairvoyance and telepathy. Normal perception, i.e., sensory and mental cognition as well as imperfect super-normal perception, i.e., clairvoyance and telepathy, is conditioned by the obstruction of karmic veils, inasmuch as in these states of cognition, the dissociation of the obscuring veils is not final and complete. The distinction between normal perception and imperfect super-normal perception lies in the fact that the former is conditioned by the services of the senses and mind, while the latter is directly derived from the self independent of any assistance of these media, and hence, it is called direct perception. Omniscience is completely free from all the obscuring veils and is directly derived from the self, hence, it is direct as well as perfect.

CLAIRVOYANCE

Clairvoyance is confined to the objects having form. Only those things which have shape, colour, etc., can be perceived through the faculty of clairvoyance.¹ This faculty differs in scope and durability with different personalities due to the difference of destruction-cum-subsidence of karmic veils. The highest type of clairvoyance can perceive all the objects having form. With regard to space, it extends over a space that could be occupied by innumerable space-points (*pradeśas*) of the size of the universe. As regards time, it penetrates innumerable cycles of time, both past and future. It cannot perceive all the modes of all the things. It knows only a part thereof.² The lowest type of clairvoyance can cognise an object occupying a very small fraction of space. In the technical language of the Jaina, it can extend to very small fraction or an '*aṅgula*' (a measure) and know the things having form that lie therein. As regards time, it can penetrate only a small part of time which is less than a second. Regarding modes, it can know only a part of all the modes of its object.³ We shall not take into account the Jaina concept of the relative subtlety of time, space, matter, modes, and the like, inas-

¹ *Rāṣiṣvaradhēḥ.*

Tattvārtha-sūtra, I. 28.

² *Paramohi asaṁkhejjā logammittā.....*

Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 685.

³ *Aṅgulassa asaṁkhejjai bhāgaṁ jāṇai pāsai.*

Nandi-sūtra, 16.

much as it is of no use for our present purpose. It has little bearing on psychological enquiry, since it is purely speculative and dogmatic. We confine ourselves to this much that clairvoyance differs in scope and durability with different persons on account of the difference of their capacity. In other words, the scope and durability of clairvoyance are determined by the capacity of the person possessing it. It is apparent from the above account that only those things that possess form are perceived by clairvoyance. The formless things like souls, etc., are not cognised by it.

Generally, clairvoyance is regarded to be of six types. First, a clairvoyance which continues to exist even if a person leaves a particular place and goes elsewhere. This type is called *anugāmin*. Second, a clairvoyance that does not continue to exist in the afore-said situation. It is diametrically opposed to the former. This variety is known as *ananugāmin*. Third, a clairvoyance that extends in scope and durability as time passes. It is called *vardhamāna*. Fourth, a clairvoyance which embraces deterioration as regards its scope and durability. It is called *hīyamāna*. This type is in direct opposition with the third one. Fifth, a clairvoyance that neither faces growth nor embraces deterioration. This variety is known as *avasthita*. Sixth, a clairvoyance that sometimes increases and sometimes decreases with respect to its scope, durability, etc. It is known as *anavasthita*.¹ In the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* there is a detailed description of clairvoyance from fourteen standpoints.² We do not enter into it at present.

TELEPATHY

Let us turn to the nature of telepathy. The mind, according to the Jaina doctrine of karma, is a particular material substance. Its modes are the different changes of states emerging into acts of thought. Every state of our thought is a particular mode of the mind. As our state of thought changes, so also the mind changes. Thus, every state of our thought is reflected in the different modes of our mind-substance. In other words, a state of thought is nothing but

¹ *Anugāmyananugāmivardhamānahīyamānāvasthitānavasthitobhedāt śaḍvidhaḥ.*

Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika, I, 22, 4.

² *Cauddasavihanikkhevaṃ idḍhīpatte va vocchāmi.*
Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 569.

a particular mode of the mind-substance. The direct cognition of these modes of the mind-substance is called telepathy. A person possessing the faculty of telepathy can directly cognise the states of our thought. This cognition of the states of thought is nothing but a direct perception of the modes of the stuff of which the mind is made up. Now, as regards the general nature of telepathy as the direct cognition of the various states of thought, the Jaina thinkers are unanimous. But regarding the knowledge of the external objects of thought, they are not in a unanimity. We shall record this fact in the course of our discussion.

Telepathy perceives the objects thought by the minds of different persons. It is confined to the plane of human beings. Its emergence is conditioned by a particular capacity possessed by one having a particular mode of right conduct.¹ The faculty of telepathy is not acquired by an ordinary person. It is conditioned by a strict mental and physical discipline. The Jaina doctrine of karma prescribes a definite course of character that is essential in acquiring the capacity to cognise the contents of the different states of minds. The person possessing the faculty of telepathy is necessarily a homeless ascetic. His character must be of a higher type. Such conditions are not set down in the case of clairvoyance. The faculty of telepathy is far more superior to that of clairvoyance. The Jaina thinkers recognize two varieties of telepathy: *ṛjumati* and *vipulamati*. The latter is purer and everlasting, i.e., lasts up to the dawn of omniscience, whereas the former is less pure and sometimes trembles, too.² The latter perceives less number of objects than the former but cognises them more vividly. It is only one who is at the upward stage of spiritual advancement, is possessed of the latter, whereas the former is possessed by one who is sure to descend the spiritual ladder. The latter is more lucid than the former.³ One possessed of telepathy perceives only a part of the objects of clairvoyance directly, since the mind is a portion of the whole material world. But he knows a greater number of states of the

¹ *Āvaśyaka-niryukti*, 76.

² *Viśuddhyapratipātābhyaṃ tadviśeṣaḥ*
Tattvārtha-sūtra, I, 25.

³ *Apratipātenāpi vipulamatiḥ viśiṣṭaḥ*.....
Sarvārtha-siddhi, I, 24.

material objects that constitute the contents of the thinking process indirectly. With respect to this position, the Jaina thinkers are not unanimous. Umāsvāti holds that one possessed of telepathy cognises only an infinitesimal part of the objects of clairvoyance. He knows a greater number of states of the material objects that form the contents of the invisible thinking process of the mind.¹ Now, this position seems to be slightly paradoxical. The implication of this statement is that the states of the material objects thought by the minds of others are cognised by telepathy through the medium of the mind. Pūjyapāda explains it as follows: 'Because of its association with the mind, the object of the mind is called 'mind.' The knowledge of that mind is entirely on account of the destruction-cum-subsidence of the respective karmic veil, although it is associated with the mind-substance.'² Thus, according to him, the external objects are directly perceived by telepathy. He holds that the states of the mind are nothing but the states of the objects themselves. Owing to its association with the mind-substance, the object itself is called mind. Hence, the modes of the mind are nothing but the modes of the objects. The person possessed of the faculty of telepathy perceives the modes of the mind, that means, he perceives the modes of the objects. The states of the mind are not different from the states of the objects of the mind. Thus, Pūjyapāda concludes that the external objects themselves are directly perceived by telepathy. Akalaṅka also supports the same view.³

Jinabhadra, Maladhāri Hemacandra, etc., hold a different opinion. 'A person possessing the faculty of telepathy perceives the states of the mind-substance directly, but cognises the external objects thought by the mind only through inference.'⁴ Maladhāri

¹ *Avadhijñānaviśayasyānantabhāgaṃ manahpuryāyajñānī jñānte
rūpīdravyāñimanorakasyavicāragatānī*
Tattvārtha-bhāṣya, I, 29.

² *Parahīyamanogatortho mana ityucyate, sāhacaryāttasya paryayaṇaṃ
parigamanam manahparyayaṃ. Matijñānaprasaṅga itī cenna.
Apekṣāmātravēdī. Kṣayopapaśamaśaktimātra*
Sarvārtha-siddhi, I, 9.

³ *. . . tadāvaranaharmakṣayopapaśamavyapadeśācchakṣuṣyavadhijñāna . . .*
Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika, I, 23, 5.

⁴ *Davvamaṇopajjās jāṇai pāsai ya taggaṇamte. Teṇāvabhāsie uṇa
jāṇai bajjheṇumāṇeṇaṃ.*
Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, 814.

Hemacandra, commenting upon the statement of Jinabhadra, says that a thinker may think about a material (*rūpin*) as well as a non-material (*arūpin*) object. It is a unanimous fact that for one who is not omniscient, it is impossible to perceive a non-material object directly. Hence, it must be admitted that one possessed of the power of telepathy knows the object thought by others only by way of inference, and not directly.¹ The function of telepathy is limited to the perception of the various modes of the mind-substance which is engaged in thinking. In other words, only the mental states of a person can be directly perceived by the power of telepathy. As regards the external objects that form the contents of those states, it is not possible to cognise them in a direct manner. It is the function of inference to know them. Telepathy is directly associated with the states of the mind, and not with the objects. The knowledge of the objects follows in the wake of the perception of the states of the mind-substance. Hence, it is indirect and inferential. It is only through the media of the states of the mind that the external objects are comprehended. True, the knowledge of the contents is not of the rank of an ordinary inference, as is the case with deductive reasoning. Jinabhadra denies the possibility of the direct perception of external objects only in the sense that they are perceived through the medium of mind. They are not directly perceived in the same way as the states of the mind are perceived. In other words, it is only through the states of the mind that they are perceived. The function of telepathy is the knowledge of the states of the mind that is engaged in thinking of the external objects, and not of the objects themselves. On the other hand, if it is admitted that telepathy cognises directly the contents of the mind, the knowledge of a non-material object would be direct, since a thinker may think of a material as well as a non-material object. But it is not possible for a person who is not omniscient to know directly a non-material object. Therefore, it follows that the function of telepathy is limited only to the perception of the states of the mind engaged in thinking. Hemacandra also upholds the

¹ *Cintako hi mūrtamamūrtam ca vastu cintayet. Na ca chadmastho-
mūrtam sākṣāt paśyati. Tato jñāyate' anumānādeva cintaniyam
vastvavagacchati'.*

Commentary on Viśeṣāśvāyaka-bhāṣya, 814.

same view. The cognition of the external objects of our thought is necessarily indirect in character derived as it is by necessary implication from the perception of thoughts which are not possible without objects.¹

LINE OF DEMARCATION BETWEEN CLAIRVOYANCE AND TELEPATHY

Now, as regards the emergence of clairvoyance and telepathy, both of them are equally conditioned by the destruction-cum-subsidence of karmic veils. Regarding their subject-matter, both clairvoyance and telepathy have reference to material objects. Such being the case, what is the line of demarcation between the two? The difference of clairvoyance and telepathy consists in the difference of purity, scope, subject, and object.² The perception of telepathy is more lucid than the perception of clairvoyance. The person possessing the power of clairvoyance also perceives the mind-substance, but the person possessing the faculty of telepathy perceives the same in a more lucid form. The scope of clairvoyance varies from an extremely minute part of an *aṅgula* up to the whole of the inhabited universe. But the scope of telepathy is limited to the sphere inhabited by human beings only. With regard to the difference of subject, the acquisition of clairvoyance is possible for living beings in all the possible states of existence (*gatis*). But the faculty of telepathy is possible only for a human being possessed of self-restraint and of noble conduct occupying a certain stage of spiritual development. In other words, only those who are possessed of super-normal powers are entitled to this type of perception and not anyone else, and again it is possible only for a few and not for all of them. As regards the difference with respect to objects, the jurisdiction of clairvoyance is limited to material objects and that again not covering all their modes. But the jurisdiction of telepathy extends to by far the minuter parts.³

¹ *Yadbāhyacintanīyārthajñānāḥ tat ānumānikameva.*

Commentary on *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I, 1, 18

² *Viśuddhiḥśeṭrasvāmīviśayebhyovadh'manaḥparyāyayoh.*
Tattvārtha-sūtra, I, 26.

³ Commentary on *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I, 1, 19.

OMNISCIENCE

Let us, now, turn our attention towards the nature of omniscience. It is the highest type of perception that comes under the category of extra-sensory perception. It is the perfection of the cognitive faculty of the self. It is the pure-manifestation of the real nature of the conscious principle. 'The perfect manifestation of the innate nature of the self, arising on the complete annihilation of all the obstructive veils, is called omniscience.'¹ It is transcendental and pure.

The self possesses consciousness as its essence. It is luminous by its very nature. The manifestation of the luminous nature of the conscious principle is nothing but the self as manifested in the act of knowledge. It occurs on the annihilation of the obscuring veils. The annihilation is nothing more than the total destruction of all the veils of the obscuring karmas. The person possessing the super-normal faculty of omniscience perceives all the substances with all their modes.² For him nothing remains unknown. No object or any mode thereof remains unperceived. His knowledge is pure and perfect.

Now, there arises a question: If the self is luminous by its very nature, why should it be subject to obscuration? And if obscuration is possible, it must be subject to obscuration for all time. This problem, strictly speaking, is metaphysical, inasmuch as it leads us to the discussion of the temporal relation between the self and not-self. We do not enter into a long discussion of the problem at present. It is sufficient for us to remark that though luminous in nature the light of the moon, the sun, and the like is liable to be covered by a veil of dust, by fog, by a patch of cloud, and so on. The case of the self is exactly parallel to these cases when it is found to be obscured by different veils of karma. The removal of the obscuration of the self is possible by the practice of a particular course of meditation and the like in the same way as the veil of the light of the sun, etc., is removed by a blast of wind.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF OMNISCIENCE

The Jaina thinkers advance the following logical argument to

¹ *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I, 1, 15.

² *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, I, 30.

prove the existence of omniscience. 'The proof of omniscience follows from the proof of the necessity of the final consummation of the progressive development of cognition.'¹ The progressive development of knowledge must reach its completion somewhere, because this is the way of all progression, as seen in the progression of magnitude. Just as heat is subject to varying degrees and consequently reaches the highest limit, so also cognition which is subject to progressive development owing to various degrees of dissociation of the obscuring veil, reaches the highest limit, i.e., omniscience when the hindrance of the obscuring karma is totally annihilated.

The Mīmāṃsakas, as we have already indicated, are not prepared to accept the possibility of the occurrence of omniscience. To refute the idea of omniscience, the Mīmāṃsaka asks: What does omniscience mean? Does it mean the cognition of all the objects of the universe? Or does it mean merely the prehension of certain principal objects? As regards the first alternative, does it mean the knowledge of all the objects of the universe in succession or simultaneously. In the former case there can be no omniscience, inasmuch as the objects of the world in the shape of past, present, and future can never be exhausted. This being the fact, the cognition conditioned by them also can never be complete. Because of the impossibility of the knowledge of all the objects of the world there cannot be omniscience. In the latter case also there can be no omniscience. It is an established fact that all the objects of the world are impossible to be known at one and the same time. How is it possible to prehend contradictory things like heat and cold at one and the same time on the strength of a single cognition? Besides, if all the objects are known at one and the same instant by an omniscient soul, in the next moment it would become unconscious having nothing to cognise. And further, the omniscient would be tainted by the attachment, etc., of others in cognising them. Consequently, he would cease to be omniscient, since attachment and the like are obstructions to a right cognition. Thus, it is established that omniscience does not mean the cognition of all the objects of the universe either successively or simultaneously. On the other hand, it cannot be admitted that omniscience means the cognition

¹ *Prajñātiśayaviśvāntyādisiddhesatsiddhiḥ.*

Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, I, 1, 16.

of certain principal objects, since only when all the objects of the universe are known, then and then alone the distinction between principal objects and subordinate objects can be established. Moreover, it is an impossibility to have the cognition of the past and the future which are, really speaking, non-existent. If the omniscient cognises the past and the future which are non-existent, his knowledge would be illusory, and hence, wrong. If the past and the future are known as existent, they are converted into the present. If the past and the future are known by the omniscient as present, his knowledge again would be illusory. Hence, logically no existence of omniscience can be established.¹

All these charges advanced by the Mīmāṃsaka are refuted by the Jaina as follows:² Our ordinary cognitions are produced by the sense-organs, and hence, they are incapable of cognising the past, the future, and the like. But such is not the case with the omniscient. The perception of an omniscient self is not produced by the sense-organs, hence, it can know supra-sensory objects. It is not produced in succession but simultaneously, and hence, it cognises all the objects of the universe at one and the same time, since it is beyond the limitations of space and time that are the necessary conditions of the cognition produced by the senses and mind. As regards the objection that contradictory things like heat and cold cannot be cognised at the same moment by a single cognition, the Jaina asks the Mīmāṃsaka: Why contradictory things cannot be cognised by a single cognition? Is it because they cannot be present at the same time, or because they by their very nature cannot be prehended by a single cognition, though they are present at the same time? The former view is not tenable, because contradictory things like heat and cold do exist at the same time. The latter position is also not defensible, because when there is a flash of lightning in the midst of darkness, there occurs a simultaneous perception of two contradictory things, viz., darkness and light. Regarding the objection that if an omniscient person knows all the objects of the universe at one instant, in the next moment he would become unconscious having nothing to cognise, the Jaina thinker replies that

¹ *Kiñca, asyāḥhilārthagrahaṇaṁ sakalajñātvaṁ
pradhānabhūtakatipayārtha*
Prameya-kamala-mārttaṇḍa, p. 254.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 260-1.

this type of objection would be valid if both the perception of the omniscient and the entire world were annihilated in the following instant. But, really speaking, both of these are ever-lasting. Hence, it is not an absurdity to hold that the omniscient perceives all the objects of the universe by a single cognition. With respect to the objection that the omniscient would be tainted by the attachment, etc., of others in cognising them, and consequently, he would cease to be omniscient, the reply is: Mere knowledge of desires, aversions, etc., is not sufficient enough to make a person tainted unless the self is transformed into that very mode. The omniscient cannot be affected by desires, etc., in the least. He cannot be tainted by the attachment, etc., of others by merely knowing them. Besides, desires and aversions are produced by our impure mental states, and not by the self which is pure and perfect. The omniscient self is pure and perfect, hence, it cannot be tainted by the imperfections of sensory and mental cognition. It is further urged that the omniscient is not capable of perceiving the past and the future, inasmuch as they are non-existent. On the other hand, if they are perceived as existent, the perception of the omniscient is illusory. This objection can be easily turned aside. The past and future are perceived by the omniscient not as present, but as past and future. Hence, no question of illusion arises. The past things are as much existent and real in relation to their own time as the present things are existent and real in relation to the present. To put it in another way, the past objects as much exist in the past as the present ones exist at present. The same argument can be applied to the future. The omniscient knows the past as existing in the past and the future as existing in the future. Because of the complete destruction of the obscuring veils of karma, the cognition of the omniscient is not produced by the senses and mind, but it is derived directly from the self. Hence, the omniscient directly perceives all the objects of the past, present, and future. In other words, the limitations of space and time are only for sensory and mental comprehension. They cannot obstruct the perception of an omniscient being. To summarise: An omniscient being prehends directly and immediately all the objects of the universe, past, present, and future, subtle and remote, by a single ever-lasting cognition independent of any assistance of the media of the external senses and mind.

CHAPTER V

SENSE-FEELING AND EMOTION

Feeling is an intermediate state of consciousness that occurs between cognition and conation. It is related to both knowledge and will. On one hand, cognition serves as the stimulus for feeling, while on the other, feeling stimulates will. In a different way, feeling can be considered as the effect of cognition, and at the same time as the cause of conation. Thus, it is an indispensable link joining the function of cognition and that of conation. The term feeling denotes simple states of pleasure and pain as well as complex states of various emotions.

I

SENSE-FEELING

Feeling is generally divided into two broad categories, viz., sense-feeling and emotion. The Jaina doctrine of karma also holds the same view. According to it, sense-feeling is the outcome of the feeling-producing (*vedanīya*) karma, whereas the deluding (*mo-hanīya*) karma produces various states of emotional experience. The distinguishing factor of the two lies in the fact that sense-feeling originates chiefly in sense-perception, whereas an emotional state emerges mainly from mental attitude which is nothing but our psychical dispositions. Sense-feeling arises through the medium of sense-perception, while emotion emerges from mental dispositions.

FEELING AND THE OMNISCIENT

It is curious enough to note that the feeling of pleasure as well as pain of a perfect person (omniscient) also depends upon his physical organs, although his perception is absolutely independent of them. In other words, although he does not perceive through his physical organs, yet he feels through them. Enjoying the faculty of extra-sensory perception he cannot escape organic feeling. Thus, in his case, a feeling is not conditioned by a sense-perception. He perceives the object that produces feeling independent of any aid of the sense-organs, but he cannot feel the pleasure or pain thereof

without the direct aid of the physical body. Why is it so? Because he is not yet free from the feeling-producing karma, though he is completely free from the karma that obscures the faculty of cognition.¹ The Jaina doctrine of karma does not give any explanation as to why the omniscient who is free from all attachment and aversion, does not give up all suffering and happiness. Because of the presence of his physical body he has to suffer or enjoy, is not a satisfactory answer, inasmuch as despite the presence of the body he does not cognise through the media of the physical organs so also he may not experience any feeling. Even if in the presence of the physical body the omniscient does not possess ordinary perception there is no absurdity in admitting that in the same condition he does not have any organic feeling as well. Moreover, the concealed cause of all pleasantness and unpleasantness is in the shape of passions and emotions. In the absence of passions and emotions, pleasure and pain have no meaning. Pleasantness and unpleasantness correspond to our attitudes of acceptance and rejection that we assume towards various aspects of our environment. The things that we like are pleasant for us. We desire and seek to obtain them. The things that we do not like are unpleasant. We strive to get rid of them. As the Jaina himself admits that the objects of the senses and mind cause pain to passionate men, but they never in the least cause any pain to the dispassionate. Pleasant things by themselves do not cause indifference nor emotions; but by either hating or loving them, a man undergoes such a change through delusion. All kinds of objects of the senses will cause to the indifferent neither a pleasant nor an unpleasant feeling.² Modern psychology also acknowledges the same view. 'Pleasantness and unpleasantness, referred to either as affective states or as hedonic tone, correspond to broad attitudes of acceptance or rejection that the organism assumes towards various aspects of its environment. Pleasant things are the things that we like, that we desire and seek to obtain. Pleasant situations are ones that we attempt to maintain and prolong. Unpleasant things are not liked. We strive to avoid them. Unpleasantness is a condition which we try to terminate'.³

¹ *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, X, 1.

² *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra*, XXXII, 100-6.

³ *Foundations of Psychology*, p. 90.

Thus, liking and disliking are the chief factors in determining the nature of feeling. The omniscient who is free from all liking (*rati*), disliking (*arati*), etc.,¹ cannot have any pleasure or any pain. Moreover, the mind is the chief medium through which pleasure and pain are experienced. The omniscient who is not in need of any service of the mind—the quasi-sense—cannot feel any pleasure or pain. The omniscient who is in possession of infinite bliss owing to the total destruction of the deluding (*mohanīya*)-karma, can by no means experience any worldly pleasure or pain.

CAUSE OF FEELING

Are there any definite objects or conditions that necessarily produce pleasure? Similarly, are there any fixed things that always generate pain? The Jaina thinkers hold that the feeling of pleasure as well as pain is conditioned and not caused by external objects. No definite thing or condition can be prescribed as the essential cause of the emergence of pleasure and pain. It is the rise of the feeling-producing karma that is mainly responsible for the emergence of the feeling of pleasure and pain. It is the rise of the pleasure-producing (*sātā-vedanīya*) karma that causes a feeling of pleasure. On the other hand, the rise of the pain-producing (*asātā-vedanīya*) karma gives rise to the feeling of pain. The external objects serve as the helping cause in reaping the fruit of the feeling-producing karma. They are the media through which and which alone we suffer or enjoy. In the absence of the rise of the corresponding karma, an external object alone is not considered to be competent enough to give rise to the feeling of pleasure or pain. As has been observed: The 'pleasure-producing karma causes the feeling of pleasantness, such as is produced by licking honey. The pain-producing karma causes the feeling of unpleasantness, such as is produced if one is hurt by a sword'² In this illustration 'honey' and 'sword' are to be taken as external factors in producing pleasure and pain. The essential cause that produces pleasure or pain is the karma corresponding to it. The object that is generally understood to be the cause of a feeling is not the essential cause but only a helping cause. If it is not admitted a thing which is pleasurable in my case would also

¹ *Mohakṣayāt*.

Tattvārtha-sūtra, X, 1.

² Karma-vipāka, 29.

be pleasurable to others. But such is not the case. The same is the position of painful things. Besides, different sensations may produce the same feeling and the same sensation may give rise to different feelings in different moods. The exponents of the biological theory advocate the view that 'pleasant stimuli tend to be those which are of positive value to the individual, and that unpleasant stimuli are in general biologically harmful. Thus, the alkalies, which are often poisonous, are bitter and usually unpleasant; whereas the sugars, which have food value, are sweet and nearly always pleasant'.¹ This theory is not altogether satisfactory. It is our common experience that many harmful stimuli are pleasant and many beneficial things are painful. Few people relish the flavour of cod-liver-oil, although its biological effect may be desirable; and diabetics continue to crave for sugar which has become bad for them. Apparently, the feeling of pleasantness and unpleasantness is more or less the product of our mental reaction which in its turn, according to the Jaina theory of karma, is determined by the rise of the feeling-producing karma.

FEELING AS A POSITIVE EXPERIENCE

Schopenhauer regards pain to be positive and pleasure to be negative in character. He holds that pain is the original and positive experience of life, whereas pleasure is only the absence of pain. In his opinion, pain is the fundamental and essential law of life, while pleasure is merely the negation of pain. He argues that life is essentially a hankering after some end. It is pain because of the consciousness of some want that is the original and positive experience of life. Pleasure arises only from the removal of the want as a consequence of the contrast with the preceding pain. Hence, pleasure is nothing more than an illusion. It is only the absence of pain and nothing real. To refute this view, Höffding advances the following points of criticism: Firstly, a craving produces pain only if it is resisted and not satisfied. Secondly, the normal functions of life are pleasurable rather than painful. Thirdly, this theory is based on a shallow conception of the law of relativity which law, really speaking, cannot make either of pleasure and pain less real and positive. Hence, we are justified to conclude that all feeling,

¹ Foundations of Psychology, p. 91.

whether pleasure or pain, is real and positive. To call either of the two negative is meaningless. Even illusory or imaginary joy is real joy.¹ The Jaina also holds the same view. He says that the feeling of both pleasure and pain is due to the realisation (*udaya*) of the feeling-producing karma.² The rise of karma which is accounted for the feeling of pleasure and pain is positive in character. The negation of feeling is the absence of feeling. In such a state, there is neither pleasure nor pain. This is a natural state of consciousness which is neither pleasurable nor painful. It is due to the destruction (*kṣaya*) and not the rise of karmic matter.

TYPES OF SENSE-FEELING

Evidently, sense-feeling is the simple feeling of pleasantness or unpleasantness accompanying a sensation, i.e., sense-perception. Hence, it has as many varieties as sensation has. The feeling of hunger, thirst, appetite, fatigue of muscles, cuts, burns, touch, movement, and the like are related to touch-sensation. Similarly, there are various feelings corresponding to the sensations of taste, smell, sight, and sound. We need not elaborate them. In modern psychology these feelings are classified into two groups: organic feelings and special feelings. Organic feelings are those corresponding to organic sensations. These include: (1) Vital or common feeling due to the total mass of organic sensations of the moment, called by Stout common sensibility. It is the general feeling of bodily well-being or its reverse. This is an extremely vague feeling which is not localisable in a particular part of the body. (2) The feelings of hunger, thirst, etc., that are vaguely localisable. (3) The feelings connected with the disordered working of internal organs and the exercise and fatigue of muscles, and the pains of cuts, burns, bruises, and sores. These are more or less localisable. Special feelings include the feelings corresponding to special sensations. These include: (1) Feelings of touch and movement; (2) Feelings of taste; (3) Feelings of smell; and (4) Feelings of sight and hearing.³ In the Jaina system, all the organic feelings and the feelings of touch and movement are included in tactile feelings. The rest are the same in both of them.

¹ Outlines of Psychology, pp. 284-7.

² Karma-granta, I, p. 6.

³ Psychology (Dutt), pp. 237-8.

The Buddhists recognize three main kinds of feeling. Feeling, according to them, is a psychic factor that is essentially present in all consciousness. It is primarily of three kinds, viz., pleasantness (*sukha*), unpleasantness (*duḥkha*), and indifference (*upekṣā*). The consciousness of the eye, the ear, the nose, and the tongue is accompanied by indifference. The consciousness of touch, being more effective, is accompanied by either pleasantness or unpleasantness. Our consciousness may be accompanied by a feeling of delight (*saumanasya*) if the object is agreeable, and by a feeling of antipathy (*daurmanasya*) if the object is disagreeable. Thus, there are altogether five types of feeling: pleasantness, unpleasantness, delight, antipathy, and indifference. As regards the nature of pleasantness and unpleasantness, only one type of consciousness is accompanied by pleasantness, and that is the touch-consciousness as the resultant of previous good karmas; similarly, there is only one type of consciousness which is accompanied by unpleasantness, and that is the touch-consciousness as the resultant of previous bad karmas.¹ The Jaina thinkers, unlike the Buddhists, did not recognise indifference as a category of sense-feeling. They categorically divided all feelings into two types: it is either pleasant or unpleasant. There is no third type which is neither pleasant nor unpleasant. Are there any states of feeling which are neither pleasurable nor painful? It is a debatable question. In modern psychology also the same controversy stands unresolved. The advocates of neutral states argue that when we go on increasing a stimulus there is a gradual change from pleasurable to painful sensation. This being the fact, theoretically, there must be a neutral centre between the extremes of the highest pleasure and the strongest pain. This position is not accepted by those who are not prepared to believe in the so-called neutral states. They advance the following counter arguments: (1) The view proclaiming neutral states of feeling overlooks the law of relativity, according to which the hypothetical centre ought to appear as pain when reached from the side of pleasure and as pleasure when reached from that of pain, and never as neutral. (2) The evidence acquired through experiments is also against it. If the warmth of a surface in contact with the palm of the hand is gradually increased, then before its agreeableness passes into

¹ Abhidhamma Philosophy, pp. 111-3.

disagreeableness, there is, no doubt, a transitional state in which weak pain sensations emerge along with pleasurable ones. (3) Then the vital feeling, the perpetual background of consciousness, is normally pleasurable. (4) Close observations reveal the truth that in the so-called neutral states there are fluctuations of pleasure and pain.¹ The Jaina also holds that feeling is never neutral. For him, there are only two alternatives: either there is no feeling at all as is the case with the liberated souls that are dissociated from all types of karma,² or there is one of the two types of feeling. To say that there is feeling but it is neither of the category of pleasure nor that of pain is a contradiction. Apart from pleasure and pain there is no feeling which is neutral. Sometimes it does happen that we have weak pain sensations or weak pleasure sensations. Such state of feeling may be called neutral state, but really speaking it is not neutral.

CO-EXISTENCE OF PLEASURE AND PAIN

Now, we come to another problem. This problem is whether pleasure and pain can co-exist in a mixture? McDougall ridicules the view that holds that pleasure and pain, being antagonistic to each other like acid and alkali, cannot co-exist. He remarks that it has been widely asserted that pleasure and pain are antagonists which cannot co-exist, because each destroys or neutralizes the other, like acid and alkali in solution; or, otherwise stated, that they are quantities of opposite signs which undergo algebraic summation, so that the feeling-tone of the subject is always one of pleasure or of pain, or, if the pleasurable and painful influences are equally balanced, neutral (i.e., non-existent). He further observes that he has no hesitation in rejecting this doctrine and in following Professor Stout, in recognizing states of feeling in which pleasure and pain are conjoined. The fact is most clearly illustrated by such emotions as pity and sorrow. In both of these emotions, pleasure and pain would seem to be blended in all proportions, from the very painful pity of the tender-hearted person who can do nothing to relieve the suffering he witnesses and sympathetically shares, to the sweet pity of the ministering angel who finds a supreme satisfaction

¹ Outlines of Psychology, pp. 287-8.

² *Kṛtsnakarmakṣayo mokṣaḥ*.

Tattvārtha-sūtra, X, 3.

in relieving the suffering which still, so long as it is not wholly relieved, she shares in some degree. Or, again, the feeling of the mother who kisses away the pain of the little one's bruise. "Parting is such sweet sorrow" said a great master of the secrets of the human heart; for the pain of the lovers at parting was sweetened by the anticipation of reunion.¹

It reveals, no doubt, some fact regarding our emotional life. It is an established fact that there are certain states in our experience in which pleasure and pain are blended together. Nevertheless, if we analyse these states, we would be convinced that a mixed feeling is not one feeling but more than that. In such a feeling, either pleasure is followed by pain or pain by pleasure. It is not that both of them arise together. Besides, one of the two dominates the other. The Jaina thinker's contention is that both of them cannot emerge simultaneously. He does not hesitate to admit that one of the two can follow the other immediately after its emergence. The only point he wants to emphasise is that the emergence of two antagonistic feelings cannot synchronise.² From this perspective it has been asserted that pleasure and pain are antagonists and cannot co-exist. The emergence of one is necessarily conditioned by the absence of the emergence of the other. In other words, pleasure and pain cannot arise at the same time. As regards their existence in *potentia*,³ however, both of them co-exist until and unless one of them is totally annihilated. This finishes our discussion of the problem of sense-feeling. Now, let us proceed to the nature of various emotions that are produced owing to the rise of the deluding (*mohanīya*) karma.

II

NATURE OF EMOTIONS

Whereas a sense-feeling is simple in nature, an emotion is complex in character. It follows some mental excitement and is usually coloured with pleasure or pain. Sometimes it is aroused by mere

¹ Outlines of Psychology, pp. 348-9.

² *Udayasthānāmapi ekam, tadyathā sātamaśātām vā, dvayoryugapādudayābhāvāt parasparaviruddhatvāt.*
Karma-grantha, VI, p. 159.

³ Ibid.

ideas and sometimes by sense-perceptions. In both these cases, mental agitation plays the chief role. The distinguishing factor of sense-feeling and emotions lies in the fact that the former has sense-perception as its fundamental basis, whereas the latter's main source is mental excitement, though both of them are dependent, in one way or the other, upon sensation and mental attitude.

The Jaina thinkers in their works dealing with the doctrine of karma ascribe the emergence of emotions to the rise or realisation of the karma that disturbs right conduct which is an innate property of the self. The emergence of emotions, according to them, is in the forms of passions and *quasi-passions*. The number of passions is sixteen and that of *quasi-passions* is nine.¹ The passions are strong emotions, while the *quasi-passions* are mild emotions. The *quasi-passions* are so called because they co-exist with the passions and also inspire them. As has been observed: 'Those which co-exist with the passions are called *quasi-passions*. If you ask: With which passions they co-exist? The answer is: With the first twelve. As the first twelve passions are destroyed, the *quasi-passions* are impossible to stay, since immediately after the destruction of the passions the destroyer destroys them, too. Or, because when they emerge, the passions are inspired by them without fail; therefore, they are said to be co-existing with the passions'.² The meaning is that the relation of the *quasi-passions* with the passions is two-fold. On one hand, the *quasi-passions* go out of existence as soon as the first twelve passions are annihilated, while on the other, the passions are inspired by the *quasi-passion* so long as both of them exist. Since both of them synchronise, therefore, they are co-existent as well.

TYPES OF STRONG EMOTIONS

There are four fundamental types of passions, i.e., strong emotions recognized by the Jaina: anger, pride, deceit, and greed. Each

¹ *Solasa kaṣāya nava nokasāva*

Pañca-saṅgraha (pañcadvāra), III, 5.

² *Kaṣāyaiḥ saḥacāriṇaḥ saḥavarttino ye te nokaṣāyāḥ. Keiḥ kaṣāyaiḥ saḥacāriṇaḥ? Iti ced, ucyate-ādyatirdvādaśabhiḥ. Tathāhi-nādyeṣu dvādaśaṣu kaṣāyeṣu ḥṣīṇeṣu nokaṣāyāpāmavasthānasambhavaḥ, tadānantarameva teṣāmapī kaṣāyasahacāriṇaḥ.*

Ibid., p. 112 (1).

of these is divided into four sub-divisions according to the intensity of their manifestation. Thus, we have sixteen passions in all. Different schools of Indian philosophy recognize different numbers of passions. We need not enter into the discussion of any justification thereof. We shall confine ourselves to the Jaina conception of passions. Let us also admit that the Jaina conception of emotion is not purely psychological. It is psycho-ethical in character. We are not in a position to separate the two, since the conception is fundamentally based on the theory of conduct. The emotions arise because of the rise of the conduct-deluding (*cāritra-mohanīya*) karma. The Jaina philosophers, as we have indicated, have classified the passions into four groups in accordance with the intensity of their manifestation. The first group consists of those passions that last for more than a year. As long as the soul is under the pressure of this group of passions, it enjoys indefinite worldly life. This group is generally believed to be of 'life-long duration'. It completely hinders right conduct as well as right belief. The second group consists of those passions which obstruct even partial renunciation. The person possessing it finds it impossible to take any course of renunciation. It makes every type of self-discipline an impossibility. Nonetheless, it allows the existence of right belief. Its antagonism is with conduct and not with belief. As regards its duration, it never lasts for more than a year. The third group contains only those mild passions that hinders the beginning of complete renunciation. Unlike the second group of passions, it does not obstruct the practice of partial self-discipline. It is only the practice of the course of complete self-discipline that is hindered by its rise. Its effect does not last for more than four months. The last group includes all those passions that are a hindrance to the attainment of complete right conduct. Unlike the third group, it allows the practice of complete self-discipline. It works only against the attainment of faultless right conduct in its completeness. It is the mildest type of passions that can exist in human life. It does not last for more than a fortnight.¹ On the destruction of this type the person never feels angry, proud, etc. His conduct is never vitiated.

¹ *Jāṭīvaṇṇasācaumāsapakḥhagā*.
Sammāṇusavvaviraiahaḥhāyacarittagḥāyakarā.
 Karma-grantha, I, 18.

As the Jaina conception of emotions is, as has been mentioned, not exclusively psychological. It includes in it the course of ethical discipline as well. Thus, it is a psycho-ethical treatment. Its origination is psychological, whereas the application thereof is ethical. The same is the case with all concepts of emotions if considered from the standpoint of applied psychology. There may be somewhat controversy regarding the nature of classification or intensity of a particular emotion, but that matters little, since it is an impossibility to have a unanimity in this respect. The Jaina point of view, as has already been mentioned, classifies all strong emotions into four groups, viz., anger, pride, deceit, and greed; and each of these is again divided into four sub-groups. Each sub-group possesses some specific characteristics. While dealing with the nature of these characteristics we pointed out that a particular group hinders a particular length of period. Now, with regard to belief and conduct, we do not propose to give any explanation. As regards the length of duration, the Jaina thinkers hold that the period mentioned in this connection is not of much significance. 'It has been mentioned only to serve our practical purposes'.¹ Really speaking, it is the intensity of emotions that is more important than the limit of time. To put it in a different manner, the primary factor constituting the nature of a particular category of emotions is the intensity of mental excitement. How long the effect of an emotion lasts, is of secondary value. It may last for the length of period prescribed for it. It may also vanish earlier. It may last for a longer period as well. Thus, it is the intensity and not the duration which plays an important rôle in the case of emotions. There are interesting illustrations in the karma-literature expressing the various degrees of the intensity of emotions.

ANGER

Let us take anger first. Watson, the champion of the school of behaviourism, in his early study of the emotional behaviour of infants found three basic patterns of response. They are fear, anger, and love. The stimuli for fear were sudden loud sounds and the sudden loss of support; for anger, restraint of movement; and for

¹ *Idam ca. . . . vyavahāranayamāśrityocyate.*

Karma-grantha, I, p. 35.

love embracing, etc. Anger is a normal response to frustration. When some situation—real or imaginary—unduly restricts the freedom of action of an individual, the individual loses his temper.¹ He takes the restriction as an unwarranted impediment to his freedom of action, i.e., conduct. Consequently, he begins to act in a violent fashion. His conduct is deluded and misled. It may appear in the shape of an impulse to break and destroy anything that comes to his hand. It may take the form of revenge² if it is of a strong ill-nature. Sometimes anger is very difficult to control. On such occasions, it develops into disorganised rage and adopts the shape of aggression. Sometimes it happens that anger does not last long. It dies immediately after its emergence. It is a mild form of anger. The Jaina philosopher classifies the intensity of anger into four types. He illustrates these types as follows:

The first type of anger is compared to a split in mountain-rock which is most difficult to be removed. The second type is compared to a split in earth that is not so difficult to eradicate. The third one is compared to a line in dust that can be eradicated more easily. The last type is compared to a line in water that is still easier to be removed.³ Thus, the first type of anger is exceedingly strong and to get rid of its effect is very difficult. The effect of the three remaining types gradually descends in strength, and can, therefore, be more easily overcome.

Now, let us turn our attention to pride, deceit, and greed. In modern psychology these three have not been thoroughly discussed. The reason may be that they are not of much importance to psychology. They are more or less primarily related to the enquiry of ethics. William McDougall, the chief exponent of the 'hormic school' gives a list of twelve human instincts that are also called propensities.⁴ Of these, self-assertive propensity can be accounted for the generation of pride, and acquisitive propensity can be con-

¹ *Tatra hrodho'kṣāntipariṇatirūpaḥ.*

Karma-grantha, I, p. 34.

² *.....hrodho vairasya hāraṇam.*

Yoga-śāstra, IV, 9.

³ *Silapudhaviḥvibhedadhūlījalarāisamāṇao have koho.....*

Jiva-kāṇḍa, 284.

⁴ Contemporary Schools of Psychology, p. 220.

sidered as the chief cause that produces greed. The rise of deceit may be ascribed either to fear, or to submissive propensity, or to both. We are not in a position to state whether McDougall has given any systematic account of these three sentiments. However, we take into account the Jaina position of these sentiments what are called passions.

PRIDE

Pride is an outcome of what the psychologist calls 'ego-centricity' or 'ego-identification'.¹ The basic end of all egoistic striving is a sense of personal identity or individual autonomy. Once a person attains this end, he goes on acquiring a further differentiation from others. He nourishes his personal distinction and seeks to immortalise his identity. Because of the sense of personal identification what the Jaina calls pride, he strives for further distinction in business or art or literature or religious leadership or anything he is interested in. Egoistic strives may lead to any conceivable pattern of conduct, i.e., behaviour. Self-display and self-assertive activity are the most common manifestations of egoism. Thus, to put it in a definite form, 'pride is nothing but the sense of ego-centricity produced by the motive of status-superiority and the like'² which motive is ultimately the outcome of the conduct-deluding karma. There are eight kinds of pride corresponding to its contents: pride of status (*jāti*), gain (*lābha*), class (*Kula*), wealth (*aiśvarya*), strength (*bala*), complexion (*rūpa*), austerity (*tapas*), and knowledge (*śruta*).³ Each of them is of four degrees in accordance with the intensity of its manifestation. They are illustrated by a pillar of stone, a piece of bone, a pillar of wood, and a piece of straw⁴ the rigidity of which correspondingly decreases.

DECEIT

The aim of deceit is to misrepresent facts or purposes. The motive underlying a misrepresentation is to attain some gain foreseen or conjectured. The deceitful person thinks that the easiest

¹ Introduction to Abnormal Psychology, p. 20.

² *Māno jātyādīsamutthohāṅkārāḥ*.

Karma-grantha I, p. 34.

³ Yoga-sāstra, IV, 13.

⁴ Jīva-kāṇḍa, 285.

as well as the shortest route to attain the gain is to deceive the person concerned. Thus, 'deceit is nothing but the act of deceiving others'.¹ This act certainly influences our mode of behaviour. We tell a lie to deceive others. Not all deceit, however, is lying, for, although the essence of lying is intent to deceive, there must be also, to constitute a lie, either untrue words or such reticence as in the context of speech or action amounts to false statement, as for instance, if I say, 'He gave me twenty rupees' when in fact he gave me fifty, or if I adopt and publish as my own essay largely or wholly written by another man. To quote Kant, to lie is 'to communicate one's thoughts to another through words which intentionally contain the opposite of that which the speaker thinks'.² The Jaina maintains that it is the intention to deceive others which is the root-cause of lying.³ Kant also gives the same place to intention. This intention adopts different forms in behaviour. The deluding karma which gives rise to the intention to deceive others is not concerned with the different forms of behaviour of deceitful person, therefore, we shall not deal with them. The rise of deceit hinders proper conduct. It is also of four degrees as regards its intensity. They are to be compared to a bamboo-root, a ram-horn, a line of cow's urine, and a carpenter's scratch.⁴ The crookedness of the succeeding ones removed more easily than that of the preceding ones. Now, let us turn to the last passion, viz., greed.

GREED

Greed has been defined by the Jaina thinkers as 'the state of attachment produced by discontentment'.⁵ All of us possess certain desires and ambitions. The nature of a desire is such that it is not very easily satisfied. To attain complete satisfaction is most difficult. Until and unless we are completely satisfied, our interest towards the object of our desire goes on increasing. Consequently, we are so much attached to that end that all our activities are directed towards the attainment of the goal. This type of attach-

¹ *Māyā paravañcanādyātmikā*

Karma-grantha, I, p. 34.

² Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. VIII, p. 221.

³ *Asūnṛtasya janani*

Yoga-sāstra, IV, 15.

⁴ *Jīva-kāṇḍa*, 286; Karma-grantha, I, 20.

⁵ *Lobho 'santoṣātmako grādhipariṇāmaḥ*.

Karma-grantha, I, p. 34.

ment is called greed. The struggle of desires is very difficult to overcome. Hence, to conquer attachment, i.e., greedy attitude is not easy. When Schopenhauer says that 'life is essentially a struggle in which every satisfaction leads to a new struggle, implying, therefore, the impossibility of attaining real or complete satisfaction except through the annihilation of desire',¹ he reveals the same truth. According to him, cravings are the ultimate mainsprings of conduct. The Jaina thinkers also hold that the mainspring of worldly conduct is greedy mind. The intensity of greed increases with the satisfaction of desires. Every satisfaction leads to a new desire.² The desires of this life are not finally satisfied with this or that kind of attainment. 'Where there is gain, there is greed. With the increase of gain, greed also increases'.³ To satisfy cravings through the attainment of gains is an impossibility. The final satisfaction which is of a different character is possible only through the annihilation of greed, i.e., through the dissociation of the karma giving rise to greed. So long as the corresponding karma is in existence, no freedom from desire is possible. The four degrees of the intensity of greed are compared to a lac-stain, a mud-stain, a safflower-stain, and a turmeric-stain respectively.⁴ With this we finish the description of the nature and effects of the four chief passions recognized by the Jaina. Now, we propose to take into account the nature and functions of the *quasi*-passions that come next in order.

QUASI-PASSIONS: LAUGHTER

Laughter is a problem with which many thinkers have wrestled. They have given us different theories of joking and laughing. In their opinion, man is the only animal that laughs. Herbert Spencer's theory of laughter was that laughter is merely an overflow of surplus nervous energy. Bergson tells us that laughter serves the ends of social discipline, because we naturally laugh at whatever in behaviour is stiff, clumsy, or machinelike.⁵ The Jaina philosopher finds the ultimate cause of laughter in karma. He maintains that

¹ Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology, pp. 152-3.

² Yoga-sāstra, IV, 10-21.

³ Jahā lāho tahā loho lāhā loho pavaḍḍhaī.
Uttarādhyayana-sūtra, VIII, 17.

⁴ Tattvārtha-bhāṣya, VIII, 10.

⁵ Outline of Psychology, pp. 165-6.

on account of the rise of the '*hāsyā-mohanīya*' karma we laugh or smile. It matters little whether there is, behind it, any other noticeable fact or not.¹ It should be noted that ludicrous as well as smiling is also included in laughter. The theory of surplus energy is not adequate because it seeks the explanation of laughter in the terms of physiology. A complex psychological fact cannot be explained by a sheer physiological theory. Can we maintain that people laugh because there is an overflow of surplus nervous energy in them? If so, why do they laugh only and not run or jump? No satisfactory answer of this question can be given. The theory of social discipline, too, is inadequate. Sometimes we laugh at an occurrence not because it is stiff, clumsy, or machinelike but because it is unexpected or unusual. We do not deny the fact that these theories make a good attempt to investigate the cause of laughter. The only conclusion we want to draw is that the ultimate cause of laughter cannot be any other condition or object than the individual's mental attitude which is the outcome of his own karma. The other conditions that are supposed to be the cause of laughing or smiling or joking may exist or may not exist. An adolescent girl who laughs without knowing why she is happy may be cited as an example. The student of abnormal psychology may say that such cases are of hysteric type, and hence, should not be considered normally. Our contention is that the case is of laughter. It is immaterial whether it is of hysteric type or of paranoic type. We are considering the nature of laughter as such without any consideration of its types or categories.

SORROW

Sorrow is contrary to joy. Joy and sorrow as emotions are ideal pleasure and pain respectively. They may be of different kinds owing to the difference of the conditions of their emergence. The different forms of joy, e.g., smiling, laughing, joking, etc., are included, as has been mentioned, in laughter in the Jaina account of emotions. The commonest forms of sorrow are crying, weeping, expression of grief, annoyance, and the like. The fundamental cause producing

¹ *Yadudayaśāt sanimittamanimittam vā hasati smayate vā tad hāsyamohanīyam.*

Pañca-saṅgraha (Pañcadvāra), p. 112 (2).

all these effects is in the shape of the *śoka-mohanīya* karma.¹ There are changeable expressions of sorrow. In women and children it is very often in the form of weeping, whereas some men never weep. There are many persons who succumb to sorrow to such a degree that means who are overcome by grief to such an extent that they cannot stand upright, but throw themselves upon the earth² in their despair.

LIKING, DISLIKING, AND DISGUST

It is our common experience that we like certain objects and dislike a number of things without any apparent reason for their liking and disliking. In other words, we have a natural love for certain things and an innate hate for some objects. We are not in a fit position to give a logical explanation for our liking and disliking. Then what can be accounted for such experiences? Some psychologists will say that it is due to human instinct. Some will solve the problem on the basis of inheritance. The Jaina thinker seeks the refuge of karma. The rise of '*rati-mohanīya*' karma is accounted for the emergence of liking, whereas that of '*arati-mohanīya*' karma is regarded to be the cause of disliking.³ Love is nothing but the liking for others growing out of the pleasure or satisfaction which the presence or companionship of others brings, or let us say, it is a mere feeling of attachment. The Jaina account of emotion does not deal with the nature of sympathy separately. We are justified if we say that the term 'love' or 'liking' also includes sympathy. It is right that liking and sympathy are not one but it is also not wrong that liking and sympathy are so united that without sympathy most of the characteristic developments of liking could never arise. There is, no doubt, love unaided by sympathy which is described as 'selfish love'. It seeks to satisfy itself without seeking the welfare of the loved object. It is also an undisputed fact that sympathy deserves an independent discussion, since it is not always accompanied by love. The Jaina account of emotion remains incomplete in the absence of a separate description of sympathy.

¹ *Yadudayāt priyaviprayogādau svorastāḍamukhrandati.*

Pañca-saṅgraha (Pañcadvāra), p. 112 (2).

² *bhūpīṭhe ca luṭhati.*

Ibid.

³ Ibid.

Disliking is diametrically opposed to liking. There is another type of *quasi*-passion, viz., disgust or hate (*Jugupsā*).¹ In our opinion, it is only a developed stage of disliking. In disliking our attitude is more or less negative, whereas disgust is a positive state of emotional attitude. Essentially both are the same. The Jaina thinkers have not pointed out any fundamental difference between the two. They have only mentioned two distinct terms for them, viz., *arati* and *jugupsā*. In what way disliking differs from disgust, how far they agree with one another, what is the fundamental distinction of the two; they say nothing in connection with these problems. Moreover, as disliking is opposed to liking, disgust is opposed to nothing. Had disgust been an independent variety of emotion, it must have had a contrary emotion. But such is not the case. Thus, we come to the conclusion that disliking and disgust are essentially the same. Now, let us turn our attention to fear.

FEAR

Fear is an insistent desire to get away from some threatening situation, objectively real or imaginary, with which the individual does not feel well adjusted, or he feels himself incapable to deal with the situation adequately. The result of it is usually some form of withdrawal. The karma held to be responsible for this type of behaviour is known as '*bhaya-mohanīya*' after the name of fear.² Terror and anxiety are two definite forms of fear. If the danger increases rapidly or if the fear strikes severely, the consequence is terror. It sometimes leads to an entire disintegration of the behaviour of the individual concerned. If the danger is anticipatory, the resulting fear then is in the form of anxiety. It is aroused by something real or imaginary foreseen in the future rather than existing in the present. Any environment, condition, or situation may cause fear provided that the individual regards it as threatening and to which he is unprepared to respond or he thinks himself to be unable to face it. The opposite of anxiety is hope. Both point to the future. As anxiety arises from the anticipation of some future danger, hope emerges from the anticipation of some future

¹ *Pañca-saṅgraha* (Pañcadvāra), p. 112 (2).

² *Yadudayaśāt sanimittamanimittān vā tathārūpasyasaṅkalpato bibhēti tad bhayamohanīyam.*

Ibid.

good. The fear in the shape of anxiety, etc., is disagreeable, whereas the delight in the form of hope is agreeable. It is a matter of somewhat surprise that the Jaina works on karma say nothing about the nature or emergence of hope. They discuss disliking with liking, sorrow with smiling (joy), but curiously enough, they do not pay any attention to hope while describing fear.

The Jaina philosophers indicate seven types of conditions that generally excite fear.¹ They are, so to speak, seven kinds of fear. Sometimes the fear produced in a particular condition is normal, whereas sometimes it is abnormal. The distinction between normal fear and abnormal fear is not strictly maintained by them. It is our own conclusion derived from the study of the conditions they mention. The first type includes the fears conditioned by the members of our own class. We human beings are very often afraid of our own class-members, i.e., human beings. Man is afraid of man as well as of woman. Woman is afraid of woman as well as of man. Children are afraid of adults as well as of the children of similar age. Fear of crowds which is called ochlophobia in modern psychology is also included in it. It is technically called '*iha-loka-bhaya*.' The second class of fears is quite contrary to the first one. It is called '*para-loka-bhaya*'. The term '*loka*' should not be confused with the English term 'world'. Here it means class (*jāti*). The fear produced from the sight of the members of another class is of the second kind. When a member of the human class is afraid of a member of the animal class or an object of the vegetable kingdom or anything else, his fear is of this kind. Fear of animals which is called zoophobia in abnormal psychology, fear of running and splashing water, and the like are some of the examples of this type of fear. The third class consists of those fears that originate in the anxiety of protection of what has been acquired by us and is in our possession. The fear of thieves, burglars, dacoits, etc., falls in this class. It is known as '*āḍāna-bhaya*'. The fourth class includes all those fears which are produced in us in the absence of an apparent external cause. They are of the nature of accident. We may include the fear of open places, i.e., agoraphobia, that of closed places, i.e., claustrophobia, that of high places, i.e., acrophobia, and the like

¹ Sthānāṅga-sūtra, VII, 3, 549.

See also Samavāyāṅga-sūtra, 7.

in it. These fears are more or less purely mental. They are not produced from external objects. The person suffering from this type of fear is unable to tell a definite cause responsible for the emergence of his fear. He will say: 'I am afraid of this situation as a whole. I do not find any definite cause behind it. It is just an accident that I am afraid of this situation'. It is not of an external fact that the person is afraid. 'An open place after all is no place at all; it is a lack of specificity. Essentially the same holds true of a high place or of a closed place'.¹ This class of fear, or say phobia, is called by the Jaina '*akasmād-bhaya*'. The fear of pain or suffering constitutes the fifth variety of fears known as '*vedanā-bhaya*'. Fear of diseases, i.e., pathophobia, fear of poisoning, i.e., toxophobia, etc., may be included in this class. The fear of death is of the sixth type. Death, really speaking, is an abstraction—something unknown to human experience. This type is called '*maraṇa-bhaya*'. The fear of dishonour and shame is of the last kind. The individual possessing this kind of fear is always afraid of losing honour and glory. It is known as '*aśloka-bhaya*'. From the psychogenic point of view it is not, perhaps, an unwarranted attempt to mention that some of our fears are simple and concrete, some of them are concrete but symbolic, some of them are abstract and symbolic. The Jaina philosophers, it is true, have not made any distinction on these lines, nevertheless, we can derive it from their description of the conditions of fear if we like.

Let us, now, study the nature of sex-drive which the Jaina thinkers regard as an outcome of conduct-deluding (*cāritra-mohanīya*) karma.

SEX-DRIVE

McDougall says that sexual desire is one of the instincts of mammals and man. Instinct means, for him, an innate inclination or desire. Emotion is not always so. It is sometimes acquired and sometimes inborn. According to him, inborn emotion is nothing more than instinct. That is why he includes anger, fear, disgust, laughter, etc., in the innate propensities and abilities of man.² In Indian psychology all these passions including sexual desires are

¹ Introduction to Abnormal Psychology, pp. 203-4.

² Energies of Man, ch. VII.

called emotions. Whether we call them instincts or emotions, essentially they are the same. We want to state only this much that in the Jaina system sex-drive is called emotion (*quasi-passion*).

Sex-drive is of three varieties corresponding to the three species of sex. They are male sex (*puruṣa-veda*), female sex (*strī-veda*), and dual sex (*napuṃsaka-veda*). The male sex and the female sex are not unfamiliar to us. Regarding the third sex, i.e., the dual sex the point to be noticed is that it should not be understood in the sense of impotency or frigidity, inasmuch as both impotency and frigidity are of the nature of negation, and hence, not positively real which is an essential condition of emotion. On the contrary, it is to be taken in the sense of two-fold desire directed towards the male and the female both. The subsequent lines will make it more clear. In this connection one more remark is to be added. The sexual desires should not be mistaken for the sexual organs. The desires relating to sex are mental, whereas the organs corresponding these desires are physical. To relate the same fact in the terminology of the doctrine of karma, sexual desire is the result of the rise of the conduct-deluding (*cāritra-mohanīya*) karma, whereas the sexual organs are formed on account of the rise of the physique-making (*nāman*) karma.¹

The drive through which the desire for courtship with the female is produced is called male-sex. The desire is produced in the same way as through the rise of phlegm the desire for something sour is generated. This drive is compared to a straw-fire. On the burning of straw the fire at once blazes and immediately after the burning it is extinguished, so also the male has a very strong urge at the outset but as soon as his desire is satisfied through the act of courtship it vanishes. Through the rise of the female-sex, the drive for union with the male is awakened. It is just like the desire for something sweet awakened through the rise of bile. It is compared to a dung-fire. As a burning dung-hill continues to glimmer as long as it is covered, but if it is given a proper and timely shaking it gradually grows into a brighter flame, just like that the sexual urge in the female is comparatively weak so long as she is not touched or kissed, but it goes on growing by and by through various stages of mating behaviour. The third sex is possessed by

¹ Karma-grantha, I, 22 : 24.

those who have an exceedingly strong desire for an intercourse. It is directed towards both the male and the female. It is just like the desire for something sour and sweet produced by the simultaneous rise of phlegm and bile. It is further compared to the burning of a town. As a burning town is not extinguished easily so also the sexual drive of a '*napuṃsaka*' lasts long and is not satisfied easily.¹ This is in brief the nature of sex-drive described by the Jaina thinkers. They use the term '*veda*' for expressing the meaning of sexual urge. The three *vedas* are of the nature of the three species of sex. The *puruṣa-veda* corresponds to the male-sex. Through it the desire for sexual enjoyment with the female is awakened. The *strī-veda* corresponds to the female-sex. It gives rise to the urge for intercourse with the male. The *napuṃsaka-veda* corresponds to the third sex. It is exceedingly strong, since it produces the desire for intercourse with the male and the female both.

To demonstrate the varying degrees of the expression of the intensity of the three drives the Jaina thinkers have given three interesting illustrations, viz., that of straw-fire for the male sex, that of the burning of dung for the female sex, and that of the burning of a town for the dual sex. As regards the expression of the dual sex, we do not have any remarkable evidence in modern psychology. Regarding the expression of the first two drives, we propose to record an experimental evidence that establishes more or less the same truth advocated by the Jaina philosophers. William McDougall records that there is undoubtedly some considerable difference between the male and the female of most species, as regards not only the receptive but also the executive side of the instinct. The male is more aggressive and active and usually takes the initiative. We have seen how among the pigeons these peculiarities of behaviour are the only clear recognition marks of sex; and how, among birds endowed with special sex-characters, such as plumes, and special colours and patterns, the male actively displays these before the female. The same is true in a less degree of the mammals. The male, in subduing the female to his "will," makes use of his voice and a display of his size, strength, and agility. The

¹ *Y'advaśāt strīyāḥ puruṣaṃ pratyabhilaṣo bhavati, yathā pittavaśāt madhura-dravyaṃ frāti, sa phumpha-mādāhasamaḥ strīvedodayaḥ...*
Karma-grantha, I, p. 38.

stallion arches his thick neck, waves aloft his tail, steps high and prances proudly. The bull bellows; the lion roars; the cat caterwauls; and the young man curls his moustache, strokes his beard, raises up his voice, and displays his strength and agility in leaps and bounds.¹ Why is the male more aggressive and active and why does he usually take the initiative? The Jaina explains this in the following manner: The sexual drive in the female is like dung-burning. It only glimmers until it is shaken. It is the male who performs the task of shaking it. Since the desire in the male is like a straw-fire, therefore, it blazes very soon and requires nobody to excite it. It is at the very outset exceedingly strong. The desire in the female is weak so long as the male does not take the initiative. To excite it, it is necessary as well as natural for the male to come forward and give the start. Thus, it is clear from the above description that both the modern psychologist and the Jaina grant the same fact as regards the nature of the rise of sexual desire in the male and the female.

As regards the causes of the binding of the various deluding karmas that generate these different types of emotions in our life, the Jaina maintains that the actions caused by the outbreak of passions produce the binding of the *kaṣāya-mohanīya* karmas. The actions caused by the mind confused through joking, liking, disliking, sorrow, fear, disgust, etc., produce the binding of the corresponding *nokaṣāya-mohanīya* karmas. Sight passionate desire, conjugal fidelity, etc., cause the binding of the karma that produces the male sex; great sensuality and the like produce that of the female sex; violent love of pleasure, strong passions directed towards sexual intercourse, and the like produce that of the third sex. It is clear from this conception of the nature of the bondage of the karma that produces an emotion that the outbreak of the corresponding emotion is the chief cause of the generation of a particular emotion. As for instance, the action caused by the outbreak of anger is the main cause of the emergence of another anger and so on. This is what we call 'like produces like'.

Now, let us take into account the problem of the existence of these emotions. How many of them co-exist and how many of them do not exist together, is the question that is to be answered.

¹ Outline of Psychology, pp. 159-160.

CO-EXISTENCE OF EMOTIONS

All the types of emotions, i.e., passions and *quasi*-passions can co-exist in *potentia* (*sattā*). With regard to the actual realisation, i.e., rise (*udaya*) of these types, the following combinations are possible:¹

1. There is a possibility of the emergence of only one of the four passions of the fourth group (*sañjvalana*). Thus, it is either anger or pride or deceit or greed belonging to the fourth group.

2. In addition to it there is one of the three sex-drives, i.e., either the male sex or the female sex or the dual sex. Thus, this combination consists of two emotions.

3. In addition to the second combination there is the generation of either joking (laughter) and liking or disliking and sorrow.

4. In this combination, there are two sub-combinations. (a) In the first one, in addition to the third combination there is either fear or disgust. (b) The second one contains one of the four passions of the third group (*pratyākhyānāvaraṇa*) in addition to the third combination.

5. It is of three sub-combinations. (a) With the third combination there arise fear and disgust both. (b) Either fear or disgust is added to the second sub-combination of the fourth combination. (c) One of the four passions of the second group (*apratyākhyānāvaraṇa*) is added to the second sub-combination of the fourth combination.

6. It is of three types. (a) Fear and disgust are added to the second type of the fourth combination. (b) Either fear or disgust is added to the third type of the fifth combination. (c) One of the four passions of the first group (*anantānubandhin*) is added to the third type of the fifth combination.

7. This combination consists of two varieties. (a) In addition to the third type of the fifth combination there exist fear and dis-

¹ *Ekham va do va cauro, etto ekkāhiya dasukkosā. Oheṇa mohaṇijje, uḍayaṭṭhāṇā nava havaṇti.*

Karma-grantha, VI, 11 and commentary thereupon.

We have not enumerated the combinations relating the belief-deluding karma because of the lack of their bearing on our topic.

gust. (b) In addition to the third variety of the sixth combination there is either fear or disgust.

8. Both fear and disgust are added to the third type of the sixth combination.

The following conclusions can be drawn from these eight types of combination:

(1) Of the four types of passions, only one can be realised. In other words, anger, pride, deceit, and greed cannot synchronise in our emotional experience. It is only one of them that can be experienced at a time.

(2) All the four groups, i.e., degrees of a passion can arise simultaneously, although all the passions cannot emerge at the same time.

(3) All the three sex-drives cannot exist at the same time in our sexual experience. They are antagonistic to each other.

(4) Joking and liking always synchronise.

(5) Disliking and sorrow always occur simultaneously.

(6) Joking and liking cannot appear in the presence of the appearance of disliking and sorrow.

(7) Fear and disgust can co-exist.

(8) Fear and disgust are not antagonistic to any type of emotion.

Regarding the realisation of the four passions, it can be easily admitted that only one of them can occur at a time. But as regards the occurrence of all the four degrees at the same time, we are not in a position to justify it. How it is possible that the different degrees of intensity can appear at the same moment. This position cannot be justified on the ground of the trace of a particular passion that has been left by it. If such were the case the antagonism among certain types of emotions would be impossible. But it is not so. From the above account it is clear that the Jaina does admit certain forms of antagonism. Hence, the position that all the four groups of a passion can arise simultaneously is not tenable. We did not come across any sound argument while studying the Jaina works on the doctrine of karma that can be advanced to give justification

to this conception. Taking into consideration the nature of the three sex-drives, it can be maintained without any danger that it is an impossibility to enjoy all of them at one and the same moment. We do not find any logical argument or psychological evidence on the basis of which we can prove that joking and liking always synchronise. Similar is the case with disliking and sorrow. With regard to the relation of joking and liking with sorrow and disliking, the account of the Jainas is quite consistent. Being of the nature of antagonism joking and liking cannot co-exist with sorrow and disliking. We can somehow maintain that fear and disgust on many occasions synchronise. The view that fear and disgust are not antagonistic to any emotion is open to debate. This is a brief account of the co-existence of emotions. In our opinion, really speaking, no two emotions can emerge simultaneously. As the simultaneous rise of pleasure and pain is not possible, so also no simultaneous realisation of two emotions is possible. It is a universal rule that two conscious activities cannot occur simultaneously. With this remark we finish our discussion of the nature of emotions.

Before we close this chapter let us deal with some individual differences of mental attitude corresponding to the emotional expressions of the individual. The Jaina term for these differences is '*leśyā*'

DIFFERENCES OF EMOTION, ATTITUDE, AND ACTIVITY

About the nature of *leśyā* there are three explanations: Some hold that it is a product of emotion, others hold that it is a result of activity, still others hold that it is an effect of karma.¹ The third view is all-inclusive because neither the existence of emotion nor that of activity is possible in the absence of karma. But this does not mean that all the types of karma produce *leśyā*. Only those karmas that inspire our activities of body, mind, or speech are held to be responsible for the appearance of *leśyā*. Thus, *leśyā* is a condition of our character (attitude, conduct, etc.) produced by the influence of different karmas. According to the ethical evaluation of activity, there may be as many varieties of character as our activities vary. Nevertheless, we can classify these varieties into certain definite categories. The Jaina thinkers have divided

¹ Doctrine of Karman in Jain Philosophy, p. 47.

all our activities and attitudes into six categories. They are distinguished according to different colours symbolising them. Our main concern is to deal with the nature of these categories, and not to take into account other problems which are psychologically insignificant. Hence, we come to their nature leaving all other issues aside. The following are the characters of the six kinds of *leśyā*:¹

He who commits great sins, does not possess self-control, has not ceased to injure living beings, commits cruel acts, is wicked and violent, is afraid of no consequences, is mischievous, and does not subdue his senses, develops the first kind (*kṛṣṇa*). He who possesses the following characteristics develops the second kind (*nīla*): Envy, anger, want of self-control, ignorance, deceit, want of modesty, greed, disgust, wickedness, carelessness, attachment to enjoyment. He who is dishonest in words and acts, who is base, and not upright, deceives others, is a talker of hurtful and sinful things, is a thief, and is full of jealousy, develops the third kind (*kāpota*). He who is humble, steadfast, free from deceit and inquisitiveness, well disciplined, restrained, attentive to his study and duties, loves the truth and keeps it, is afraid of forbidden things, and strives after the highest good, develops the fourth type of *leśyā* (*tejas*). A person who possesses little anger, pride, deceit, and greed, whose mind is at ease, who controls himself, who is attentive to his study and duties, who speaks but little, who is calm, who subdues his senses, develops the fifth type (*padma*). He who abstains himself from constant thinking about misery and sinful deeds, but engages in concentration, contemplation, and meditation, whose mind is not crooked but straight, who possesses complete self-control, is more or less free from passions, is calm, and subdues his senses, develops the last, i.e., the sixth kind of *leśyā* (*śukla*). Some characters are common to more than one type, as is apparent from the description. The first type is characterised by the possession of the greatest intensity of passions and sinful attitude and activity, while each following one grows lesser and lesser. The last type is the highest form of purity where no sinful attitude survives, no inauspicious act exists. The Ājīvika also recognizes the same number

¹ This account is based on the Uttarādhyayana-sūtra, XXXIV, 21-23. (Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XLV, pp. 199-200.)

of attitudes.¹ He calls them *abhijātis*. They are *Kṛṣṇābhijāti*, *nīlābhijāti*, *lohitābhijāti*, *padmābhijāti*, *śuklābhijāti*, and *parama-śuklābhijāti*.

Let us quote two interesting illustrations² indicating the comparative value of these types.

Six men saw a *jambū*-tree that was full of ripe fruits. All of them wanted to eat those fruits. It was a difficult task to climb up the tree. To avoid the trouble of climbing-up they suggested that they could fulfil their desires by cutting down the tree from the root. The second proposed to cut down the boughs. The third did not like this suggestion. He proposed to cut down only the branches. The fourth man did not want even this idea to be put into practice. He advised to cut-off only the bunches. The fifth suggested to pluck only the ripe fruits. The sixth even did not like this idea. He proposed to eat only those fruits that are fallen on the ground. The general tendency of the people possessing the respective types of *leśyā* should be compared to the six persons of this illustration. Similar is the case of six robbers who wanted to rob a village. The first robber wanted to kill all the beings of the village irrespective of animals and human beings. The second one wanted to kill only human beings. The third one proposed to butcher only men. The fourth one suggested to murder only armed ones. The fifth of them advised to kill only those who wanted to fight. The sixth one proposed not to kill any one, but to take away desirable things. These illustrations will help the reader in understanding the nature of the general attitude and tendency of different kinds of people who did not agree with one another in respect to their feelings, emotions, volitions, and the like. It is all due to the various degrees of the intensity of emotions and the velocity of vibrations (*yoga*).

¹ Aṅguttara-nikāya, III. (pp. 383 ff.)

² Karma-grantha, IV, pp. 113-4.

CHAPTER VI

ACTIVITY AND ITS CONTROL

The meaning of activity is the meaning of life. The existence of life presupposes the existence of activity. Conation, volition, will, action, and the like connote the same fact. When an activity is directed towards an intellectual end it is called intellectual conation or attention. On the other hand, if the end is in the form of a bodily movement or a muscular activity it is called motor conation or action proper. It is also to be noted that these activities are sometimes voluntary or purposive and sometimes non-voluntary or automatic. Whatever may be the case, an activity is an activity.

I

NATURE OF ACTIVITY

The Jaina view of activity is that the self possesses an innate capacity of activity which is known as energy (*vīrya*). All our activities are necessarily connected with the manifestation of this property of the self. The occurrence of knowledge, the experience of feeling and emotion, the practice of concentration and meditation, the performance of self-discipline—all these activities are possible only on the proper manifestation of the innate energy of the self. To be precise, energy is the common cause of activity.

Now, why is it that the innate quality of the self is not manifested in its entirety? What is that which hinders the complete manifestation of energy? Why is it that our natural power does not flow in all perfection? It is not very difficult to imagine what the Jaina has to reply. It is due to the rise of power-obscuring (*anta-rāya*) karma that our natural energy is obscured. It is true that the karma hindering it does not completely eliminate its appearance nonetheless it is restricted to a considerable extent. The manifestation of this restricted energy stands in need of the media of the body, speech, and mind. Unless there is a fit body, the serviceable organ of speech, or the conscious mind the limited power of the self cannot be expressed. The Jaina considers these three kinds of media as the essential factors for the expression of our restricted energy.

The energy thus expressed is called activity or *yoga* in the Jaina system. Activity, in other words, is nothing but the vibrations of the body, organ of speech, and mind. These vibrations are due to the energy of the self.

As has already been indicated, the activity is either intellectual or motor as is the belief of modern psychology. The Jaina recognizes three types of activities. He takes the first type, viz., intellectual activity, as it is. As regards the second type, viz., motor activity, it is classified into two varieties: physical and vocal. Really speaking vocal activity is not different from physical activity; but on account of its outstanding significance it has been regarded as an independent type. Thus, in accordance with the Jaina view, there are three classes of activity: mental, vocal, and physical.

Now, we propose to take into account the nature of these three types.

MENTAL ACTIVITY

Mind, according to the Jaina, is the internal organ of knowledge. It is, just like other sense-organs, of physical nature and cognises all the objects of the external senses. It is so to speak a uniting sense-organ. The nature of mind in detail has already been discussed in connection with the discussion of the nature and functions of sense-organs. It is of no use to repeat it again. It is sufficient to state that mind is the organ of thinking. The implication of this statement is that the activities of mind are the activities of thought. Corresponding to the objects of thought, it is further observed by the Jaina, the mental activities of a being can be of four types: true, false, true and false, and neither true nor false.¹ We do not propose to justify these types on the verdict of logic. Leaving the Law of Contradiction and the Law of Excluded Middle aside we proceed to analyse what we actually experience. The thinking of the mind about a thing which is of the same nature as the mind thinks it to be, is a true mental activity. What is the criterion of truth? Is the criterion empirical or transcendental? It is not in our interest to enter into all these controversial problems. For our present purpose it is sufficient to state that if a mental

¹ *Sarceyava mīsa asaccamosa maṇa*.....

Karma-grantha, IV, 24.

activity is not contradicted by the subsequent mental activities, it is safe to hold it to be true. To put it in a different manner, there is no ultimate criterion of truth other than our own experience. A false mental activity is diametrically opposed to a true one. It is nothing but a mental operation that does not correspond to the object of thought. Consequently it is contradicted afterwards. These two are the most common forms of thought. The third type of mental activity is a mixture of the two. It is neither completely true nor totally false, i.e., it is partly true and partly false. We think of a garden that has a plenty of mango-trees like this: 'It is a mango-garden'. This kind of our thought is an instance of the third type. As a matter of fact, the garden is not exclusively a garden of mango-trees. It has other varieties of trees as well. Because of the majority of mango-trees we are apt to think in the said manner. Thus, this kind of our thinking is a mixture of truth and falsity. It corresponds to the object of thought partly, and not wholly. The corresponding portion thereof is true and the non-corresponding one is false. The nature of a thought which is neither true nor false is like this: Sometimes we think of something which has no direct reference either to truth or to falsity. Such modes of our thought are not directly associated with the concept of truth and falsity. They simply express our desires, purposes, inclinations, and the like. 'Come here, go there, bring the ball, give me the chair' are some of the instances of this kind of thinking. It is also restricted like the first three types to the province of thought only.

VOCAL ACTIVITY

The manifestation of vocal activity is in the shape of speech. Let us, before dealing with the various types of the activity of speech, have an estimate of the nature of speech itself. Speech is nothing but a particular form of sound emerging on the rise of the physique-making (*nāman*) karma. It is mentioned in the first Karma-grantha¹ that sweet voice, suggestive speech, ill-sounding voice, unsuggestive speech, etc., are some of the types of the physique-making karma. In the Tattvārtha-sūtra the function of sound is ascribed to matter.² This is already known to us that physical karma

¹ *Susarā mahūrasuhajhuṇi*.

Karma-grantha, I, 50.

² Tattvārtha-sūtra, V, 24.

is material in nature. Hence, both these views are essentially the same.

The Jaina philosophers, unlike the Vaiśeṣika, etc., do not associate sound with ether. On the contrary, they attribute it to matter. The emergence of sound is due to the violent contact of material products with one another. In the language of the scientist, the source of sound is in the state of vibration. For instance, the strings of a piano, the prongs of a tuning-fork, the air in an organ pipe—all are in a state of vibration when they produce sound.

Sound is classified into two chief divisions. The sound incorporated in various languages comprises the first variety and the sound which is not incorporated in any language constitutes the second variety. The former is in the form of language, while the latter is in the form of noise. Language is further divided into two classes: articulate utterance and inarticulate utterance. Articulate utterance is nothing but speech. It is this type of sound with which we are interested in the present discussion of our topic. Noise is also classified into two categories: musical and natural. The sounds produced with the help of musical instruments are of the first category. The second category is comprised of the roar of thunder, the rippling of water, and the like.¹ Our purpose in describing the nature of sound has been only to indicate that speech is a particular type of sound. It is produced by articulate utterance. An articulate utterance is possible only on the possession of the organ of speech. Thus, speech is invariably associated with the organ of speech. From the standpoint of the doctrine of karma the vocal organ as well as speech is due to the *nāma* karma. The activities of speech, just like those of mind, are of four types.² They are true, false, true and false, and neither true nor false corresponding to the four types of thinking. Sometimes it happens that our vocal activity does not exactly correspond to our mental activity. While thinking truly we tell a lie and *vice versa*. Whatever may be the case, our vocal activity is always of one of the four types.

¹ Sarvārtha-siddhi, p. 188.

²*vāgyogopī caturdhā draṣṭavyaḥ*.....
Karma-grantha, IV. p. 151.

PHYSICAL ACTIVITY

Before discussing different types of physical activity let us take into account the nature and kinds of physique itself. It has already been mentioned that the root cause of the entire structure of our body is the physique-making karma. What are the varieties of this karma and what is their nature, all this has been recorded in the chapter dealing with the fundamentals of the Jaina doctrine of karma. It is needless to repeat it here. We shall confine ourselves to the five types of bodies only. According to Jaina conception, matter is the material cause of body. It adopts various forms in the shape of different types of bodies. It is also a fact that different types of bodies require different kinds of material particles. There are five groups of such particles. They are technically known as *āhāraka-vargaṇā*, *tejo-vargaṇā*, *bhāṣā-vargaṇā*, *mano-vargaṇā*, and *kārmaṇa-vargaṇā*. We know that the Jaina recognizes five types of bodies: gross, transformable, projectable, electric, and karmic.¹ Of them, the first three types are formed of the first group of material particles. The second group forms electric body. Karmic body which is the root cause of all physical and mental media of activity is composed of the last group. The composition of mind and speech, as has already been mentioned, is dependent upon the *mano-vargaṇā* and *bhāṣā-vargaṇā* respectively.² The following are the chief characteristics of the five kinds of bodies:

The organic body of human beings, plants, and animals is called gross body. It is full of blood, bones, flesh, etc. It is this type of body what we generally understand to be physical and visible. That which is possessed by the beings of heaven and hell (with which we are not interested here) and by the human beings as well having an extraordinary power (*labdhi*) is known as transformable body. It is invisible to the normal vision and is capable of transformation into different shapes, sizes, etc. The third kind consists of those subtle bodies that are developed by the advanced ascetics. This type of body can be projected to great distances on certain special occasions. The electric body is composed of fiery

¹ These bodies can be compared with the three bodies—*kāraṇa*, *sūkṣma*, and *sthūla* or *avidyā*, *liṅga*, and *sthūla* in Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Vedānta and also with the Astral Body in Parapsychology.

² *Jīva-kāṇḍa*, 606-8.

particles. It is possessed of the power of digesting the food materials we take. The inner subtle body which is the seed of all mental and motor activities is called karmic body. It is composed of the eight types of karmas.¹ With this background in mind we, now, proceed to the various types of physical activity.

According to different combinations of the five kinds of bodies, there are seven varieties of physical activity.² (1) Corresponding to gross body we have the first variety, viz., the activity of gross body. Similarly, there is (2) the activity of transformable body, (3) that of projectable body, (4) that of karmic body. The last three are the mixed activities. They are (5) the activity of gross body mixed with that of karmic body, (6) the activity of transformable body mingled with that of karmic body or that of gross body, and (7) the activity of projectable body mixed with that of gross body. Why there are only seven kinds of physical activity when it is possible to have more than seven combinations of the five kinds of bodies? For instance, what is the reason in not admitting the activity of transformable body mixed with that of projectable body? For the understanding of this problem let us point out certain Jaina conceptions regarding the possession of various kinds of bodies. The last two bodies (electric and karmic) are always associated with every being. At the time of transmigration only these two bodies are possessed by the self. It can possess at the most four bodies at one and the same time.³ Obviously, it is an impossibility to possess all the five bodies simultaneously, since transformable body and projectable body never exist together. Thus, when there is a co-existence of two bodies they are electric and karmic; when it is of three they are either electric, karmic, and gross or electric, karmic, and transformable; when it is of four they are either electric, karmic, gross, and transformable or electric, karmic, gross, and projectable.⁴ Bearing this conception in mind, we, now, come to the examination of the seven varieties of physical activities.

¹ Outlines of Jaina Philosophy, p. 78.

² *Tathākāyayogaḥ saptadhā*.....

Karma-grantha, IV, p. 151.

³ *Tadādinī bhāṣyāni yugapadekasyā caturbhyaḥ*.

Tattvārtha-sūtra, II, 44.

⁴ Tattvārtha-sūtra-vivecana (Sukhlalji), p. 106.

Corresponding to the four types of bodies, viz., gross, transformable, projectable, and karmic we have the first four varieties, viz., the activity of gross body, that of transformable body, that of projectable body, and that of karmic body. What about the activity of electric body? The answer to this question is that the activity of electric body is not specially counted, inasmuch as it is invariably associated with the activity of karmic body.¹ We have the following objection to this answer: Being of an independent and specific nature electric body must have a special activity just like the activities of the other bodies. It is altogether a different problem whether a particular body is always connected with another body or a particular body is never connected with another kind of body. The only satisfactory solution is that if there is an independent type of body it is the demand of logical thinking that it must possess an independent activity. Hence, the activity of electric body must be specially counted. It is equally real and positive exactly like the activity of karmic body. Regarding the mixed activities the following conclusions can be drawn: (1) The activity of gross body can co-exist with that of transformable body, karmic body (including electric body), or projectable body. (2) The activity of transformable body can co-exist with that of gross body or karmic body (electric body is also included). (3) The activity of projectable body can co-exist with that of gross body only. (4) The activity of karmic body (and that of electric body) can co-exist with that of gross body, or transformable body. Let us examine these four positions. The activity of gross body is not antagonistic to any physical activity. The activity of transformable body does not co-exist with that of projectable body. Why is it so? It is because of the impossibility of the co-existence of both these bodies, as is apparent from the study of the Jaina conception of bodies. Why is it an impossibility to exist transformable body and projectable body together? It is because of the fundamental difference of the nature and conduct of the possessors of the two. The conditions required for the existence of the two are diametrically opposed to each other. The existence of transformable body is necessarily conditioned by psychical inertia (*pramāda*), whereas

¹ *Sadā kārmaṇena sahāvvyabhicāritayā*.

Karma-grantha, IV, p. 154.

that of projectable body is invariably connected with its absence. Hence, both of them cannot co-exist. Why is it that psychical inertia is essential for one and not for the other? It is the very ground of the differentiation, hence, no further explanation is called to account. The activity of projectable body cannot co-exist with that of karmic body as well. Its co-existence is possible only with the activity of gross body. What can be accounted for this? As regards the existence of projectable body, as has already been mentioned, it can co-exist with karmic body. It is only their activities that cannot occur together. The reason is that at the time of their existence both of them live in the same gross body. Projectable body, at the time of discharging its duty, leaves the body where it lives and goes to a distant place from where it returns after performing its respective function. Hence, the activity of projectable body that is performed at a certain distance cannot co-exist with the activity of karmic body which, according to the Jains, is accomplished while living in the gross body of the individual. If such is the case, what about the co-existence with the activity of gross body? How is it possible that the activity of gross body and that of projectable body exist together? The Jaina replies that at the time of dissociation from or reassociation with gross body the activity of projectable body co-exists with that of gross body.¹ Granted that on such occasions there is a mixture of these two activities. One question still remains to be answered: Karmic body, on these and some other occasions, is invariably associated with gross body. This is also a fact that in the absence of the activity of karmic body which is the root cause of all activity (*yoga*) no activity of gross body is possible. Why then at the time of their dissociation and reassociation the activity of projectable body and that of karmic body do not exist in the selfsame mixture? What is that debar us from applying the same logic in the case of karmic activity? Why not the same argument that has been given for the mixture of the activities of gross and projectable bodies be advanced for the mixture of the activities of karmic and projectable bodies? Or, let us advance another argument: Accepting the possibility of the mixed existence of karmic and projectable bodies

¹ *siddhaprayojanasya* *āhāraṇaṁ parityajata* .
audārikaṁ upādādānasya āhāraṇaṁ prārabhamāṇasya vā
 Karma-grantha, VI, p. 152.

what is the sense in rejecting the mixed existence of their activities? Existence is of no meaning if there is no activity. To say that a particular body exists without performing its respective function is to say that there is the soul but it is not conscious. In our opinion, therefore, the same is the possibility of the mixed activity of bodies as is that of their mixed existence.

II

CONTROL OF ACTIVITY

We have taken into account the general nature and specific characteristics of activity. We have also critically examined the three-fold activity of the Jainas. Now, we propose to consider in brief the Jaina account of the regulation and control of various activities. How the activities of our behaviour are controlled, regulated, and stopped? What is the motive behind it? What are the means and methods that can be utilized in this connection? These are some of the problems that are to be dealt with. In Indian psychology all such problems are discussed under the head *Yoga*.

The word '*yoga*' literally means 'union'. In Vedānta it is used in the sense of the spiritual union of the individual soul with the Universal Soul. The Gītā defines *yoga* as that state than which there is nothing higher or worth realising and firmly rooted in which the person is never shaken even by the greatest pain. This state is free from all pain and misery. *Yoga* for Patañjali is nothing more than spiritual effort to attain perfection through the control of the body, sense-organs, and mind.¹ The Jaina meaning of *yoga*, as we have mentioned, is diametrically opposite to that of Patañjali. According to the *Yoga-sūtra* of Patañjali, '*yoga* is the cessation of the activities of mind',² whereas according to the Jaina, 'the activities of body, speech, and mind are called *yoga*'.³ It is nothing but the inflow of karma (*āsrava*).⁴ That through which this inflow is

¹ Indian philosophy (Dr. C. D. Sharma), p. 235.

² *Yogaścittavṛttinirodhaḥ*.

Yoga-sūtra, I, 2.

³ *Kāyavāñmanahkarma yogaḥ*.

Tattvārtha-sūtra, VI, 1.

⁴ *Sa āsravaḥ*.

Ibid., VI, 2.

checked is called *saṁvara*.¹ Thus, *saṁvara* is the cessation or stoppage of the activities of body, speech, and mind and hence, it can be taken as the exact equivalent of the Pātañjala term *yoga*. It is to be noted that the later Jaina writers have used the term *yoga* in the Pātañjala sense as well. For instance, Haribhadra defines the term *yoga* as the means of emancipation.² This emancipation is nothing but the perfection conceived by Patañjali. There may be some difference between the two if considered in detail but fundamentally they are the same. We are, however, mainly concerned with the control of activities which constitutes the path to dissociation and cessation of karmic matter. And this is the essence of emancipation and perfection. There are certain conditions necessary for the successful control, regulation, and lastly complete stoppage of thought, speech, and physical movements that allow karmic particles to enter into the soul. In other words, the Jaina thinkers prescribe certain definite means to control, stop, and remove the inflow of karma that is due to the activities of the individual.

CONDITIONS OF THE CONTROL

Patañjali's eight-fold path of *yoga* is well-known to us. He advocates the control of the body, sense organs, and mind. He does not allow to kill the body, on the contrary, it is recommended by him to make it pure and perfect. He prescribes the eight-fold path of discipline³ necessary for the attainment of perfection. For our present study, it is desirable to describe its nature in brief.

The first of the eight chief requisites is *yama*. It is nothing but abstention from five evil acts, viz., abstention from enjury through thought, word, or deed, abstention from falsehood, abstention from stealing, abstention from passions and lust, and abstention from avarice.⁴ These are negative in nature. The second requisite called *niyama* includes five positive rules. They are external and internal purification, contentment, austerity, study, and devotion to God.⁵ The third one is *āsana*, i.e., posture. A steady and comfortable

¹ *Aśravaniradhak saṁyarah.*

Tattvārtha-sūtra, IX, 1.

² *Mukkhena joyaṇḍo jogo.....*

Yoga-vimśikā, 1.

³ Yoga-sūtra, II, 29.

⁴ Ibid., II, 30.

⁵ Ibid., II, 32.

posture¹ is a necessary help to self-control. The fourth one is known as *prāṇāyāma*. It is nothing but control of breath. It is in the form of regulation of inhalation, retention, and exhalation of breath². *Pratyāhāra* constitutes the fifth requisite. It is to be understood in the sense of withdrawal of the senses from their respective objects.³ The sixth condition is called *dhāraṇā*. It is concentrating or fixing the mind on a particular object of meditation.⁴ It makes the mind steadfast like the unflickering flame of a lamp. The seventh one is *dhyāna*. It means meditation. It is the steadfast contemplation without any disturbance.⁵ The eighth requisite is called *sa-mādhi*. It is in the form of ecstasy or trance. It is the consummation of all the previous requisites. It is the highest means to the cessation of the mental activities. It is of two varieties: conscious (*samprajñāta*) and supraconscious (*asamprajñāta*). The former is that state of mind in which the meditator and the object of meditation are not completely fused together. There is still the duality of the object of meditation and its consciousness. In the latter the consciousness of the object is transcended. Here no mental activity arises.⁶ Immediately after this stage of mental discipline the body breaks and the self obtains complete emancipation. This is in short, the process of the cessation of mental modifications in the system of Patañjali.

The Buddhists also recognize various stages of mental control. They divide meditation (*dhyāna*) into four degrees. The first and the lowest of the four degrees corresponds in its quality to a state higher than the *dhāraṇā* stage of Patañjali. This stage is not attained immediately. To reach it some preliminary practices are required. These practices are exactly like the first five stages of Yoga. The first and the foremost condition is in the form of the practice of the precepts and rules of morality laid down by the Buddha. Secondly, the person practising meditation must keep his body and mind pure and serene. He is required to live in solitary retirement

¹ *Tatva sthīrasukhamāsanam.*

Yoga-sūtra, II, 46.

² *Ibid.*, II, 49-50.

³ *Ibid.*, II, 54.

⁴ *Ibid.*, III, 1.

⁵ *Ibid.*, III, 2.

⁶ *Ibid.*, III, 3, and the Bhāsvatī Commentary on it.

away from the people in a forest or in a cave and to sit cross-legged always thinking on a particular object. He should practice love and compassion in which he is to regard all sentient beings as his brothers. He should also practice the method of counting the number of his inspirations and expirations.¹ After these practices he may attain the state of meditation proper. The following are the four stages of meditation: 'He concentrates his mind upon a single thought. Gradually his soul becomes filled with a super-natural serenity, while his mind still reasons upon and investigates the subject chosen for contemplation: this is the first *jhāna* called *vitakka*. Still fixing his thoughts upon the same object, he then frees his mind from reasoning and investigation, while the ecstasy and serenity remains, and this is the second *jhāna vicāra*; next his thoughts still fixed as before, he divests himself of ecstasy and attains the third *jhāna sukham*, which is a state of tranquil serenity. Lastly, he passes to the fourth *jhāna* in which the mind exalted and purified is indifferent to all emotions alike of pleasure and pain called *upekkhā*'.²

This is a brief description of mental control in accordance with the Buddhist conception of meditation. With this background in mind, let us estimate a comparative value of the Jaina view of the means and conditions necessary for a successful control of the activities of the mind, speech, and body that leads to the ultimate and highest purification of the self which, in other words, is necessarily conditioned by the complete cessation of the inflow as well as the utter annihilation of the accumulation of karmic matter.

The following are the conditions needed for the consummation of the stoppage and control of the inflow of karmic matter which is due to the three-fold activities of thought, speech, and bodily modifications:³ (1) Self-regulation, (2) moral virtue, (3) contemplation, (4) conquest of affliction, (5) auspicious conduct, and (6) austerity. The last condition is meant for both the stoppage of inflow and the annihilation of the accumulated karmic matter.

¹ Yoga Philosophy, p. 342.

² Ibid., p. 343.

³ *samitiḍharmānupreṣṣāpariṣahajayacāritraiḥ*.

Tapasā nirjarā ca.

Tattvārtha-sūtra, IX, 2-3.

The Tattvārtha-sūtra mentions self-control (*guṇṭi*) as an additional means of the cessation of the inflow. Self-control is nothing but the control of the three-fold activities.¹ Because the central theme of our discussion is the control of the three-fold activities, we have deliberately left its enumeration as one of the conditions of the stoppage of activities (*saṁvara*). Moreover, the above-cited means are nothing more than the elucidation and elaboration of self-control. They are, in a different language, the necessary conditions to give a definite shape to self-control. It is, however, possible to understand the nature and methods of the control of the three-fold activities through the proper understanding of the aforesaid means. Let us, now, have an analysis of these means one by one. It is but natural that the account of these means is not purely psychological but mixed with ethical discipline.

SELF-REGULATION

Self-regulation is the regulation of the five chief activities performed for the maintenance of life. The five-fold activities are: walking, speaking, receiving of something, keeping of things and performance of the excretional activities.

The walking of a well-disciplined person should be pure in four respects: the support, the time, the road, and the caution.² The support is in the shape of cognition, belief, and conduct by which our thought becomes pure. The time is day-time which is in all respects better than night. The road excludes bad ways that are harmful in maintaining discipline.³ The caution is again four-fold: regarding the chief cause, place, time, and condition of mind.⁴ As regards the chief cause, the walking person should look forward with his eyes. With regard to place, he should look forward for four cubits, and seeing animals he should move on by walking on his toes or heels or the sides of his feet. If there be some by-path, he should choose it, and not go straight on. If there are on the way living beings, seeds grass, water, or mud, he should not go straight

¹ Tattvārtha-sūtra, IX, 4.

² *Alaṁbaṇeṇa kāleṇa, maggeṇa jayaṇāi ya.*
Uttarādhyayana-sūtra, XXIV, 4.

³ Ibid., XXIV, 5.

⁴ *Davvas khetṭao ceva, kālao bhāvao*
Ibid., XXIV, 6.

if there be an obstructed by-way.¹ With respect to time, he should look forward as long as he walks. As regards the condition of mind, he should move attentively.² He walks attentively who pays attention only to his walk and the body executing it. He avoids attending to the objects of other senses.

Regarding the activity of speaking, a well-disciplined person should avoid the following eight emotions: anger, pride, deceit, greed, laughter, fear, loquacity, and slander.³ To put it positively, he should use blameless and concise speech at the proper time. Well considering, speaking with precision, one should employ language in moderation and restraint. For this, he should know that there are four kinds of speech: true, untrue, true mixed with untrue, and neither true nor untrue nor true mixed with untrue. He should not use speech whether true or untrue or true mingled with untrue, if it be sinful, blamable, rough, stinging, coarse, hard, leading to sins, to discord and factions, to grief and outrage, to destruction of living beings.⁴ Then what type of speech should he use? The reply is: He, considering well, should use true and accurate speech, or speech which is neither true nor false. For such speech is not sinful, blamable, rough, stinging, etc.⁵ To sum up: A well-disciplined person, putting aside anger, pride, deceit, greed, etc., considering well, speaking with precision, what one can hear and follow, not too quick, with discrimination, should employ language in moderation and restraint.⁶ This finishes the description of the discipline regarding the activity of speech.

As regards receiving, etc., a well-disciplined person should avoid the faults in the search, in the acceptance, and in the use of the three kinds of objects, viz., food, lodging, and other articles of use. There are three kinds of faults in this connection: faults occasioned either by the receiver or by the giver, faults inherent in the act of receiving, and faults caused by the use of the articles

¹ Ācārāṅga-sūtra, II, 3, 1, 6-7.

² Uttarādhyayana-sūtra, XXIV, 7.

³ *Kohe māṇe ya māyāe, lobhe ya uv ruttayā.*

Hāse bhāse moharīe, viḥahāsu taheva ya.

Ibid., XXIV, 9.

⁴ Ācārāṅga-sūtra, II, 4, 1, 6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 4, 1, 7.

⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 4, 2, 19.

received.¹ There are in all forty-six faults to be avoided in this respect. We need not enumerate them here. The only point we want to emphasise is that for the control and regulation of activities, all possible faults as regards receiving of things should be avoided.

With regard to keeping of things, a well-disciplined person should wipe a particular article after having inspected it with his own eyes, and then he should take it up or put it down with complete carefulness.²

Regarding the performance of excretional activities, a well-disciplined person should act in the following manner: Excrements, urine, saliva, mucus, uncleanness of the body, offals of food, waste things, and everything of this kind is to be disposed of in a place neither frequented nor seen by other people, which creates no trouble to self-control, which is not odd, which is not covered with grass or leaves, not having holes, which has an inanimate surface-layer, which is not too near a village, etc., which is exempt from insects and the like.³ These are the five aspects of self-regulation (*samiti*) corresponding to the five chief activities performed for the maintenance of life. Let us have a comparative and critical estimate thereof.

The whole code of self-regulation is inspired by the great Jaina principle of non-violence. Violence is not confined to physical slaying only. All possible types of injury whether it be mental, vocal, or physical are included in violence. This being the reason, a well-disciplined person is prohibited against making unwarranted assertions or negations. He is required to be very careful about his speech. He should not joke, nor should he make any categorical assertions. Similarly, he is required to be careful about walking, receiving, and the like. He should not hurt even the feelings of others. Anger, pride, deceit, and greed are his real enemies. He should destroy them and not any other living being. He should, therefore, desist from killing others. He should restrain himself. He can, thus, be free from all anger, pride, deceit, and greed, and ultimately he is freed from all karma which is the sole cause of suffering. The conception of *yama* of Yoga can be compared with the Jaina con-

¹ *Gavesanāe gahane ya paribhogesaṇā*.....

Uttarādhyayana-sūtra, XXIV, 11-2.

² *Ibid.*, XXIV, 14.

³ *Ibid.*, XXIV, 15-8.

ception of self-regulation. All the five evil acts to be avoided are implicitly present in the principle of non-violence. To put the idea in a different manner, the five evil acts are nothing but the expansion and elucidation of violence itself. To avoid them necessarily means to avoid violence. The avoidance of violence is nothing more than the avoidance of the five evil acts of Yoga and the observance of the five self-regulations of Jainism. In a different context, the Jainas also maintain, just like the followers of Yoga, the same five types of *yama* in the form of five vows. It is needless to explain them here. The Buddhists also believe in the five fundamental rules of moral conduct more or less in the same way. '1. Kill not any living thing. 2. Steal not. 3. Commit not adultery. 4. Lie not. 5. Drink not strong drink'.¹ Thus, we may observe that the first four of the five evil acts to be avoided correspond to the first four commandments in Buddhism. The fifth alone is different. Taking the principle of non-violence or non-injury into consideration, all of them are included in it. Hence, the fundamental unity underlying all these conceptions is in the form of non-violence. It is the chief factor responsible for the check of the inflow of karma. Self-regulation is observed either fully or partially as the circumstances and the strength of the observer may be.

Now, let us turn to moral virtue that comes next in order.

MORAL VIRTUE

The *Tattvārtha-sūtra* mentions the following tenfold moral virtues as essential for self-control: forbearance, modesty, straightforwardness, contentment, truthfulness, self-restraint, austerity, renunciation, non-attachment, and celibacy.² According to the *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra*, he who is ignorant of the truth, egoistical, greedy, without discipline, and who talks loosely, is not fit for the practice of moral virtue. There are five causes that render complete self-control impossible: egoism, delusion, carelessness, illness, and idleness. Because of the following eight causes self-discipline is called virtue: not to be fond of laughter, to control one's bad habits, not to speak ill of others, not to be without discipline, not to be of wrong discipline, not to be of strong desires, not to be choleric, and

¹ Buddhism, p. 126.

² *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, IX, 6.

to love the truth. He who is liable to the following fourteen charges, is not capable of moral virtue: If he is frequently angry; if he perseveres in his wrath; if he spurns friendly advice; if he is very proud of his knowledge; if he finds fault with others; if he is angry even with his friends; if he speaks evil of even of a good friend behind his back; if he is always positive in his assertions, if he is malicious, egoistic, greedy, without self-restraint; if he does not share with others; if he is always unkind. He, on the contrary, should possess the following good qualities if he is to acquire or develop moral virtue: If he is always humble, steady, free from deceit and desires; if he abuses nobody; if he does not persevere in his wrath; if he listens to friendly advice, if he is not proud of his learning; if he does not find fault with his friends; if he speaks well even of a bad friend behind his back; if he abstains from quarrels; if he is enlightened, polite, decent, and quick; then and then alone he is capable of the observance of moral virtue.¹ The above-mentioned qualities and defects are some of the necessary acts to be performed and to be avoided for the observance of complete self-discipline. We are aware of the fact that some of them are repeated more than once. It is also true that some important virtues might have been left uncounted. We are, however, not concerned with the exactness of the number of moral virtues. Our purpose in stating these qualities has been only to indicate the nature of moral virtue that is necessary for the control of the acquisition of inauspicious karma. These are some of the positive means that can help us in checking the inflow of karmic matter.

These moral virtues of the Jainas can be compared with the five types of *niyama* of Yoga. External and internal purification corresponds to modesty, forbearance, straightforwardness, etc. Contentment and austerity are common to both. As regards study, the Jaina deals with it as one of the twelve types of austerity. Hence, it is not different from austerity. As regards the fifth type, viz., devotion to God, the Jainas have not mentioned a separate variety of moral virtue of this kind. According to them, it can be conjectured, this is not an essential factor to practise self-control. Moreover, they do not attach any importance to God, since their conception of Godhead is totally different from that of Yoga. We,

¹ Uttarādhyayana-sūtra, XI, 2-13.

however, need not enter into the discussion of the nature of God. Some of the Jaina moral virtues, e.g., celibacy can also be compared with the *yama* of Yoga, since the Jaina view of moral virtue is both negative and positive. The Buddhists also regard some of these moral virtues as necessary for self-control and meditation. It should be noted that Buddhism repudiates various processes of bodily mortification (austerity).¹ Now, we come to contemplation.

CONTEMPLATION

Contemplation means repeated thinking of a particular idea or object. It does not correspond to any of the eight requisites recognized by the Yoga system in its exactness. We, however, can compare it with *dhāraṇā* and *dhyāna* roughly. The Jaina thinkers hold that a well-disciplined person should contemplate the following twelvefold objects. We simply quote them without taking into account any justification thereof. Some of these objects correspond to the metaphysical speculations of the Jainas. These are the twelvefold objects of contemplation: the fleeting nature of things, the helplessness of a particular individual, the miserable nature of the world, the loneliness of the worldly sojourn, the distinctness of the self from the body, the impure character of the body, the conditions and consequences of the inflow of karmic matter, the means for the stoppage of karmic inflow, the conditions of the dissociation of karmic matter from the soul, the nature of the constituents of the universe, the difficulty of the attainment of enlightenment, and the true nature of reality.²

The fourth condition of the control of activities is conquest of afflictions, i.e., patient endurance of troubles. We, now, proceed to the nature and conquest of various troubles. The patient endurance of these troubles is helpful for the dissociation of karmic matter as well.

CONQUEST OF AFFLICTION

There are twenty-two troubles to be learnt and conquered by a person of self-control. The Uttarādhyayana-sūtra presents a

¹ Buddhism, p. 240

² *Anityāśarāṇasamsāra*.....

Tattvārtha-sūtra, IX, 7.

lucid description of these troubles.¹ We make an attempt to reproduce the description in brief. The following are the twenty-two troubles: hunger, thirst, cold, heat, biting or stinging insects, nakedness, discontentment or disliking, women, wandering, isolation, lodging, abuse, punishment, begging, failure, illness, pricking of grass etc., dirt, kind and respectful treatment, knowledge, ignorance, and righteousness. Some of them are agreeable, whereas some of them are disagreeable. To regulate the mental, vocal, and physical activities of the individual it is necessary to conquer over both the favourable and unfavourable circumstances that may stand in his way. As is apparent from our previous discussion, the endurance of these troubles as well as the practice of moral virtues, self-discipline, and contemplation is not exclusively psychological but mingled with ethical precepts recognized by Jainism. We should also bear in mind that these ethical principles are to a great extent psychological. This being the reason we have without any hesitation discussed and shall discuss them. In fact the Indian conception of life is so interwoven that it is, however, most difficult or say impossible to study its various branches in an absolute isolation. Let us, with this fact in mind, proceed to the nature of the conquest of the aforesaid troubles.

(1) Though his body be weakened by hunger, a person who is strong in self-control, should not cut or cause another to cut anything to be eaten, nor cook it or cause another to cook it. (2) Though overcome by thirst, he should drink no cold water (Jaina monks are prohibited even to touch cold water in view of the danger of its life being hurt), but try to get distilled water, i.e., water which by boiling or some other process has become lifeless. Wandering about on deserted ways with dry throat and distressed, he should bear this trouble. (3) If he, on some occasion, suffers from cold on his wanderings, he should not walk beyond due time. 'I have no shelter and nothing to cover my skin, hence, I shall make a fire to warm myself;' such a thought should not be entertained by him. (4) If he suffers from the heat of hot things, or from the heat of his body, or from the heat of summer, he should not lament the loss of comfort. He should not desire for a bath,

¹ Uttarādhyayana-sūtra, II. (Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XLV, pp. 8-15.)

or pour water over his body, or fan himself. (5) Suffering from insects he should remain undisturbed. He is not required to scare them away, nor to keep them off, nor to be in the least provoked to passion by them. Tolerant persons do not kill them, though they eat their flesh and blood. (6) 'My clothes being torn, I shall go naked, or I shall get a new suit;' such thought-activities should not be entertained by a self disciplined person. At one time he may have no clothes, on another occasion he may have some clothes; knowing this to be a noble rule, he should not complain about it. (7) He who wanders from one place to another may become tired of his houseless life. He should bear this trouble. He should wander about free from sins, guarded in himself, performing no actions, and perfectly passionless. (8) Men have an instinctive liking for women. A self-controlled man is not disturbed by them in the least. (9) He should wander about, bearing all troubles, in a village or a town or a market place or a capital. He is strictly forbidden to acquire any property. He should live without a fixed residence. (10) He should sit down alone in a burial-place or a deserted house, or below a tree without moving himself and driving away any one. Sitting there he should patiently endure all dangers. When seized with fear, he should not stand up and go to some other place. (11) He who practises penance and is strong in self-control will not be affected by good or bad lodgings. (12) If somebody abuses him, he should not get angry. Hearing bad words, cruel and irritating speech, he should silently overlook them, and not take them to heart. (13) He should not lose temper if beaten, nor should he entertain revengeful thoughts. (14) A wandering person always faces difficulties to get everything by begging and nothing without begging. The hand of the giver is not always kindly stretched out to him when he is on his begging tour. Notwithstanding these difficulties, he should not be disturbed in the least. (15) He should beg food from the householder when his dinner is ready. He should not care whether he gets alms or not. (16) If on some occasion he suffers from some pain, he should cheerfully control his mind and bear the ills that attack him. He should not long for medical treatment. He will, thus, strengthen his discipline by neither acting himself nor causing others to act. (17) When a naked or a half-naked person lies on the grass, his body is sure to be hurt, in the sun his pain is sure to grow insupportable; still he

should not desire for comfort. (18) When by the heat of summer his body sweats and is covered with dust and dirt, he should not lament his loss of comfort. On the contrary, he should bear all this waiting for the annihilation of karma. (19) It may be that a gentleman salutes him, or rises from his seat on his approach, or invites him to accept alms; he should not be proud of this type of behaviour. (20) It may be that a self-controlled person possesses extra-ordinary intelligence. He should not feel proud of that. (21) It is also possible that he does not possess even ordinary intelligence and knowledge. He should not feel ashamed of his ignorance in such a state of his life. (22) While practising self-control he should not think: 'There is nothing to be gained by penances. I have been deceived by my false notions'. These are some of the chief troubles to be conquered by a self-disciplined person practising self-control. The above-mentioned troubles arise on account of the rise of different types of karmas. For instance, hunger, thirst, cold, heat, punishment, and the like are caused due to the rise of feeling producing karmas; ignorance, intelligence, etc., are due to the effect of apprehension and comprehension-obscuring karmas; failure, etc., are due to the rise of power-obscuring karmas; disliking, abuse, begging, and the like are on account of the rise of deluding karmas.

Patañjali does not mention these troubles in similar detail. All these types of afflictions can be included in his conception of austerity (*tapas*). The Jaina account of austerity in its completeness would be discussed separately in due course owing to its paramount importance in the present context.

Now, we deal with a brief description of auspicious conduct which, too, is helpful in practising self-control, in checking the inflow of karmic matter, and lastly in eliminating the accumulated karmic particles.

AUSPICIOUS CONDUCT

Pure conduct is an innate property of the self. It is distorted or obscured by the influence of a particular type of karma known as conduct-deluding (*cāritra-mohaniya*) karma. The varying degrees of the possession of conduct are wholly due to the varying degrees of the effect of the corresponding karma. In accordance with the possession of conduct, self-discipline also varies. We have already

stated (while dealing with the nature of the eight chief types of karma) that the first two groups of passions, viz., *anantānubandhin* and *apratyākhyānāvaraṇa* hinder pure conduct completely. They make every type of self-discipline impossible. On the removal of these two types, an individual possesses partial self-discipline. On the elimination of the third group of passions (*pratyākhyānāvaraṇa*), complete self-discipline can be practised. The Jaina thinkers have recognized five stages of pure conduct. (1) The first stage is called *sāmāyika*. One possessing it does not do any harm to others. He has the sense of equanimity.¹ For his person friend and foe are equal. In other words, he is free from the conception of friendliness and enmity. The second stage is called *chedopasthāpana*. It is the beginning of spiritual advancement. The individual begins to follow the path of self-control rigorously at this stage. It is of two types: with transgression (*sāticāra*) and without transgression (*niraticāra*) corresponding to the conduct of the possessor of self-control.² If he transgresses his vows on some occasions, his conduct is of the first type. If he never transgresses his vows, his conduct is said to be of the second class. The third stage of conduct is known as *parihāra-viśuddhi*. It is a stage of conduct produced by the observance of a particular type of austerity.³ The fourth stage is called *sūkṣma-samparāya*. In this stage the individual suffers from various passions that manifest themselves in a very subtle form. The last stage of pure conduct is called *yathākhyāta*. In this stage the self-disciplined person possesses completely perfect and pure conduct. It is the outcome of the total annihilation of passions.⁴ This is the highest stage of the development or manifestation of pure conduct attained by a self-controlled person.

AUSTERITY

Now, we come to the last condition responsible for the control of the inflow as well as the annihilation of the collection of karmic matter. This condition is known as austerity or penance. The Yoga school of philosophy also attaches importance to austerity. It is one

¹ *Sarvasāhvadyaviratirūpan*.....

Karma-grantha, IV, p. 130.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 130-1.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

of the five *niyamas* observed by Patañjali in his *Yoga-sūtra*. The Buddhist also recognizes the value of austerity to a certain extent. He rejects the idea of rigorous bodily mortification. 'We learn from the *Lalita-vistara* that various forms of bodily torture, self-maceration, and austerity were common in Gautama's time (which he rejected). Some devotees, we read, seated themselves in one spot and kept perpetual silence, with their legs bent under them. Some ate only once a day or once on alternate days, or at intervals of four, six or fourteen days. Some slept in wet clothes or on ashes, gravel, stones, boards, thorny grass, or spikes, or with the face downwards. Some went naked, making no distinction between fit or unfit places. Some smeared themselves with ashes, cinders, dust, or clay. Some inhaled smoke and fire. Some gazed at the sun, or sat surrounded by five fires, or rested on one foot, or kept one arm perpetually uplifted, or moved about on their knees instead of on their feet, or baked themselves on hot stones, or submerged themselves in water, or suspended themselves in air'.¹ Of these and similar other practices, we shall see, what is accepted and what is rejected by the Jaina.

According to the Jainas, there are two types of austerity: physical and mental or external and internal. Physical austerity is of six sub-types: fasting, decreased diet, collecting alms, giving up of delicious diet, mortification, of the flesh, and separation.² Mental austerity is also of six sub-classes: expiation, humility, service, study, renunciation (of the body), and meditation.³

Fasting is of two kinds: temporary and ending with death. Temporary fasting is either such in which a desire for food is present or such in which there is no such desire. Fasting which ends with death is of two varieties with regard to the motions of the body: with change of position and without its change.⁴

The meaning of decreased diet is familiar to us. He who takes

¹ Buddhism, pp. 228-9.

² *Anasaṇamupoyariya bhikkhāyariyā ya rasapariccāo. Kāyakilesa sahlīṇayā ya bajjho tavo hoi. Uttarādhivayana-sūtra, XXX, 8.*

³ *Pāyacchittāṇi viṇaṇa veyāvaccāṇi taheva sajjhāo, Jhāṇaṇaṃ ca viṇassaggo eso abbhintaro tavo, Ibid., XXX, 30.*

⁴ Ibid., XXX, 9; 12.

less food than he usually does performs the austerity of decreased diet.

There are certain definite rules prescribed by the Jaina thinkers with regard to collecting alms. A self-disciplined person should observe those rules while collecting alms.

Giving up of delicious diet is nothing but abstention from such highly delightful and nourishing food and drink as milk, curd, butter, etc.

Mortification of the flesh is in the shape of different postures and the like that are helpful in attaining the purity of the self. We need not count them here.

Separation is to be understood in the form of using unfrequented lodgings and beds, i.e., living and sleeping in separate and isolated places where there is nobody to disturb. This is, in brief, the description of physical or external austerities. The following is the description of mental or internal austerities.

Expiation is nothing but confession of a sin, repentance thereof, and the like. The Tattvārtha-sūtra mentions nine kinds of expiation,¹ whereas the Uttarādhyayana ten.² A self-controlled person should, however, expiate his sins.

Humility consists in rising from one's seat, folding of the hands, offering of a seat, affection for the teacher, cordial obedience, and the like.

Doing service consists in giving one's assistance. It is of ten kinds corresponding to the following ten types of persons: the chief preceptor (*ācārya*), the preceptor (*upādhyāya*), an ascetic (*tapasvin*), an ascetic student (*śaikṣa*), an ailing ascetic (*glāna*), the group of the disciples of different chief preceptors (*gaṇa*), the group of the disciples of the same chief preceptor (*kula*), the four-fold community of monks, nuns, laymen, and laywomen (*saṅgha*), a monk (*sādhu*), and a companion (*samanojña*).³

Study is of five kinds: learning one's lesson, questioning the

¹ Tattvārtha-sūtra, IX, 22.

² Uttarādhyayana-sūtra, XXX, 31.

³ Tattvārtha-sūtra, IX, 24.

teacher about it, contemplation, repetition, and preaching or teaching.¹

To remain motionless when lying down, sitting, or standing upright, is called renunciation of the body.

Now, we come to meditation which is of supreme importance in the present context. The systems of Yoga, Buddhism, and Jainism have equally emphasised the practice of meditation for self-realisation. There is, no doubt, difference of opinions regarding the ultimate nature of the self among these philosophical systems, nevertheless, they all unanimously recognise the paramount importance of the role of meditation in achieving the *summum bonum*.

NATURE OF MEDITATION

The Jaina definition of meditation (*dhyāna*) includes all the four stages of self-discipline advocated by the Yoga system of Patañjali. As has already been observed, these stages are in the form of withdrawal (*pratyāhāra*), concentration or fixation (*dhāraṇā*), meditation (*dhyāna*), and ecstasy (*samādhi*). Umāsvāti defines meditation as 'the concentration of thought on a particular object by a person of excellent physical construction'.² The act of concentration presupposes withdrawals of the senses from their objects. Meditation is nothing but the undisturbed flow of thought round the object of concentration. In other words, meditation is a steadfast contemplation without any break. The highest stage of meditation is called ecstasy or trance. Thus, meditation practically includes all the stages of mental or spiritual concentration in it. The act of meditation, on the other hand, is conditioned by an excellent physical construction. Why is it so? Because the minimum mental strength required for the act of concentration is conditioned by a strong and healthy body. The possession of sound mind is invariably related to the possession of sound body. To develop a strong mind in a weak body is an impossibility. The strength of mental activity is always connected with the strength of bodily construction. It is only a person of excellent physical construction

¹ *Vācanāpracchhanānuprekṣāmnāyadharmopadeśaḥ*.
Tattvārtha-sūtra, IX, 25.

² *Uttamasāhhananasyaikhāgracintānīrodho dhyānam*.
Ibid., IX, 27.

who can control and regulate his mental modifications. The Jaina thinkers hold that it is not possible to concentrate the mind on a particular object for more than forty-eight minutes.¹ They do not believe in the conception of the period of life-long duration held for a particular act of concentration. They admit, no doubt, that the mind can re-concentrate on the same object after a short break. Thus, the series of re-concentration can expand.² The point is that a particular act of concentration never lasts for more than the above-mentioned period. Is there any sound argument to defend this position? We have no logical argument to prove the exactness of the period regarding the life of a particular mode of meditation. The statement about the said period is only a dogmatic assertion of a particular tradition.

Concentration or meditation is classified into four types: mournful contemplation, cruel contemplation, inquisitive contemplation, and metaphysical contemplation. Mournful contemplation is that thinking of mind which is produced owing to some pain or misery either real or imaginary. It is again of four varieties. The constant thinking of the removal of an undesirable object constitutes the first variety. The second variety comprises the anxiety for emancipation from some pain. The mournful thinking of the loss of one's beloved object is the third variety of mournful contemplation. The fourth variety is nothing but a concentration of mind on unsatisfied desires. Cruel contemplation, too, is of four types: to contemplate to attack and kill others, to tell a lie to deceive others, to take an undue possession of someone's property, and to protect one's own property with intense greed.³ These two types of concentration emerge out of attachment or aversion. The elements of anger, pride, deceit, or greed dominate them. Hence, a person of self-control should not be led away by them.

Inquisitive contemplation has been defined as the 'meditation on the nature of a particular revelation, suffering, karmic fruition,

¹ *Amuḥārtāt.*

Tattvārtha-sūtra, IX, 28.

² *dīrghāpi dhyānasantatiḥ.*

Yoga-śāstra, IV, 116.

³ *Ārtaraudradharmaśuklāni.*

Tattvārtha-sūtra, IX, 29-36.

and the structure of the universe'.¹ Thus, it follows from the definition given above that inquisitive contemplation is fourfold corresponding to its objects. The first type is in the form of the concentration upon the nature of a particular mode of revelation. The second type is to be understood as the contemplation of the nature and conditions of misery. The third type is in the shape of the contemplation upon the nature of various functions of karma. The last type is represented by the meditation on the structure of the universe.

He who intends to practise inquisitive contemplation should have the following four virtues: friendship with all creatures, cordial appreciation of the merits of others, compassion for sufferers, and indifference for the unruly.² He should also fulfil some other conditions such as regular study for the steadiness of mind, purification of belief and attitude for the removal of delusion, right conduct for the cessation of the inflow of new karmic matter and annihilation of the accumulated one, and so on. He is also required to select a lonely and peaceful place for the practice of concentration. As regards the selection of posture, he can select any according to his own convenience. The same is true regarding the selection of time.³ The necessity of breath control is also realised by the Jaina thinkers.⁴ It goes without saying that the withdrawal of the mind along with the senses from the external objects is one of the essential conditions of the practice of inquisitive contemplation.

The fourth type of concentration which we call metaphysical contemplation (*śuka-dhyāna*) for want of a better term is the highest stage of concentration. It is needless to say that forbearance, humility, straightforwardness, etc., are the pre-requisites of metaphysical contemplation. It is also of four kinds. The first two kinds, just like the previous three types of concentration, are mental in character, whereas the last two are extra-mental. The first kind consists in the contemplation of the various characteristics of the worldly phenomenon such as origination, decay, and permanence of

¹ Tattvārtha-sūtra, IX, 37.

² *Maitrī pramodahāravyamādhyasthyāni*.....
Yoga-śāstra, IV, 117.

³ Dhyāna-śataka, 30-9.

⁴ Jñānārṇava, XXIX.

a particular object from different viewpoints. At this stage of meditation, the mental activity of a meditator is not confined to a particular characteristic or aspect of the object. The thought moves from one aspect to another. This is in regard to mental activity. Regarding the activities of his body and speech, there is, however, a slight movement. This movement consists in a definite change from one verbal symbol to another, from one kind of physical activity to that of another. The second kind of metaphysical contemplation is opposed to the first one in this particular sense. There is no movement in it. It is free from any change of activity. Besides, the thought concentrates upon a single aspect of an object. Unlike the first type, it does not concentrate upon the various characteristics of a particular phenomenon. In the third type, the mental as well as the vocal activities of the meditator are completely arrested. He possesses some subtle physical activities only. Thus, excepting certain essential physiological activities all the activities of the mind, the verbal sense-organ, and the gross body are totally stopped at this stage of meditation. In the last type which immediately and necessarily follows the previous one, the remaining physical activities, too, are stopped.¹ In this state of spiritual evolution, or say spiritual realisation, the self exists in its pristine nature. It is, really speaking, not a stage leading to self-realisation, but self-realisation itself. It is not a means to some end but the end in itself. This is the consummation of meditation. This is the highest stage of ecstasy-*asamprajñāta samādhi*. There is no fear, no delusion, no attachment, in this state. In it the inflow of new karmic matter is absolutely stopped, the annihilation of the accumulated karmas is complete.

ROLE OF MORTIFICATION

The Jainas emphasise the practice of physical austerity such as fasting, giving up of delicious diet, etc., for the sake of spiritual purification. They do not admit the value of physical mortification for its own sake. It is good so long as it serves the cause of self-realisation. It is a means to that end. It should not be mistaken as the end in itself. It is not for its own sake but for the sake of a higher stage. 'The six forms of physical austerity practised in a right manner result in non-attachment, lightness of the body, con-

¹ Dhyāna-śataka, 77-82.

quest of the senses, protection of self-discipline, and annihilation of karmic matter.¹ This fact has been realised by a good number of philosophical and mystic systems. In the eyes of some mystics, the object of mortification is to kill the old self, break up its egoistic attachments and cravings, in order that the higher centre, 'the new man' may live and breath. As St. Teresa discovered when she tried to reconcile the claims of worldly friendships and contemplation, one or other must go—a house divided against itself cannot stand. "Who hinders thee more than the unmortified affections of thy own heart? If we were perfectly dead into ourselves, and not entangled within our own breasts, then should we be able to taste Divine things, and to have some experience of heavenly contemplation," says Thomas a kempis.² Mortification is not an end in itself. It is a process, an education directed towards the production of a definite kind of efficiency, the adjustment of human nature to the demands of its new life. Augustine Baker remarks: 'Mortification tends to subject the body to the spirit—'.³ Pain is always welcome by the mystics. It is sometimes, in the crudely physical form, sometimes in those refinements of torture that a sensitive spirit can extract from loneliness, from deliberate contact with the repulsive accidents of life. In psychological language, the process of mortification is the process of setting up 'new paths of neural discharge'. The energy which wells up incessantly in every creature must abandon the old road of least resistance and discharge itself in a new and more difficult way.⁴ The conative drive of the psyche must be concentrated upon new objectives. The old paths must die. When the old habits are dead and the new life has come into existence, mortification is at an end. Its services are no more required. On the achievement of an end, the means related to it are automatically set aside, nay, they no more survive.

EIGHTFOLD PATH OF SELF-REALISATION

While dealing with the Jaina conception of self-control we have made comparison here and there between the means of self-

¹ *Samyakh-prayuktāni*
. karmanirjarā bhavanti.
 Tattvārtha-bhāṣya, IX, 19.

² Quoted in the 'Mysticism', p. 217.

³ Ibid., p. 218.

⁴ Mysticism, pp. 217-223.

discipline in the system of Pātañjala Yoga and those in the Jaina school. From our above description it is evident that there is no essential difference of opinion between the Jaina and Yoga systems. It is also to be noticed that the Buddhist conception of self-discipline also agrees with that of the two to a great extent. Having the fact of such a similarity in mind, some Jaina scholars have given the account of self-realisation exactly in the manner of the Pātañjala Yoga. We propose to deal briefly with the account given by Haribhadra in this respect.¹

There are eight stages of self-discipline leading to the complete stoppage of the physical, vocal, and mental activities of the individual: *mitrā*, *tārā*, *balā dīprā*, *sthirā*, *kāntā*, *prabhā*, and *parā*. They are called *dr̥ṣṭis* meaning thereby different types of attitudes or inclinations. One who is capable of self-realisation gradually develops them. They are compared to the sparks of straw-fire, cow-dung-fire, wood-fire, the light of a lamp, the brightness of a gem, the light of a star, the light of the sun, and the brightness of the moon respectively.² The first four types are fallible as well as unsteady, whereas the last four are infallible and firm.³ These eight stages respectively correspond to the eightfold path of Yoga.⁴

Mitrā is the first stage of spiritual advancement at which one has very faint spiritual light. He who possesses this stage develops fear for bad acts. He performs good and noble activities. His heart is full of sympathy and obligation. He is free from the jealousy and envy of the praiseworthy. He seeks opportunities for spiritual development.

At the second stage known as *tārā*, the enlightenment is not so faint. It is a bit distinct. The person possessing this stage is in a position to practise self-restraint. His spiritual pursuit is somewhat steady. He does not indulge in evil deeds. Besides, he is con-

¹ It is based on his *Yoga-dr̥ṣṭi-samuccaya*. For a detailed account we may refer to Dr. Tatia's *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, pp. 300-4.

² *Tṛṇagomaya*.....
Yoga-dr̥ṣṭi-samuccaya, 15.

³ *Pratīpātayuktāścādyāscatasro*.....
Sāpāya.....
Ibid., 19.

⁴ *Yamādiyogayuktānāḥ*.....
Ibid., 16.

scious of his defects. He is seriously as well as sincerely anxious to break the bondage of karmic shackles.

The third stage is called *balā*. It is, evidently, possessed of more distinct enlightenment. The inclination for the realisation of spiritual emancipation, at this stage, is more strong. It is particularly the stage of the control of various postures. It exactly corresponds to the *āsana* stage of Yoga.

One gets control over breath at the fourth stage of self-discipline called *dīprā*. It consists in regulating inhalation, retention, and exhalation of breath. The person belonging to this stage attaches more importance to spiritual realisation than to life. On arising a conflict between his duty and life, he readily gives up his life for the sake of his duty. He believes that it is the fruit of good or evil activity alone that accompanies death. Everything else is perished with this physical body. These four stages are unsteady and fallible as has already been mentioned. The following four stages are not of this nature. They are not affected by fallibility and unsteadiness. We now come to them.

The fifth stage is called *sthirā* meaning thereby steady. One possessing this stage of self-discipline is capable of deep and subtle thinking. He also possesses auspicious conduct. His senses are withdrawn from their respective objects. He attaches no importance to external objects. For him, they are nothing more than a game of children.

At the sixth stage called *kāntā* the individual concentrates his mind on spiritual investigations. His personality at this stage is so developed that it attracts others, although none can attract him. He has love for all creatures irrespective of any preference to any one.

At the seventh stage known as *prabhā* the individual develops self-meditation. He is always possessed of peace of mind. His faculty of right discrimination is fully developed. For him, self-dependence is the greatest happiness and other-dependence is the greatest misery.

Now, we come to the last stage of spiritual realisation known as *parā* meaning thereby the highest. The individual now attains ecstasy. His activities are pure and perfect. He gradually annihilates all the obscuring (*ghātin*) karmas and attains omniscience. The

remaining karmas are also destroyed in due course. Consequently, all the activities of his body, speech, and mind are stopped. He now becomes inactive (*ayogin*). This stage can be compared with the *nirvikalpaka samādhi* of Yoga. Immediately after this, the self attains the final emancipation which is nothing but the consummation of all spiritual endeavour, the highest stage of spiritual realisation.

CHAPTER VII

TRANSMIGRATION

It goes without saying that the doctrine of karma is invariably associated with the concept of transmigration. This concept has for its support the existence of the self that goes from birth to death and death to birth. Our present life is nothing more than a link of the great chain of transmigratory circuit. The doctrine of karma is meaningless in the absence of a fully developed doctrine of transmigration. The soul passes through births and deaths retaining its chief individual characters of the next life fashioned by the forces of its mental, vocal, and physical activities of the former life. The belief in the doctrine of transmigration or metempsychosis consists of the fact of the passing of the soul from one body into another. The soul after dwelling in one body for a certain length of period leaves it at the time of death and enters into another body in accordance with its own accumulated karmas. It may enter into a human form, an animal form, a vegetable form, a celestial form, or an infernal form. All this is governed by the supreme law of karma. The souls choose their bodies according to the bent of their previous characters. They are bound to enjoy or suffer the natural consequences of their good or evil deeds. For this purpose they have to adopt various forms.

INDIVIDUAL IMMORTALITY

The soul that runs through various stages of birth and death is not to be understood in the shape of a collection of habits and attitudes. It is in the form of an independent entity to which all these habits and attitudes belong. It is a spiritual and immaterial entity which is permanent and eternal in the midst of all changes. We are not in a position to have an experience of its pure and pristine nature. Nevertheless, on the ground of logical necessity we can establish its existence. Man's mundane soul is an aggregate of the qualities of both the material and the spiritual nature. Karmic particles associated with the soul are held to be responsible for the manifestation of material qualities. The soul is absolutely immaterial and spiritual if its nature be considered in a free stage of its existence.

Beliefs, attitudes, emotions may come and go but the soul is always there. It is found in various forms owing to the rise of karma. As the situation of karma changes, so also the form of the soul alters. To put it in a psychological form, personal immortality is indeed an impossibility. But individual immortality is one of the deepest truths of life. 'For the personality, made up of mental and physical characteristics of a person, belongs to the changing world of time, whereas the individuality consists of those enduring qualities which belong to the spirit of man and of which, as the word itself tells us, the personality or mask self is only the outer garment.'¹ To sum up: We are, perhaps, justified in stating that man is in essence immortal and eternal. He is spirit, and this spirit, however, projects itself into the extended worlds of matter under the deep influence of karma. The extraordinary maturity of some children even at an early age, the high degree of psychological and physical development of a very ordinary person, and the like compel us to believe that something must have existed before physical birth. It may also be extended beyond physical death.

Those who have worked on scientific lines on this problem also admit the possibility of individual survival after bodily death. Hereward Carrington who has devoted his whole life to the study of psychic phenomena writes: 'Practically every psychical researcher agrees in thinking that the evidence in favour of the spiritistic hypothesis is now so strong that it may be justifiably employed as a working hypothesis . . . There is a strong evidence to prove survival.' Flammarion, a French investigator on the phenomenon of death, establishes the same fact: '(1) The soul exists as a real entity independent of the body. (2) It is endowed with faculties still unknown to science. (3) It is able to act at a distance, without the intervention of the senses'.² There are other psychical researchers as well who uphold the same view. We need not quote their opinions.

SOME OBJECTIONS TO REBIRTH

The first and the foremost objection to the doctrine of transmigration or rebirth is that had there been our previous lives we

¹ This World and That, p. 45.

² Quoted from the 'Proceedings of the Twenty-sixth Indian Philosophical Congress', pp. 59-60.

should have remembered them. Because we do not remember our previous lives, therefore, we are justified in rejecting the doctrine of rebirth. The answer given by the doctrine of karma is that the brain possessed by average being is new in each life. This is a general answer. Besides, there are some super-normal occurrences on record that prove even the possibility of remembering some events of previous life. Hence, to reject the doctrine of rebirth outrightly on the ground of unremembered past lives is not justifiable. Not to speak of the recollection of previous lives, we, on many occasions, are not able even to recall some impressions of our present life. To use the Freudian terminology, such impressions are retained in the Unconscious.

The second objection is: Why should we suffer for the deeds about which we know nothing? The answer is that it matters little whether you remember your deeds or forget them. The actions performed by you are sure to yield their fruits. It is you who is to suffer or enjoy the fruits of your actions and not any body else. The individual who has forgotten, the individual who complains, and the individual who suffers are the same, though the brain is different. The deeds for which we suffer or enjoy are associated with us in the shape of karma. Some form of suffering or enjoyment is inevitable for the dissociation of karma.

The third objection is that rebirth is disproved by the doctrine of heredity. This objection is due to the ignorance of the distinction between the entity that uses the body and the body that is produced by the union of parents. The soul is drawn by the law of karma what is known as '*ānupūrvi*' in Jainism, to that body where it develops its own body for the working out of its previous karmas for that birth. We do possess some hereditary characters in our life, but ultimately they are also indebted to our previous karmas. Until and unless we are drawn by our own karmas to the body of our parents we cannot develop our hereditary characters. Moreover, the so-called hereditary characters are nothing but personal characters produced and developed by the working of the karma of the individual. There is nothing like pure heredity. It is always in a transformed form. In each individual it is unique. In short, there is no heredity, uninfluenced by individual characters—personal karmas.

Sometimes it is held that the doctrine of karma is uncongenial.¹ We do not want to come back to this world of misery and toil. Why do we return then? This objection has no basis, since it is not on our likes and dislikes that everything depends. A law works independent of our wishes. Hence, the doctrine of transmigration which is an offshoot of the doctrine of karma, is somewhat satisfactory solution of the problem of inequality and variegation.

JAINA ACCOUNT OF TRANSMIGRATION

The Jaina thinkers, just like the other adherents of the karma-theory, maintain that the individual has to reap the fruit of his good or evil actions. Sometimes the fruit is enjoyed in this very life, whereas sometimes it is reaped in the next life or thereafter. It depends on the length of duration (*sthiti*) of a particular karma. There are the following eight alternatives² regarding this problem. (1) Evil deeds of this life have their evil results in this life. (2) Evil deeds of this life have their evil results in another life. (3) Evil deeds of a former life have their evil results in this life. (4) Evil deeds of a former life have their results in a life after this. (5) Good actions of this life bring good results in this life. (6) Good actions of this life bring good results in a later life. (7) Good actions of a former life bring good results in this life. (8) Good actions of a former life bring good results in a subsequent life.

There is a belief that 'once consciousness attains to human level there is no return. If evil reaches a stage beyond redemption there may be an utter dissolution of that entity; otherwise, though man may become a super-man, he will never be less than man.'³ This conception is influenced by the Theory of Evolution. According to it, once a soul has reached the human stage in the evolutionary progress, it will not go back into lower forms in spite of the forces of karmas in action. The Jaina tradition has never entertained this notion of the Theosophists. The Jaina holds that the soul of a human being after death can go back to animals or vegetables. It may also go to heaven and live there for some

¹ Karma and Rebirth, p. 61.

² Sthānāṅga-sūtra, IV, 2, 7.

³ Karma and Rebirth, p. 59.

time. Thus, he believes in the retrogression of the souls. He does not believe in the theory of growth and progress of the souls from lower to higher states of consciousness. It is not proper to maintain that 'the rational minds in India do not believe in the retrogression of the human souls into animal forms...'¹ There are many passages, just like those in the Jaina works even in the writings of the Upaniṣads that clearly refer to the retrogression of the human souls into animal forms. The following are some of the passages that mention the retrogression of the human souls into lower bodies. 'Those who do not know these two paths become insects, gnats, mosquitoes...'² 'Those who possess good conduct here would attain good birth, the birth of a *Brāhmaṇa*, that of a *Kṣatriya*, or that of a *Vaiśya*. Those who are of bad conduct here would attain evil birth, the birth of a dog, that of a hog, or that of a *sūdra*.'³ 'Some persons according to their karma and inclination of mind take another birth. Some others again are degenerated into the states of trees.'⁴ 'He is born on this earth as a worm, a grasshopper, a fish, a bird, a lion, a boar, a snake, a tiger, or another creature in one or other station according to his deeds.'⁵ In accordance with the conception of the Jaina, the karma leading to the bondage of hellish life is the result of possessing immense wealth, indulging in violent deeds, killing the beings of five sense-organs, eating flesh, etc. The karma leading to the life of animals, vegetables, and the like is the consequence of deceiving others, practising fraud, speaking untruth, etc. The karma leading to human life is the result of simplicity of behaviour, humble character, kindness, compassion, and so on. The karma leading to the enjoyment of celestial life is the result of practising austerities, observing vows, and the like.⁶ It is evident from the above description that the individual performing the actions befitting hellish life goes to hell. If he performs any act that fits in with the life of an animal or vegetable kingdom, he has no choice other than to take birth in that state of existence.

¹ Life beyond Death, p. 71.

² Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad, VI, 2, 16.

³ Chāndogya-Upaniṣad, V, 10, 7.

⁴ Kaṭha-Upaniṣad, II, 2, 7.

⁵ *Sa iha kiṣo vā palaṅgo vā śakunirvā śārdūlo vā.....*

Kauṣītaki-brāhmaṇa-upaniṣad, I, 1, 6.

⁶ Bhagavati-sūtra, VIII, 9, 41.

The same is the fact as regards the enjoyment of human and heavenly lives. The Jaina thinkers do not believe in a systematic and gradual evolution of mind. They hold that all the states of life are ascribed to the karmic forces associated with each worldly soul. They may lead the soul to a higher state as well as to a lower state according to their nature. The soul has to accompany them. It is not necessary that a soul which has once attained the human state of existence will also achieve the same in the next birth. If the karmic forces associated with it are fit for achieving human state, it will necessarily get human life. If the forces are not favourable to human life, he may go to any state of existence in accordance with the innate nature of the forces.

There is an interesting illustration in the Uttarādhyayana-sūtra regarding the nature of the cause of a particular state of life. Three merchants started from their own place to a different place. Each of them had his own capital. They started some business there. One of them gained much, the second returned with the same capital, and the third came home after having lost his capital.¹ Now, the capital is human life, the gain is heaven, and the loss is in the form of hellish life or animal birth. He who brings back his capital is to be compared to one who goes again to human life. 'Those who through the exercise of various virtues become pious householders, will be born again as men, for all beings will reap the fruit of their actions. But he who increases his capital is like one who practises eminent virtues. The virtuous, excellent man cheerfully attains the state of gods.... He who practises evil acts and does not fulfil his duty will be born in hell.... A wise man weighs in his mind the state of the sinner and that of the virtuous. Quitting the state of the sinner, the wise realises that of the virtuous.'² There are definite causes prescribed by the Jaina thinkers that lead to various states of life. It is only through the exercise of them that a man can attain a particular state of existence (*gati*).

CLASSES OF BEINGS

We have so far discussed the general nature and logical and moral necessity of the theory of transmigration, metempsycho-

¹ Uttarādhyayana-sūtra, VII, 14-5.

² *Vemāyāhiṃ sikkhāhiṃ je narā.....*

Ibid., VII, 20-1; 28; 30.

sis, rebirth, or reincarnation. It has also been mentioned that the Jaina tradition does not believe in the theory of progress and growth of the soul and does not reject the concept of retrogression. Now we propose to give a detailed description of the various states and classes of beings that are invariably connected with the theory of transmigration. The age-determining (*āyus*), the physique-making (*nāman*), and the status-determining (*gotra*) karmas are the principal causes of the diversity of beings.

There are four states of existence: the state of celestial beings, that of hellish beings, that of human beings, and that of animal beings. All those beings that are not included in either of the three states, viz., celestial, hellish, and human are called animal beings.¹ This state, therefore, also includes all vegetable kingdom and other elementary beings such as water, air, fire, and the like. Let us, first of all, take into account the state of animal beings.

ANIMAL BEINGS

The soul attains the animal state of existence due to the rise of the respective physique-making (*nāman*) karma. This state lasts as long as its age-determining (*āyus*) karma allows to live. After the exhaustion of its age it dies and takes a new birth according to the then existing condition of its own accumulated karmas. Excepting the beings of five senses all other beings of this class, the Jaina believes, do not bind the karmas that lead to the celestial and hellish states of existence. The beings existing in the states of fire and air, however, do not bind in addition to the two the human state of existence.² We are not in a position to prove the validity of the statement on the ground of reasoning. May be that the conditions and causes required for binding these states are not within the reach and control of the beings of one sense-organ. The distinction made between the beings of fire and air and those of other states in this respect is also outside the province of reasoning. Animals are classified into two chief kinds: movable and immovable. The immovable ones are of three kinds: earthly beings, watery beings, and plants. They are again divided into

¹ Tattvārtha-sūtra, IV, 28.

² Loka-prakāśa, IV, 102 ff.

various sub-divisions. The earthly beings are of two kinds: subtle and gross; and both of them are either fully developed or undeveloped. The gross ones are of two kinds: smooth and rough. The smooth ones are of seven kinds: black, blue, red, yellow, white, pale and dusty. The rough ones are of thirty-six kinds: earth, gravel, sand, stone, rock, rock-salt, iron, copper, tin, lead, silver, gold, diamond, etc. The subtle earth is only of one kind, since it has no variety.

The watery beings are also of two kinds: subtle and gross; and both of them are either fully developed or undeveloped. The gross ones are of five kinds: pure water, dew, exudation, fog, and ice. The subtle water is of one kind, as there is no variety.

Plants, too, are of two kinds: subtle and gross; and both of them are either fully developed or undeveloped. The gross ones are of two kinds: either many have one body in common or each has its own body; and each of them is again of many kinds. The subtle plants are of one kind only, for there is no variety. Now, we come to the movable animal beings.

The movable animal beings are of three kinds: fiery beings, airy beings, and those with an organic body. The fiery beings are of two kinds: subtle and gross; and both of them are either fully developed or undeveloped. The gross ones are of many kinds: fire, lightning, etc. The subtle fire is of one kind only.

The airy beings are also of two kinds: subtle and gross; and both of them are either fully developed or undeveloped. The gross ones are of five kinds: squall, whirl-wind, thick wind, high wind and low wind. The subtle airy beings are but of one kind. All the above-mentioned animal beings living in the form of earth, water, fire, or air possess only one sense-organ, viz., the organ of touch and belong to the third sex.

The movable animal beings with an organic body are of four kinds: possessing two sense-organs, three sense-organs, four sense-organs, and five sense-organs. The first three kinds are again of two types: subtle and gross; and both of them are either fully developed or undeveloped. Worms, shells, conches, etc., are with two sense-organs, viz., those of touch and taste. Ants, bugs, and the like are possessed of three sense-organs, viz., those of touch, taste, and smell. Flies, mosquitoes, bees, scorpions, etc., possess four

sense-organs, viz., those of touch, taste, smell, and sight. The animals that possess five sense-organs, viz., those of touch, taste, smell, sight, and hearing are of two kinds: those which originate by *generatio aequivoca* (*sammūrchima*) and those which are born from the womb (*garbhaja*). Each of them is again of three kinds: aquatic, terrestrial, and aerial. Fishes, tortoises, crocodiles, and the like are the beings of the aquatic type. The terrestrial animals are of two varieties: quadrupeds and reptiles. The quadrupeds are of four types: solidungular animals, as horses, etc., biungular animals, as cows, etc., multiungular animals, as elephants, etc., and animals having toes with nails, as lions, etc. The reptiles are of two kinds: those which walk on their arms and those which move on their breast. Lizards and the like are of the first kind; snakes and the like are of the second kind. Both are again of many kinds. The aerial animals are classified into four varieties: those with membranuous wings, those with feathered wings, those with the wings in the shape of a box, and those which sit on outspread wings. They are again of many kinds.¹ These are the various kinds of animal beings described by the Jainas. The description is undoubtedly stereotyped and to some extent crude too. In spite of these defects it is very much helpful in understanding the nature of the variegation of the animal beings found in the world. This variegation is explained by the Jaina thinkers through the assistance of the doctrine of karma. The soul takes birth in these states because of the rise of the respective physique-making (*nāman*) karmas. Let us deal with some more informations regarding the animal class.

The subtle one-sensed beings are so fine that they cannot be perceived by our senses. The body of the gross one-sensed animals is apparently gross and therefore perceptible. The two, three, and four-sensed animals are combinedly called *vikalendriya-trika*, since they are not very much different from one another if viewed from the stand point of the doctrine of karma. Like the beings of one sense-organ they also belong to the third sex and can bind the karmas suitable to the animal class and human beings only. They are never to be found in a subtle form. They are, of course, either fully developed or undeveloped. The five-sensed animals are divided

¹ This description is based upon the Uttarādhyayana-sūtra, XXXVI, 69-187.

into two groups: those having the faculty of reasoning (*sañjnin*) and those without the faculty of reasoning (*asañjnin*). Reasoning is the consideration of the state of a thing in the present, past, and future. Those who do not possess this capacity act in accordance with their own instincts. The beings belonging to the five-sensed class possess either of three sexes. Those who are fully developed can bind the karmas leading to either of the four states of existence. The undeveloped beings bind the karmas suitable to animals and human beings only.¹ These are some of the fundamental dogmas of the Jaina doctrine of karma as regards the position of the animal class of existence. They are to a great extent justifiable, too, because of their verification by our common experience. As regards the binding of new karmas by a particular being leading to another birth, we are not in a fit position to advance any sound argument through which the *a priori* assertion of the Jainas may be proved to be true. It is also true that the Jaina position cannot be outrightly rejected, inasmuch as there is no strong argument to do so. We leave this problem here without entering into a further discussion and come to the human state of existence.

HUMAN STATE OF EXISTENCE

Human beings are of two kinds: those originating by *generatio aequivoca* and those born from the womb. Those who are born from the womb are of three kinds: those living in the *Karmabhūmis*, those living in the *Akarmabhūmis*, and those living on the *Antaradvīpas*. Those parts of the world which are inhabited by human beings who practise self-discipline, etc., are called *Karmabhūmis*.² In the *Akarmabhūmis* men do not practise any self-discipline. The *Antaradvīpas* are minor continents. According to the traditional account of the Jainas, there are fifteen *Karmabhūmis*, thirty *Akarmabhūmis*, and fifty-six *Antaradvīpas*. The beings of this class, just like those of the animal class, are either fully developed or undeveloped. The developed human beings can possess all types of activity—physical, vocal, and mental. They can bind all species of karmic combinations suitable to all the four states of existence. A developed human being alone can achieve complete self-control and

¹ For a detailed account the reader may be referred to the Doctrine of Karman in Jain Philosophy, pp. 52-6.

² Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XXII, p. 195 fn.

thereby attain final liberation. The undeveloped human beings are those whose senses or mental faculties have not fully grown. The beings originating by *generatio aequivoca* are always of the undeveloped class. They are produced in bile, phlegm, urine, blood, semen, and the like.¹ This concept of the Jainas is a unique one in the history of Indian thought. The Jaina goes even so far as to believe 'that in every act of sexual intercourse 900,000 living beings, very minute, of the shape of the human being and having the five senses, but no mind (*asaññi-pañcendriya-manuṣyas*), are generated and killed'.² To a scientific mind, this conception seems to be somewhat queer. How could the Jaina thinkers or seers have counted the exact number of the living beings existing in the form of human species at the time of the act of sexual intercourse? Did they have in their possession a scientific instrument through which they could measure the exactness of the number of all those creatures, and that also of the shape of human beings? We have neither an experimental datum nor a logical argument through which the aforesaid dogmatic assertion of the Jainas could be proved to be true. It is only on the basis of Extra-sensory Perception that the account may be taken as true. Now, let us proceed to a brief description of the celestial state of existence. This description also transcends the boundaries of our discursive reasoning. We should take it as a traditional account. Almost all the branches of Indian speculation present the same type of account.

CELESTIAL STATE OF LIFE

The beings of heaven are possessed of fine transformable (*vaikriya*) bodies. They are born through a direct manifestation (*upapāda*) of their bodies.³ They do not spend any time in the womb. Their appearance is all of a sudden. On account of the rise of their *ānupūrvī*, they go to the place of their birth directly. On the exhaustion of their age-determining karma they automatically leave the body and according to the rise of their new *ānupūrvī-nāma*

¹ *Saṁmārcchima garbhajāśca*

Loka-prakāśa, VII, 1-5.

² Karma Philosophy, p. 145.

³ *Nārakadvānāmupapātaḥ*.

Vaikriyamaupapātikam.

Tattvārtha-sūtra, II, 35; 47.

karma, they go from the place of death in the proper direction to the place of new birth. Gods are also either fully developed or undeveloped. As regards the practice of self-control, gods are in no way superior to animals. It is not possible for them to observe any self-discipline. It is only the human state of existence in which perfect self-discipline is possible. The following karmas are, however, not bound by the beings of heaven: celestial and hellish states of existence, *ānupūrvīs*, and age; transformable body, and limbs; projectable body and limbs; undeveloped common body, two, three, and four-sensed class of beings, and fine body.¹ It needs no elaboration. Now, we propose to give a short description of the four classes of gods recognized by the Jaina without making any comment thereupon.

Gods are of four kinds: *Bhavanavāsins*, *Vyantaras* (ghosts), *Jyotiṣkas*, and *Vaimānikas*.² The lowest species of them are the *Bhavanavāsins* who are again divided into ten classes: *Asura-kumāra*, *Nāga-kumāra*, *Vidyut-kumāra*, *Suparṇa-kumāra*, *Agni-kumāra*, *Vāta-kumāra*, *Stanita-kumāra*, *Udadhi-kumāra*, *Dvīpa-kumāra*, and *Dik-kumāra*. The gods of the first class are living in the muddy part of the first hell (*Ratnaprabhā*). The remaining ones pass their life in a hard part of the earth.³ All of them satisfy their sexual desires by bodily coition.⁴ The *Vyantaras* (ghosts) are of eight classes: *Kinnara*, *Kimpuruṣa*, *Mahoraga*, *Gandharva*, *Yakṣa*, *Rākṣasa*, *Bhūta*, and *Piśāca*. They also live in some parts of the earth and fulfil their sexual desires through bodily coition. The *Jyotiṣkas* are classified into five varieties: suns, moons, plants, *nakṣatras*, and stars. They live in the upper part of the world. They are incessantly revolving in the direction towards the right round the Meru mountain in the human world and beyond it they are in a stand-still.⁵ Regarding the problem of sexual satisfaction, they also fulfil their desires by bodily coition. The *Vaimānikas* are divided into two chief classes.⁶ *Kalpapaṇnas* and *Kalpātītas*. The *Kal-*

¹ Doctrine of Karman in Jain Philosophy, p. 58.

² *Devāścaturṇikāyāḥ*.

Tattvārtha-sūtra, IV, 1.

³ *Sarvārtha-siddhi*, IV, 10.

⁴ *Kāyapracāra ā aiśānāt*.

Tattvārtha-sūtra, IV, 8.

⁵ *Sarvārtha-siddhi*, IV, 11-5.

⁶ *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra*, XXXVI, 208-215.

popapannas live in the following places (which are called *Kalpas*): *Saudharma*, *Īśāna*, *Sanatkumāra*, *Māhendra*, *Brahmaloka*, *Lāntaka*, *Mahāśukra*, *Sahasrāra*, *Ānata*, *Prāṇata*, *Āraṇa*, and *Acyuta*. With every *kalpa*, beginning from the first, the life-time, power, splendour, purity of attitude, strength of the senses, and sphere of knowledge-activity of its inhabitants increase, whereas the sphere of their wandering, size of the body, possession, and pride decrease.¹ In the first and second *Kalpas* sexual satisfaction is still dependent on bodily coition. In the remaining ones sexual pleasure is gradually refined. In the *Sanatkumāra* and *Māhendra* the goddesses permit themselves to be touched by the god who has erotic desires, whereupon he is satisfied. In the *Brahmaloka* and *Lāntaka* the goddesses show themselves in their splendour and beauty to the god for the same purpose and with the same success. In the *Mahāśukra* and *Sahasrāra* the gods need only hear the laughter, the chatter, and the singing of the goddesses in order to satisfy their desires. In the *Ānata*, *Prāṇata*, *Āraṇa*, and *Acyuta* it suffices that the gods imagine the goddesses in thought.² The gods who are born in the regions above the *Kalpas* are called *Kalpātītas*. They are of two varieties: *Graiveyaka* and *Anuttara*. The *Graiveyakas* are of nine sub-classes: the lowest of the lowest, the middle of the lowest, the highest of the lowest, the lowest of the middle, the middle of the middle, the highest of the middle, the lowest of the highest, the middle of the highest, and the highest of the highest. Some writers also name them as *Sudarśana*, *Supratibandha*, etc. The *Anuttaras* are of five kinds: *Vijaya*, *Vaijayanta*, *Jayanta*, *Aparājita*, and *Sarvārthasiddha*. The gods of the first four kinds do not take more than two more births. The gods of the last kind are reborn only once and then attain final emancipation.³ Regarding the previous classes of gods, the Jaina prescribes no such rule. Now, we come to the last class of beings, viz., the hellish state of existence.

DENIZENS OF HELL

Those beings who perform evil and cruel acts go to hell to reap the consequences, as has already been observed. All the in-

¹ Tattvārtha sūtra, IV, 21-2.

² Jacobi's Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, IV, 9.

³ Vijayādīṣu dvicarmāḥ.

Tattvārtha-sūtra, IV, 27, and the Bhāṣya.

fernal beings, as a rule, belong to the third sex.¹ They also appear, just like the gods, through a direct manifestation of their bodies which are transformable in nature.² They are either fully developed or undeveloped.³ As regards conduct, they are not in a fit position to practise self-control. The denizens of hell are of seven kinds according to the seven hells. The following are the hells: *Ratna-prabhā*, *Śarkarā-prabhā*, *Vālukā-prabhā*, *Pañka-prabhā*, *Dhūma-prabhā*, *Tamaḥ-prabhā*, and *Mahā-tamaḥ-prabhā*.⁴ They exist in the successively descending regions of the earth. The denizens of the seventh hell are the most miserable beings; those of the sixth are less miserable than them; those of the fifth are still less miserable and so on. Their attitude corresponds to the sinfulness of their activity. The inhabitants of the first three hells are sometimes tortured by the gods of the lowest class. Generally, the hellish beings torment each other in their own regions.⁵ Their re-incarnation is possible only in the form of developed five-sensed animals and human beings.⁶ This is a brief account of the Jaina conception of the various states of existence and different classes of beings that are entirely based upon the operation of different kinds of karmas. It is true and we ought to admit that the general features of this account are somewhat logical and rational, whereas its detailed description is purely dogmatic and traditional in character.

¹ Tattvārtha-sūtra, II, 50.

² Ibid., II, 47.

³ *Paryāptāparabheda*.....

Loka-prakāśa, IX, 2.

⁴ Ibid., IX, 1.

⁵ Tattvārtha-sūtra, III, 3-5.

⁶ Loka-prakāśa, IX, 11.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION AND RECAPITULATION

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DOCTRINE OF KARMA

The Indian thinkers have made an attempt to solve the great riddle of the source of misery and happiness through the doctrine of karma. The doctrine holds that the well-being as well as suffering of a person is due to his accumulated karmas. As a man sows, so he reaps. He does not inherit the good or evil deed of another being. The doctrine of karma is one of the essential elements of all moral and philosophical theories of India. Almost all the philosophical and ethical systems of India uphold the theory of karma. It is, however, in the Jaina system that it reaches its climax and assumes a unique character. It is justifiable to maintain that all the significant concepts of Jaina epistemology and ethics may be analysed on the basis of karma.

The doctrine of karma is invariably connected with the theory of transmigration. If the consequences of our actions have not been fully worked out in this life, they logically stand in need of a future life. Thus, the doctrine of transmigration justifies the belief in the immortality of souls. The souls are there from time immemorial and will be there for endless time. They are eternal. The history of the individual does not begin with his birth. The instincts, passions, personality-characters, etc., of one life may go to another life.

MEANING OF KARMA

Karma is nothing but a series of acts and effects. This series expands in an automatic course. There is no force over and above its own that moves it. This hypothesis leads to Determinism, since the entire process of the series of acts and effects that runs in an automatic course presupposes the existence of a pre-determined form hidden behind it. As time passes, it reveals itself. If it is so, human effort has no value in the universe. Consequently, the idea of Freedom of Will should be discarded. The exponents of the doctrine of karma say that the doctrine recognizes the value

of human effort to some extent. A man can influence his future destiny by his own actions. He is free to a certain extent to regulate his conduct and to conquer his passions. His faculty of free decision is not completely arrested by karma. He possesses some freedom to choose his path. On certain occasions, it is true, he has no choice of his own, but it is not always so. Man is neither completely free nor totally bound. He is partly free and partly not-free.

Some regard Time as the ultimate cause of the universe. Some others believe in Nature as the determining factor of the world. There are others who believe in Accidents. There are still others who regard Matter as the ultimate cause of the whole universe. The advocates of the doctrine of karma reject all these theories. The reason is that none of them can explain the variegated nature of the universe. It is only karma through which the diversity of all beings can be explained.

KARMA AND SOUL

The Jaina philosopher holds that every soul possesses the faculty of infinite apprehension, infinite comprehension, infinite bliss, and infinite energy. These qualities are not in their perfection in the worldly souls, since they are always associated with karma. Karma, according to Jainism, is nothing but an aggregate of some very fine particles of matter. Though the soul is pure and perfect by nature, it is subject to limitation and impurity. As the light of the sun and moon is obscured by a veil of dust and so on, so also the soul is subject to obscuration by the veil of karmic particles. The obscuration of the soul is from time immemorial; and as the dross of gold is found to be removed, so also the removal of karmic matter is possible. As the power of consciousness, although immaterial and amorphous, is found to be obscured by intoxicating drugs and the like, so also the immaterial soul is being obscured by material karma.

The Jaina thinkers distinguish between physical karma and psychical karma. Physical karma is nothing but the particles of karmic matter. The psychical effects and states produced by the association of physical karma are called psychical karma. The self can be liberated from karma by two means: the influx of new

karmic matter must be stopped and the accumulated one must be eliminated.

JAINA ACCOUNT OF KARMA

The Jaina thinkers have dealt with the problem of the influx of karma from four viewpoints: according to its nature, duration, intensity, and quantity. The nature and quantity of karmic particles depend on the activities of body, speech, and mind. Their duration and intensity are determined by the nature of our passions.

As regards the nature of karma, it is classified into eight chief species: apprehension-obscuring karma, comprehension-obscuring karma, feeling-producing karma, deluding karma, age-determining karma, physique-making karma, status-determining karma, and power-obscuring karma. They perform their respective functions. The karma that produces pleasure and enjoyment is virtuous and auspicious and the karma that yields pain and suffering is sinful and inauspicious. Regarding the length of duration, the Jaina writers have prescribed the maximum and minimum length of period for each kind. It is purely dogmatic in character. The intensity of a particular karma depends on the weakness and strength of our passions. As regards the quantity of karmic particles, the share that falls to each type differs from one another. The age-determining type receives the smallest part and so on. It is also a traditional concept of the Jainas. There is no sound argument for its support. The influx of karmic elements can be checked through the control of the activities of body, speech, and mind. The elimination of the accumulated karmic particles is possible through the practice of austerity—external as well as internal.

The Jaina does not believe in the rigidity of the procedure of karmic fruition. Through the practice of certain means a particular karma can be enjoyed earlier. Its period of realisation can be increased as well as decreased. Besides, the nature, duration, intensity, and quantity of one karma can be transformed into those of another, of course, to a certain extent and with certain limitations.

The doctrine of karma is invariably related to the Jaina account of cognition, affection, and conation. In the present volume it has been our attempt to present a psychological analysis of the doctrine.

COGNITION

Consciousness is the essential characteristic of the self. It is present in all the states of existence. It is a permanent factor of life that undergoes various changes. Cognition is a particular modification, i.e., manifestation of consciousness. The Jaina thinkers, just like other Indian philosophers, recognize two chief varieties of cognition: indeterminate and determinate. The former is known as *darśana*, i.e., apprehension and the latter is called *jñāna*, i.e., comprehension. Each of them is again divided into different kinds. Since the soul is the source of consciousness, it possesses infinite cognition. It also possesses infinite power and infinite bliss. Thus, if a soul were in its pristine state, it would enjoy infinite apprehension, infinite comprehension, infinite bliss, and infinite power. The mundane souls do not possess these faculties in their perfection, since they are obscured and distorted on account of their association with the obscuring (*ghātin*) karmas.

PRINCIPLE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The theory of soul holds that the principle of consciousness must be a substantial entity, for psychic phenomena are activities, and no activity is possible unless there exists an agent. Since the modifications of consciousness are immaterial in character, the substantial agent must also be something immaterial. It cannot be brain, because the brain is composed of matter. William James admits that to posit a conscious principle influenced in some mysterious way by the brain-states and responding to them by conscious affections of its own, seems to be the line of least logical resistance. Likewise, Mary Whiton Calkins holds that the self, far from being merely a metaphysical concept, was an ever-present fact of immediate experience and fully worthy to be made the central fact in a system of scientific psychology. The Jaina thinkers believe in a permanent principle of consciousness undergoing different modifications. This principle is not a material entity but an immaterial substance independent of the body as well as the brain. The self is directly experienced owing to the realisation of 'I' in 'I did, I do, and I shall do'. The self which is the substratum of thought-activities, is self-evident owing to its activities being self-evident. The attributes like cognition, etc., cannot be ascribed to the body, inasmuch as the body has a form, i.e., material shape, whereas cognition

is devoid of form. The substance possessing material shape cannot be the cause of immaterial qualities. Hence, the body cannot be the source of cognition. It is the self which is the cause of all conscious activities. Consciousness is the very essence of self and not an adventitious quality, since the very existence of self is dependent upon consciousness.

APPREHENSION AND COMPREHENSION

As regards indeterminate cognition, i.e., apprehension, the Indian schools of psychology hold slightly different opinions. The Buddhists hold that indeterminate cognition apprehends only the unique momentary thing-in-itself shorn of all relations. The Sāṅkhya holds that indeterminate cognition is purely presentative in character. It is free from all associations of name, class, etc. The Vaiśeṣika maintains that indeterminate cognition is nothing but an immediate apprehension of the mere form of an object that arises just after the contact of the object with a sense-organ. The Naiyāyika also upholds the same view. The Bhāṭṭa maintains that just after peripheral stimulation there arises an undefined and indeterminate knowledge. It is pure and simple, just like the simple apprehension of a baby. The Prābhākara says that indeterminate cognition is not the apprehension of mere individual object which is the substratum of its generic and specific qualities, but it also cognises the general and particular qualities of the object without comprehending their distinction. The Śaṅkarite holds that indeterminate cognition does not cognise any qualification. It apprehends merely the unqualified 'Being'. The Rāmānujite maintains that indeterminate cognition apprehends an object attributed by some qualities and not devoid of all qualifications. Regarding the nature of indeterminate cognition (*darśana*), the Jaina thinkers can be classified into three blocs. Some hold that the introspection of the self is of the nature of apprehension, i.e., indeterminate cognition (*darśana*), whereas the observation of an external object falls under the category of comprehension, i.e., determinate cognition (*jñāna*). Both of them cognise their objects with both generic and specific qualities. The distinction of the two is that apprehension is purely introspective in character, while comprehension is observational in nature. Virasena, Brahmadeva, etc., are the advocates of this view. Some others believe that apprehension is the knowledge of the generic characters of an

object without the cognition of its specific attributes. Comprehension, on the other hand, is the knowledge of the specific characters of the object. Nemicaṇḍra is one of the exponents of this view. There are still others who hold that apprehension is the first stage of cognition where a person is barely conscious of the existence of a particular object. It originates just after the contact of the object with the sense. The same fact is expressed by Hemacandra in a negative fashion like this: Apprehension is the cognition of an object which does not take into consideration any specific determinations. It takes place immediately after the sense-object-contact. Apprehension is the stuff which is transformed into comprehension. In other words, apprehension itself undergoes transformation into the subsequent state of cognition, i.e., comprehension. Thus, the object of comprehension is essentially the same as that of apprehension. Of the three views, the last one seems to be more rational, psychological, and satisfactory.

TEMPORAL RELATION BETWEEN APPREHENSION AND COMPREHENSION

As regards the temporal relation between the occurrences of apprehension and comprehension in an imperfect person, the Jaina thinkers are unanimous. All of them admit that there is no simultaneous occurrence of both of them in imperfect beings like us. Regarding the case of a perfect person i.e., an omniscient, there is no unanimity among them. They can again be classified into three blocs. Some like Umāsvāti, Kundakunda, Pūjyapāda, Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda, and others hold that the apprehension and comprehension in the omniscient occur simultaneously. Some others like Jinabhadra, etc., hold that the appearance of apprehension and comprehension in the omniscient is successive and not simultaneous. Siddhasena regards the apprehension and comprehension of the omniscient as identical and not as separate. He says that we can distinguish between apprehension and comprehension upto the stage of telepathy (*manahpariyaya*.) In the state of omniscience, however, they are identical. Since the destruction of apprehension-obscuring (*darśanāvaraṇa*) karma and comprehension-obscuring (*jñānāvaraṇa*) karma is synchronous, the dawnings of perfect apprehension and perfect comprehension also occur at the same time. Because of the impossibility of the occurrence of two con-

scious activities at the same time, the apprehension and comprehension of the omniscient are identical. Siddhasena, thus, concludes that the apprehension and comprehension of the omniscient emerge simultaneously, last for ever, and remain identical. Now, which of these three views is correct? It is an established fact that two conscious activities in one and the same person cannot occur simultaneously. If they seem to occur, they are, really speaking, not two but one. It is also true that the cognition of a perfect person is pure and complete, and hence, in him, apprehension and comprehension cannot arise in succession. Therefore, as regards this problem, Siddhasena's view is tangible as well as tenable. The knowledge of the omniscient is a complex of apprehension and comprehension in which both of them lose their individual identity and form a unique pattern that possesses the characters of both of them, even though they arise neither successively nor simultaneously. He cognises the objects as they are in themselves. He knows the things-in-themselves.

SENSORY AND MENTAL COMPREHENSION

The Jaina admits of two types of comprehension (*jñāna*): sensory and mental and supra-sensory. The essential conditions of sensory and mental comprehension are the sense-organs and mind. The emergence of supra-sensory comprehension which is also known as extra-sensory perception, is not conditioned by any of these instruments, but it is directly derived from the soul which is the principle of conscious activities. The presence of the object and light which is generally regarded to be the additional conditions of visual perception, is treated by the Jaina as one of the remote conditions just as time, space, and the like are. Moreover, he admits that the object and light are of direct service to the cause of the removal of the respective obscuring karma. He argues that because of the lack of concomitance in difference (*avyatirekāt*) they are not regarded as the essential conditions of sensory comprehension. It is a fact that the cats, etc., perceive in a place steeped in thick pall of darkness; the perception (*illusion*) of water takes place in mirage in the desert.

SENSE-ORGANS

The sense-organs are five in number: tactual, gustatory, olfactory, visual, and auditory. They have for their characteristic the

capacity of prehending touch, taste, odour, colour, and sound respectively. Each of these is of two varieties: physical and psychical. The physical senses are caused by the manifestation of physique-making (*nāman*) karma. The cause of the psychical senses is in the shape of the destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayaopaśama*) of cognition-obscuring karma. In this state of karma, the 'completely obscuring' (*sarva-ghātin*) karmic particles that are manifesting themselves are destroyed, those in latent existence are subsided, and the 'partially obscuring' (*deśa-ghātin*) ones continue to rise. The physical sense-organs are in definite shapes possessed of the material particles. They are of two types: the organ itself and its protecting environment. A psychical sense is also of two kinds: attainment and activity. Attainment is the acquisition of the potential sense-activity. Activity is a particular conscious modification of the self through which it is directed to the physical sense-organ roused toprehend its respective object.

MOTOR ORGANS

The Sāṅkhya holds that besides the five sensory organs there are five motor organs as well. They are the organs of speech, prehension, locomotion, evacuation, and generation. The Jaina maintains that only those which are the conditions of specific cognitions should be treated of under the head of *indriya* (sense-organ). If tongue, hands, feet, etc., are regarded as separate *indriyas*, many other organs should also be admitted as such. The throat discharges the function of swallowing food, the shoulders perform that of carrying burdens, and so on. Why should they be excluded from the list of *indriyas*, inasmuch as, as the vocal organ, etc., are instruments of particular varieties of physical action, so also the throat, etc., are instruments of particular kinds of bodily action. The rank of an *indriya* should be accorded to a sensory organ only, and not to a motor organ. From the five specific cognitions it follows that there are only five sense-organs.

MIND

Mind is generally recognized as the internal sense-organ through which pleasure, pain, etc., are experienced. The Jaina psychologist also regards mind as the internal instrument of apprehension and comprehension. It is not a sense-organ in the ordinary sense, since

it does not occupy a particular site in the body as the other sense-organs do, nor does it last for a long period like the other senses. It is called *quasi-sense* (*anindriya*), since it is not of the status of an external sense-organ such as eye, ear, etc. It is further maintained that mind is the organ of cognition of all objects of all the senses. In other words, all objects of all the external senses, and not specifically determined such as colour is of the visual sense; are cognised by the mind. It is also of two types just like the five sense-organs: physical and psychical. The physical mind is in the shape of the material particles transformed into it. The stuff of which it is composed is technically known as '*manovargaṇā*' which means the group of atoms competent to form the mind. The psychical mind is nothing but the conscious activity of the self apt to cognise an object which consists in the destruction-cum-subsidence of the relevant obscuring karma.

SENSE-OBJECT-CONTACT

With the solitary exception of the visual sense, all the external sensesprehend their objects coming in direct contact with them. The Jaina, unlike the Sāṅkhya, holds that the senses do not move to their objects in the form of modifications but the objects themselves come in contact with the senses. The senses remain in the same state as they are situated in their sites. The mind, it goes without saying, cognises its objects without having any conjunction with them.

NON-VERBAL SENSORY AND MENTAL COMPREHENSION

Sensory and mental comprehension is of two kinds: verbal (*śruta*) and non-verbal (*mati*). The essential condition of non-verbal comprehension is the destruction-cum-subsidence of *matijñānāvaraṇa* karma—the first species of comprehension obscuring karma. The generation of verbal comprehension is essentially conditioned by the destruction-cum-subsidence of *śruta-jñānāvaraṇa* karma—the second type of comprehension-obscuring karma. Other conditions that help in producing these comprehensions are auxiliary, and not essential. The Jaina thinkers classify non-verbal comprehension into four categories: sensation (*avagraha*), speculation (*īhā*), perception or perceptual judgment, (*avāya*), and retention (*dhāraṇā*). Sensation is a vague cognition of the distinctive nature of an object following the apprehension of its existence emerging just

after the contact of a sense-organ with its object. Speculation is the cognition that follows in the wake of sensation. It knows the object more distinctly. It enquires more facts about the specific characters of the object. Speculation should not be confused with doubt, inasmuch as doubt is that mental state which relates to many contradictory features, is not capable of differentiating the true from the false, whereas speculation is the mental state striving for the ascertainment of the truth on the ground of implicit reasoning which is to be successful at the next stage. Perception is the cognition that follows in the wake of speculation. The enquiry that starts at the stage of speculation attains completion in this stage of comprehension. It involves the ascertainment of the right and the exclusion of the wrong. It is the final determination of the specific feature of an object. Retention is the act of retaining what has been perceived. At this stage the judgment that has been obtained in the stage of perception, becomes so firm that it does not lapse for a particular length of period. It involves three stages: the absence of lapse of the perceptual judgment, the formation of mental trace, and the recollection thereof in the future. In short, retention is the absence of forgetting the same of what has been cognised by perception. It is the essential condition of recollection.

RECOLLECTION AND RECOGNITION

Recollection, recognition, reasoning, and the like are also included in the same category of non-verbal comprehension. Recollection is the cognition that has the stimulus of a latent mental trace for its condition. It refers to its content by a form of the pronoun 'that'. The external conditions such as the observation of similar objects and the like help in rousing the latent mental trace. Recognition is a synthetic judgment born of the joint activity of perception and recollection. It involves such forms of communication as 'that necessarily is it', 'it is like that', 'this is different from that', and so on.

REASONING

Reasoning is the cognition that helps in drawing certain conclusions. It elaborates the material acquired and conserved by perception, retention, etc. It helps us in getting a glimpse of the remote past, unseen present, and distant future. It is in the form of a mental process of passing from some given judgments to a

new one. It adopts two forms: inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning. In the former, we draw a general conclusion from particular cases. In the latter, particular conclusions are drawn from universal premises.

VERBAL COMPREHENSION

Verbal comprehension is the cognition derived from the reading or hearing of words of trustworthy persons. It is necessarily preceded by non-verbal comprehension, inasmuch as perception of words is essential for its emergence. Bhadrabāhu enumerates eight qualities necessary to give rise to it: desire for hearing (including-reading), repeated questioning, attentive hearing, grasping, enquiry, conviction, retention, and right action. Conscious exercise of the faculty of language is the essential condition of verbal comprehension. Jinabhadra formulates the following definition of verbal comprehension: The knowledge that comes into being owing to the activity of the senses and mind, is possessed of proper words in accordance with the conventional application, and is capable of expressing its contents clearly, is verbal comprehension, whereas the rest is non-verbal comprehension. Speculation, simple judgment, etc., are also possessed of proper language, nonetheless, they come under the category of non-verbal comprehension, since they do not possess any deliberate application of language. Because language is an exceedingly important instrument of conveying knowledge to others, therefore, it is held to be the cardinal factor of verbal comprehension. Sometimes we make use of physical gestures in place of language to convey our intention to others. Verbal comprehension performs two-fold function: In the form of knowledge it reveals its contents to the knower himself, while in the shape of verbal expression it reveals its contents to others as well.

EXTRA-SENSORY PERCEPTION

Excepting the schools of Cārvāka and Mīmāṃsā all the schools of Indian psychology admit of the possibility of the occurrence of extra-sensory perception. They believe that the person possessing the peculiar power of supra-sensory comprehension can cognise the past as well as the future. This conception is of hoary antiquity in India. Those who have worked on scientific lines in modern age on the problem of extra-sensory perception also admit of the possibility of cognition independent of the assistance of the senses and mind.

They hold that clairvoyance and telepathy are primary data of scientific observation. Those endowed with this power can grasp the secret thoughts of other individuals without using their sense-organs. They also perceive events more or less remote in space and time. They realise that telepathy or some mode of acquiring knowledge which is super-normal, must be admitted, because in case of refusal of such a cognition we stand helpless in the face of well-attested phenomena which neither can be accounted for nor can be rejected.

CLAIRVOYANCE

The Jaina admits of three types of extra-sensory perception: clairvoyance which he calls *avadhi*, telepathy which is named *manah-paryaya*, and omniscience or *sarvajñatva*. Omniscience occurs on the entire annihilation of all the obscuring (*ghātin*) karmic veils. But when there are differences in the removal of these veils, there occur two varieties of supra-sensory perception, viz., clairvoyance and telepathy.

The jurisdiction of clairvoyance is confined to material objects. The highest type of clairvoyance can perceive all the objects possessing form. However, it cannot cognise all the modes of all of them. The lowest type of clairvoyance perceives the object occupying a very small fraction of space.

TELEPATHY

Telepathy is the cognition of the states of the minds of others. The mind, according to the Jaina doctrine of karma, is a peculiar material substance transformed into the act of thinking. Its different states are nothing but the various modes emerging into the acts of thought. The direct cognition of these modes independent of the assistance of the sense-organs and mind is called telepathy. It is confined to the abode of human beings. Its emergence is conditioned by the possession of a particular type of conduct. In other words, the person possessing the faculty of telepathy is necessarily an ascetic. His character must be of a higher type. The Jaina admits of two varieties of telepathy: *ṛjumati* and *vipulamati*. The latter variety is purer and everlasting, i.e., lasts up to the dawn of omniscience. The former one is less pure and sometimes trembles, too. The function of telepathy is in the shape of the direct comprehension

of the states of the mind that is engaged in thinking of the external objects. It cognises the objects through the medium of mind, and not directly. If it is admitted, as some Jaina thinkers do admit, that telepathy cognises directly the contents of the mind, the knowledge of a non-material entity would be direct, for a thinker may think of a non-material object as well. But this position is against the Jaina theory of knowledge, since no person who is not omniscient, can know directly a non-material entity, according to the Jaina belief. Hence, telepathy comprehends the objects through the medium of mind, i.e., indirectly. It perceives only the mind directly. The perception of telepathy is more lucid and purer than that of clairvoyance.

OMNISCIENCE

Omniscience is the supreme of all extra-sensory perceptions. It is nothing but the perfect manifestation of the innate nature of the principle of consciousness arising on the complete dissociation of all the obscuring karmic veils. It perceives all the objects with all their modes. To justify the concept of omniscience it is argued that the progressive development of knowledge must reach its completion somewhere, because this is the way of all progression. The highest limit of the progressive development of knowledge is in the form of omniscience. It is the culmination of the faculty of cognition of a living being.

FEELING AND THE OMNISCIENT

The Jaina account of sense-feeling and emotion is, no doubt, a very significant contribution to the early psychological studies of Indian thinkers. It is, to a certain extent, also verifiable by the observations of modern psychologists. We ought to admit that the ancient thinkers had no experimental basis for their speculations. They simply used to introspect and draw certain conclusions. This fact is common to both the East and the West.

Feeling denotes the simple states of pleasure and pain as well as the complex states of emotion. The first variety is simply called sense-feeling. It necessarily presupposes sense-perception. The stimulus that gives rise to it is the external cause, whereas the internal cause is in the shape of the rise of feeling-producing karma. We are somewhat surprised to note that the omniscient also pos-

sesses organic feelings, even though he is not in possession of sensory perception. To argue that because of the physical body he possesses he has to feel is not a satisfactory explanation, inasmuch as just as in spite of the body he does not cognise with his sense-organs so also he may not feel despite the body he possesses. Furthermore, the feelings of pleasure and pain are necessarily related to the emotions of liking and disliking. The omniscient who is free from all emotion, logically speaking, cannot have any feeling of pleasure and pain.

PLEASURE AND PAIN

The essential cause of pleasure as well as pain is the karma corresponding to it. The external object that is generally understood to be the sole cause of a particular type of feeling is only a helping cause. If such is not the case a thing which is pleasurable to me would also be pleasurable to others. But our experience does not tell so.

The Jaina psychologist does not agree with Schopenhauer who regards pain to be positive in character and pleasure to be negative in nature. According to the Jaina theory of karma, the feeling of pleasure as well as pain is produced on account of the rise of feeling-producing karma. The rise in both cases is positive in character. Hence, both pleasure and pain are positively real. The absolute negation of feeling is nothing but the absence of feeling. In such a state of consciousness there is no feeling at all. Regarding the controversy of neutral feelings, the Jaina, unlike the Buddhist, does not recognize any such category. All feeling is categorically divided into two types: pleasant and painful. There is no possibility of a feeling which is neither pleasurable nor painful. Similarly, pleasure and pain cannot co-exist in a mixture. The so-called mixed feelings are nothing but various successions of pleasure and pain. In these cases either pleasure is followed by pain or pain by pleasure. Both of them cannot arise simultaneously, since no two conscious activities occur at one and the same moment. It is, no doubt, a fact that pleasure can immediately follow pain and *vice versa*. The argument advanced by the Jaina philosophers is that because of the antagonism of the two pleasure and pain cannot arise simultaneously. In our opinion, no two conscious activities can synchronise. It is immaterial whether they are antagonistic or not.

EMOTION

An emotion is a mental excitement usually coloured with pleasure or pain. All our emotions arise due to the rise of conduct-deluding karma. This being the case the place of deluding- (*mohanīya*) karma is exceedingly significant in the Jaina doctrine of karma. This type of karma is the chief factor in determining the nature of all our emotions, attitudes, and activities. This is the reason why with the destruction of *mohanīya* karma our entire worldly status is shocked and ultimately extinguished. We have two varieties of emotions: strong and mild. Strong emotions are called passions and mild emotions *quasi*-passions. The number of passions is sixteen and that of *quasi*-passions is nine. What is the logical strength behind these numbers we do not know. We have no argument at our disposal to prove their exactness. We have simply followed the writers in discussing the nature and functions thereof with some critical remarks here and there.

STRONG EMOTIONS

Anger is nothing but a response to some frustration real or imaginary. It is generally expressed in the form of an impulse to break and destroy anything that comes to hand. Sometimes it takes the form of revenge and aggression. Pride is the outcome of ego-identification. It is manifested in the shape of self-assertion and self-display. Deceit is the root cause of telling a lie to deceive others. All fraudulence is due to the emotion of deceit. Greed is stated to be the state of attachment. It is due to dissatisfaction of our desires and ambitions. The mainsprings of our worldly conduct are the cravings produced by dissatisfaction of our desires. Each of these four passions is again of four varieties in accordance with the intensity of its nature and functions. Thus, the passions are four multiplied by four or sixteen in number.

MILD EMOTIONS

The *quasi*-passions or mild emotions are nine in number. Of these, three are sexual and six are non-sexual in nature. The non-sexual *quasi*-passions are laughter, sorrow, liking, disliking, disgust, and fear. Laughter includes smiling, joking and ludicrous. These are the different forms of joy. Sorrow is opposed to joy. Crying, weeping, and the like are the most common forms of sorrow. Liking is

the love for others that grows out of the pleasure or satisfaction we obtain from the presence or companionship of others. Sympathy is also included in it. Disliking is contrary to liking. Disgust is only a developed state of disliking. In it we positively hate the thing we do not like. Fear is an insistent desire to escape. It is directed to some threatening situation, real or imaginary, with which we do not feel safe. Terror and anxiety are the forms of fear. The rapidity of increasing fear leads to terror. The anticipatory danger produces anxiety. Hope is an important emotion which is opposed to anxiety. It is not discussed in the Jaina works on karma separately. The Jaina thinkers mention seven types of fear: fear of our own class, fear of another class, fear of protection, fanciful fear, fear of pain, fear of death, and fear of dishonour.

SEX-DRIVE

Sexual emotions are three in number. Two of them, viz., male sex and female sex are quite familiar. The third sex is a mixture of the two. It is the strongest sex-drive according to the Jaina theory of sex. It includes both homosexuality and heterosexuality and is not of the nature of frigidity or impotency.

CO-EXISTENCE OF EMOTIONS

Regarding the co-existence of various emotions, we have to state only this much that the different combinations recognized by the Jaina thinkers are not agreeable to us. It is our definite opinion that in any case no two conscious activities can synchronise. Neither two cognitions nor two feelings nor two volitions can occur at the same moment. At a particular moment we are conscious of one and one event only. The moment our conscious activity is drawn towards another event the previous one automatically extinguishes. Hence, it is an impossibility to attend more than one emotion at a particular time.

VARIETIES OF ATTITUDE

As regards differences of emotion, attitude, and activity, the Jaina doctrine of karma prescribes six varieties. These varieties of individual differences are very helpful in understanding the nature of human behaviour. It is all due to the varying degrees of the effects of karma. The Uttarādhyayana-sūtra deals with these varieties elaborately. It mentions eleven standpoints: name, colour, taste,

smell, touch, degree, character, variety, duration, result, and life. Our inquiry is confined only to those characters that are psychologically valuable.

ACTIVITY AND YOGA

Activity is the essence of life. The Jaina holds that the self possesses an innate capacity of activity known as energy (*vīrya*). On account of the rise of power-obscuring karma this innate capacity is distorted. This distorted energy is manifested in the form of the activities of body, speech, and mind. These three types of activities are called *Yoga* in the Jaina system. Thus, the traditional meaning of the Jaina *Yoga* is directly opposed to that of the Pātañjala *Yoga*. Patañjali defines *Yoga* as the cessation of mental activities, whereas according to the Jaina, *Yoga* is nothing but the activities of mind, etc. The later Jaina writers have defined *Yoga* also in the sense of the control and arrest of activities.

MENTAL ACTIVITIES

Mind is the internal sense-organ. It cognises all the objects of the external senses. The Jainas hold that all our mental activities can be classified into four kinds: true, untrue, true and untrue, and neither true nor untrue. A true mental activity corresponds to its object. A mental activity that does not correspond to its object is untrue. A mental activity is said to be true and untrue if it is partly true and partly false. Our desires, purposes, inclinations, etc., are of the fourth kind. Such activities of thought are neither true nor untrue, since they have no corresponding objects. They are more or less our own creations.

VOCAL ACTIVITIES

Vocal activity is in the form of speech. Speech is a particular form of sound resulting from the rise of physique-making karma. The activities of speech are also of four kinds: true, untrue, true and untrue, and neither true nor untrue. These four kinds of speech are exactly like those of mental activity.

PHYSICAL ACTIVITIES

According to Jaina conception, there are five types of bodies: gross, transformable, projectable, electric, and karmic. According to different combinations of these five types, the Jainas recognise seven types of physical activities: activity of gross body, that of

transformable body, that of projectable body, that of karmic body, activity of gross body mixed with that of karmic body, activity of transformable body with that of karmic body or mixed with that of gross body, and activity of projectable body mingled with that of gross body. The activity of electric body is not counted separately, since it is always connected with the activity of karmic body, inasmuch as electric body and karmic body always co-exist. This position does not seem to be logical. We have no reason to believe that a particular activity always associated with another activity should lose its independent existence. If they perform different functions, they have an equal right to enjoy an independent existence. Moreover, it is not a profitable concept to hold that karmic body and electric body always synchronise. The activity of transformable body and that of projectable body never exist together, for it is an impossibility to co-exist both these bodies. The reason is that the conditions required for the possession of these two bodies are of opposite nature. The activity of projectable body cannot co-exist with the activity of karmic body, since the activity of projectable body is performed at a distant place where karmic body does not exist. Regarding the activity of gross body, the Jainas do not hold the same position. On the contrary, they maintain that the activity of projectable body and that of gross body can synchronise. At the time of projectable body's dissociation from and re-association with gross body, the activities of both of them occur simultaneously. We can advance the same argument in the case of karmic body and say that the activities of projectable body and karmic body also co-exist. The Jaina writers however, do not accept this position without advancing any rational argument.

CONTROL OF ACTIVITY

The problem of control, regulation, and stoppage of all our activities is one of capital importance in the Jaina doctrine of karma. Indian psychology discusses this problem chiefly under the head *Yoga*. In Jaina psychology the stoppage of activities is called *saṁvara*. Through it we can check the inflow of new karmic matter as well as annihilate the acquired one. This constitutes the path to self-realisation.

MEANS OF THE CONTROL

There are certain essential conditions recognized by the Jaina thinkers for the successful control, regulation, and cessation of various activities. Following them the final spiritual emancipation can be attained. The Buddhists, the adherents of the Pātañjala Yoga, and others prescribe similar conditions of self-discipline. The eight-fold path of self-discipline of Patañjali is familiar to us. The Buddhists attach great importance to meditation. They recognize four stages of meditation: *vitarka*, *vicāra*, *sukha*, and *upekṣā*. Through these stages we can control our mental activities. The Jaina prescribes the following conditions for the control of various activities and the realisation of final liberation: self-regulation, moral virtue, contemplation, conquest of affliction, auspicious conduct, and austerity. Self-regulation consists in the control of the five-fold activities, viz., walking, speaking, receiving of something, keeping of things, and performing of excretional activities. Moral virtues are ten in number: forbearance, modesty, straightforwardness, contentment, truthfulness, self-restraint, austerity, renunciation, non-attachment, and celibacy. Contemplation consists in repeated thinking of a particular idea or object. A self-disciplined person is required to contemplate the following twelve-fold objects: the fleeting nature of things, the helplessness of the individual, the miserable nature of the world, the loneliness of the worldly sojourn, the distinctness of the self from the body, the impure character of the body, the conditions and consequences of the inflow of karmic matter, the means for the stoppage of the inflow, the conditions of the dissociation of karmic matter from the self, the nature of the constituents of the universe, the difficulty of the attainment of enlightenment, and the true nature of reality. The Jaina gives a list of twenty-two troubles to be learnt and conquered by one practising self-control. Hunger, thirst, cold, heat, nakedness, isolation, begging, etc., are some of the troubles. The Buddhists do not attach much importance to the conquest of various afflictions. The Jaina thinkers have recognized five stages of auspicious conduct. The first stage is known as *sāmāyika*. A person belonging to it does not do any harm to others. He develops the sense of equanimity. The second stage is called *chedopasthāna*. At this stage the individual begins to follow the path of self-discipline rigorously. The

third stage is known as *parihāra-viśuddhi*. The individual observes a particular type of austerity in this stage. The fourth stage is known as *sūkṣma-samparāya*. One belonging to this stage suffers from some subtle passions. The last stage is called *yathākhyāta*. In this stage the self-disciplined person possesses perfect and pure conduct. All his passions and emotions are annihilated.

PHYSICAL AUSTERITY

There are two varieties of austerity: physical and mental which are also called external and internal. The Jainas, the followers of Yoga, and to some extent the Buddhists, too, recognize the value of both these types of austerity. It is a fact that physical mortification is essential for a successful self-control. It should, of course, not be practised for its own sake. It is welcome so long as it serves the cause of self-discipline. The Jaina philosophers admit this fact. They say that the six forms of physical austerity practised in a right manner result in non-attachment, lightness of body, conquest of the senses, protection of self-discipline, and finally annihilation of karmic particles. Some mystics also establish the same fact. They maintain that the object of mortification is to kill the old self, break up its egoistic attachments and cravings. Mortification is not an end in itself. It is a process, an education directed towards the production of a definite kind of efficiency. It tends to subject the body to the spirit.

MEDITATION

Meditation is the chief constituent of internal austerity. It includes all the four requisites of self-discipline advocated by Patañjali, viz., withdrawal (*pratyāhāra*) concentration (*dhāraṇā*), meditation (*dhyāna*), and ecstasy (*samādhi*). It is defined as the fixation of thought on a particular object by a person of excellent physical structure. The act of meditation is conditioned by the possession of a strong and healthy mind. The possession of strong mind is invariably related to the possession of excellent body. Thus, successful meditation is necessarily conditioned by a strong physical construction. A particular act of concentration can never last for more than forty-eight minutes. The Jaina does not admit the capacity of mind to concentrate any longer than the said period. He, of course, admits its capacity of re-concentration.

KINDS OF MEDITATION

Meditation is classified into four varieties: mournful concentration (*ārta-dhyāna*), cruel concentration (*raudra-dhyāna*), inquisitive concentration (*dharma-dhyāna*), and metaphysical concentration (*śukla-dhyāna*). Each of them is again of four types. Mournful concentration and cruel concentration are of sinful nature, hence, a person of self-control should avoid their practice. The rest two varieties are to be practised. At the last stage of metaphysical concentration, first of all, the mental activities of the meditator are completely stopped, then his vocal activities are arrested, and lastly, all his physical activities are stopped. This is the completion of the control of activities. Now, the self exists in its pristine nature. This state is free from all fear, all delusion, all attachment, all aversion, all physical, vocal, and mental activities. There is no inflow of new karmic matter, no accumulation of previous karmas.

EIGHT STAGES OF SELF-REALISATION

Exactly like the eight-fold path of self-discipline in Yoga, Hari-bhadra has given a lucid description of self-realisation according to Jainism. He has given a list of eight stages of self-discipline leading to the complete cessation of all our activities. These stages are styled as *mitrā*, *tārā*, *balā*, *dīprā*, *sthirā*, *kāntā*, *prabhā*, and *parā*. Of these, the first four are fallible and unsteady, while the last four are not so. At the first stage one has very faint spiritual light. At the second stage the enlightenment is a bit distinct. One possessing it is in a position to practise self-restraint. The third stage is possessed of more distinct enlightenment. One possessing it is capable of the control of various postures. At the fourth stage one gets control over breath. For him, spiritual realisation is more valuable than life. At the fifth stage one is capable of deep thinking and good conduct. He withdraws his senses from external objects. The sixth stage is in the form of spiritual concentration. At the seventh stage the individual develops self-meditation. His power of right discrimination is fully developed. The eighth stage is the consummation of the previous stages. The individual now attains ecstasy. He gradually destroys all his obscuring (*ghātīn*) karmas and achieves omniscience. In course of time the non-obscuring (*aghātīn*) karmas are also annihilated. Thus,

he attains final liberation and is completely free from karmic matter.

TRANSMIGRATION

The theory of transmigration presupposes the doctrine of karma. It also takes for granted the existence of a permanent conscious principle that undergoes various changes. The conscious principle, i.e., the soul passes through births and deaths without losing its essential nature. This very fact is to be understood as the theory of transmigration or metempsychosis. The force responsible for the successful performance of this process is known as karma. It is wholly on account of our own accumulated karmic forces that we enter into a human form, an animal form, a vegetable form, a celestial form, or a hellish form. As the situation of the forces that perform the functions of karma changes so also the form of our individuality changes. The personality made up of mental and physical characters is due to the working of karmic forces. All such phenomena as the extra-ordinary maturity of some children at an early age, the super-normal psycho-physical development of an ordinary person, and the like that cannot be explained by an average hypothesis necessarily indicate that something of which we have no empirical experience must have existed before actual birth. The Psychical Researchers also agree in thinking that the evidence in favour of the spiritistic hypothesis is now so strong that it may be justifiably employed as a working hypothesis. They admit that there is a strong evidence to prove survival. In the Jaina doctrine of karma, the karma that draws the soul to that body where it develops its own body for the working out of its accumulated karmas for that particular birth is known as '*ānupūrvi*'. In accordance with the four states of existence (*gati*), there are four types of '*ānupūrvi*': celestial, human, animal (including vegetable), and infernal.

PROGRESSION AND RETROGRESSION

The Jaina philosophers, exactly like the other exponents of the theory of transmigration, hold that the individual has no choice but to reap the fruits of his actions. On some occasions the fruits are enjoyed in this very life, while sometimes they are enjoyed in a life hereafter. The Jaina thinkers do not agree with the belief that once consciousness attains to human level, there is no return; though man may become a super-man, he will never be less than

man. They hold that the soul of a human being can return to animals and so on. The soul is not a principle of Evolution. It is not necessarily developed gradually and stage by stage. Essentially every soul is of the same kind. All variegated forms of life are attributed to the karmic forces associated with the worldly soul from beginningless time. These forces may lead the soul to a higher as well as a lower state of existence in accordance with their innate nature. The Jaina, thus, does believe and perhaps rightly in the so-called retrogression of human souls into animal forms.

CLASSES OF BEINGS

There are four chief classes of beings recognized by the Jaina: the beings living in the state of heavenly existence, those living in the state of infernal existence, those enjoying the state of human existence, and those living in the animal state of existence. The last class also includes in it the vegetable kingdom, water, air, fire, etc. Each of these classes is further divided into different sub-classes. The soul attains a particular state of life on account of the rise or realisation of the corresponding physique-making (*nāman*) karma and it lasts so long as the age-determining (*āyus*) karma associated with the soul is not exhausted. After the exhaustion of its age-determining karma the soul takes a new birth according to the then existing condition of its stored karmas. If there is no karma in its possession, it automatically attains emancipation and enjoys its pristine nature.

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